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Introduction 
“Economists and psychologists rely on widely divergent 
assumptions about human behavior in constructing their 
theories” (Chugh & Bazerman, 2004). 
 
Business scandals such as the “Ford Pinto memo”, in which managers relied on a cost-benefit 
analysis in order to evaluate a fuel tank modification which was known to possibly result in 
fatalities associated with crash-induced fuel leakage and consequent fires, not only renew 
attention on business ethics and responsibility of corporations and their managers, but also 
raise fundamental questions about the origin of “unethical” behavior. 
Investigating the roots of unethical practices has drawn continuous attention in business 
literature and beyond. Ayton (a psychologist) asserts that the foundations of traditional 
decision-making research - and hence its‟ contemporary shape - have been strongly 
influenced by thinking from economical (and mathematical) disciplines. This influence has 
left its mark, as he argues, as economists and mathematicians have different “concerns” 
compared to psychologists. The question posed and pursued by the different thinkers on this 
topic was often not how people actually do make decisions but how, ideally, decisions should 
be made (Ayton, 2005). Consequently, research on “ethical failures” has mostly led to the 
development and refinement of normative theories on which moral imperatives should be 
taken into consideration during conscious ethical thought, resulting in theories of “optimal” 
moral reasoning and judgments, of which all, according to Painter-Morland (2008), find their 
philosophical justification in a specific worldview and anthropology. 
The Ford Pinto memo, where the managers involved insisted that they did not “sense” the 
ethical problem at hand and hence did not engage in conscious moral reasoning and judgment 
processes on the implications of their (implicit) decisions, shows a fundamental limitation of 
purely normative approaches to ethical decision-making. It is business scandals like these that 
provoke “renewed” interest in the roots of misconduct and the field of behavioral ethics (i.e. 
descriptive approaches to ethical decision-making) in the recent past (Molinsky & Margolis, 
2006). Descriptive (or positive) approaches to ethical decision-making add to normative 
theories arguing that unethical decisions can be made “outside the awareness of individual 
actors” - in contrast to the assumption of “deliberate cheating” (De Cremer, van Dick, 
Tenbrunsel, Pillutla & Murnighan, 2011). 
   2 
This paper acknowledges the importance of positive approaches to ethical decision-making in 
order to improve business practice, however argues that although it appears at a first glance 
that “traditional”1 descriptive approaches are helpful to better understand “unethical” 
behaviors, recent findings from behavioral ethics research indicate that the theoretical base of 
the traditional research paradigm insufficiently describes how individuals actually make 
ethical decisions.  
 
This thesis elaborates in detail on the need to drastically review the theoretical base of the 
traditional research paradigm of descriptive approaches to ethical decision-making. Because 
of the focus of behavioral ethics on actual behavior of individuals, a revision largely draws 
from work in psychology, which is considered as the “scientific study of human behavior and 
thought processes” (Quinn, 1995). This thesis hence argues that the application of 
psychological insights is elementary in order to promote our understanding of business 
scandals such as the Ford Pinto memo – or why and how “good” people with best intensions 
can behave “unethical” as well. This view is in line with Bazerman & Banaji‟s (2004) claim 
that “efforts to improve ethical decision-making are better aimed at understanding our 
psychological tendencies”. Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe (2008) too argue that it becomes 
increasingly necessary to not only “evaluate” but also understand from a psychological 
perspective how and why unethical behavior emerges, despite the presence of multiple control 
and monitoring systems. The perhaps best recent piece of evidence for the claim that 
psychological insights are valuable for business decision research is that a psychologist, 
Daniel Kahneman, shared the 2002 Nobel Prize for Economics “for having integrated insights 
from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment 
and decision-making under uncertainty” (Nobel Foundation, 2002). 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 “Traditional” descriptive research poses that (un)ethical behavior is the (unique) consequence of a series 
of conscious processes, initiated by the individual becoming aware of a moral issue, before reasoning and 
judging on moral questions. During these processes it is generally claimed that the individual follows 
rational thought aka Kantian typology to different “degrees” - without any impact of the situation or the 
environment. The theoretical base of this approach is strongly coined by Lawrence Kohlberg‟s cognitive 
moral development theory and James Rest‟s “Four Component Model”. 
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Context and research questions 
An agent may reason well in moral situations, uphold the 
strictest standards of impartiality for testing her maxims and 
moral principles, and be adept at deliberation. Yet unless she 
perceives moral situations as moral situations, and unless she 
perceives their moral character accurately, her moral 
principles and skill at deliberation will be for nought and may 
even lead her astray (Blum, 1991). 
 
Descriptive theories of ethical decision-making first matured in the second half of the past 
century. The inclusion of psychological insights into decision-making research has since then 
a history which is dominated by approaches rooted in the cognitive moral development 
theorem, mainly due to the work of Lawrence Kohlberg and James Rest. Kohlberg‟s “Theory 
of Moral Development” and Rest‟s “Four Component Model” were the first main positive 
approaches that aimed at conceptualizing the individual‟s ethical decision-making process. 
After having studied and theorized ethical decision-making, Kohlberg claimed that the level 
of moral cognitive development of individuals indicates (un)ethical behavior. And ever since 
Rest‟s Four Component Model, most descriptive theories of moral decision-making posit 
ethical behavior as the culmination of a multistage process - a process that begins with moral 
awareness or the “recognition of the moral issue”.  
 
Due to the claimed causality connections between the four different components, not only 
moral reasoning is regarded of primary importance for ethical behavior, but also moral 
awareness, since “issue interpretation is likely to set the premises within which subsequent 
thought processes take place” (Butterfield, 2000). This first component has sparked further 
interest in how theories of human cognition can be related to the ethical decision-making 
process, including some minor efforts to incorporate situational and contextual factors in their 
models (e.g. Treviño, 1986; Jones, 1991). Most additional research has been dominated by 
rationalist models (as proposed by Kohlberg and Rest) and moral awareness was commonly 
defined as the “recognition of moral reality” and thereby an individual-level phenomenon. 
Individual differences were considered as explanatory variables why some managers “see” a 
moral issue, whereas others do not. 
Based on this research paradigm, several business ethicists such as Falkenberg (2004) argue 
that managers have come under “ethical scrutiny” over recent decades due to “lack of 
maturity” of individual moral awareness and reasoning. They commonly conclude that pre-
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and conventional moral cognitive development
2
 is insufficient as a basis for ethical guidance, 
relying on the individual level of cognitive moral development as the (main) explanatory 
variable for unethical behavior, while taking contextual and situational factors - if at all - only 
partially into consideration. Approaches based on Kohlberg‟s cognitive moral development 
theory are very popular, as they are thought to help to “explain” both why some managers are 
not able to ”sense” an ethical problem, as well as how corporations and managers can differ 
on the extent of how they ”reason through” ethical decisions.  
In order to thoroughly understand the theoretical base of the cognitive moral development 
approach as well as the underlying assumptions, the first research question of this paper is 
dedicated to understanding Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s approaches and further research which 
builds on their theoretical bases. It can be formulated as follows:  
 RQ1: How do “traditional” descriptive theories of moral cognitive development as well 
as related research which builds on this approach explain (un)ethical behavior and 
what are the main underlying assumptions of (the theoretical base of) this paradigm? 
 
It will be argued in the first part of this paper that when seeking to elucidate ethical failures, 
“traditional” explanations which build on the moral cognitive development theory promote 
the idea that most business scandals are the responsibility of a few unethical “bad apples”. 
This approach is intuitively compelling and attractive to use, as DeCremer (2009) correctly 
argues, as it is a simple and straightforward solution and at the practical level facilitates the 
identification and punishment of those deemed to be responsible. 
 
When describing the ethical decision-making process, Kohlberg and Rest were quite explicit 
that the cognitive mechanisms at work involve conscious, language-based thinking, as Haidt 
(2001) asserts. In line with the Kantian tradition, Kohlberg argues that in a moral decision-
making process, individuals follow rational thought and are entirely objective human beings. 
Individuals can, according to this paradigm, “recognize” ethical challenges within a given 
context “to different extents” and be explicitly ranked e.g. on the basis to the extent to which 
their judgments on the pre-defined cases consider the judgments given as the most advanced 
(i.e. ethical). 
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 as stages of moral cognitive development according to Kohlberg 
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Yet although Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s theory created a remarkable surge in descriptive ethics 
research, it also entrenched the field into their cognitive approach. However there are ample 
empirical evidences which stumble business ethicists who base their models on the cognitive 
moral development approach. Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe (2008) argue that several empirical 
studies of “ethics” that have been published in recent time provide “clear evidence that ethical 
thinking and behavior is prone to many of the same mental processes and pitfalls, some 
outside of consciousness, as the rest of human thinking and behavior”. One critique to 
Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s paradigm, and indeed pivotal assumption of this paper, is for example 
that managers, despite being aware of prescriptive normative approaches to ethics
3
 and 
possessing advanced conscious moral reasoning skills, can nevertheless fail to perceive of 
ethical problems from a rich perspective, as this process is contingent on different moral 
capabilities as (conscious) moral reasoning.  
 
More generally, as Chugh & Bazerman (2004) assert, economists tend to assume that 
individuals are fully rational, while psychologists, and in particular behavioral decision 
researchers, tend to identify the systematic ways in which individuals depart from rationality. 
Yet, while the two disciplines have offered different predictions of how individuals e.g. react 
to external stimuli, both groups have for a long while shared the implicit assumption that 
individuals will “accurately perceive the stimuli available to them” (Chugh & Bazerman, 
2004). Several authors (such as De Cremer, van Dick, Tenbrunsel, Pillutla & Murnighan, 
Bazerman & Tenbrunsel) have recently challenged this tacit assumption that awareness is 
unbounded, and provide evidence that humans regularly and systematically fail to “see and 
use” stimuli and information (easily) available to them. 
 
Several psychological barriers to “sound” ethical awareness and decision-making, which 
support the idea that the ethical mind is bound in many more ways than commonly believed, 
are discussed in this paper. Research on the notion of moral disengagement for example 
argues that individuals generally engage in automatic processes to avoid conflicts of interest, 
which consequently bounds their ability to perceive of ethical problems. A systematic 
cognitive bias in ethical decision-making is also described by psychologist Haidt (2008), who 
argues that “our human minds are not only historically designed to e.g. unite us in teams or 
divide us against other teams, but also to “blind us to the truth”.” He considers it therefore of 
                                                 
3as e.g. communicated by their companies‟ code of conduct and mission statement 
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utmost importance to know our moral psychology in more depth in order to understand why 
and acknowledge that “everybody thinks he is right” (Haidt, 2008). 
Moreover, the bounded ethicality model suggests that individuals often, without being aware 
of it, perceive their own judgments and behaviors to be more ethical than others (i.e. see 
themselves as more ethical than their peers, co-workers, and supervisors). As in this thesis 
moral judgments are found to be necessarily made when perceiving of moral problems, this 
concept of bounded ethicality is also of primary importance for understanding the process 
when the individuals become aware of ethical problems. Shu, Gino & Bazerman (2011) 
moreover interestingly add that while the bounded ethicality perspective emphasizes how 
unethical behavior results from our lack of awareness, a new line of research (with authors 
such as Ayal & Gino, 2011; Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2009; Gino, Norton & Ariely, T, 2010) 
suggests that many of us explicitly are able to (and in fact often do) cheat with full awareness. 
They argue that individuals are even able to consciously violate ethical standards while 
maintaining a positive view of their own ethicality. 
 
Evidence of people with highly developed conscious moral reasoning skills but with “poorly 
developed awareness”, as well as clear empirical findings of people across the board seeing 
themselves as more ethical than their peers, even able to cheat with full awareness, cannot be 
explained by models based on the “traditional” cognitive moral development theory. 
Assuming that an important part of ethical decision-making, and in particular moral 
awareness, is contingent on different moral “capabilities” than conscious moral reasoning and 
judgments processes, the second part of this paper challenges the underlying assumptions of 
the moral cognitive development approach and investigates how individuals actually make 
ethical decisions,  with  a  specific  focus  on  the  systematic  ways  in  which individuals 
deviate from rationality or “optimality” in decision-making . 
The second research question is as follows 
 RQ2: What are barriers to “sound” ethical awareness and judgments that lead to 
cognitive biases, and what are their implications on the theoretical base of the moral 
cognitive development theory, and hence the understanding of the entire ethical 
decision-making process? 
 
Perdersen (2009) asserts that individuals may conceive of ethical problems in many different 
ways, and therefore claims that a moral judgment must necessarily reflect the features that are 
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deemed morally relevant by the individual. He consequently argues that it is of utmost 
importance to understand how individuals come to conceive of situations as a “morally laden 
ones”, i.e. which features of situations carry moral significance for the individual. Also this 
paper argues that understanding the content of the process how the individual sense ethical 
problem, is elementary to adequately evaluate any moral judgment. The second part of this 
paper therefore starts with elaborating in detail on questions Blum (1991) posed to all of us: 
“How do agents come to perceive situations in the way that they do and how does a situation 
come to have a particular character for a particular moral agent?” 
 
This paper argues that Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s theory of moral cognitive development 
insufficiently describes the fact that - what is truism in psychology - personality and situation 
“interact” to generate ethical thought and behavior, as do cultural and societal influences. The 
deficiency to account for contextual factors is considered a major shortfall of the theoretical 
base of the moral cognitive development theory. This is why existing theories rooted in the 
cognitive development approach must be considered to be incapable of simultaneously 
accommodating both the role of the individual moral agent and the community in which he or 
she participates, as well as the institutions with which he or she associates (Painter-Morland, 
2008). And despite relevant theories in other closely-related fields (e.g. Fiske & Taylor, 1991) 
and attempts to steer research in this direction (Treviño, 1986; Jones, 1991), business ethics 
research has generally failed to adequately address the interaction between the individual and 
his or her surroundings (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2009). 
A second major limitation of the cognitive moral development theory outlined in this paper is 
the emphasis on the role of rational thought to the point of excluding other decision-making 
processes such as intuition and emotions. Analyzing the process of how individuals become 
aware of ethical problems, Haidt (2001) conclusively shows that an individual‟s judgment 
when facing a moral problem is often intuitive and emotional. In his view, moral stimuli are 
often identified “spontaneously, unconsciously and automatically”. Moreover, as already 
highlighted above, some decision-making processes are not only intuitive and emotional, but 
also motivated. Chugh, Banaji & Bazerman (2005) argue that (in the bounded ethicality 
model) self processes work unconsciously to protect a particular view and this view “bounds” 
sound ethical judgments. Ethical decision-making must hence be considered as being “biased 
by a “stubborn” view of oneself as moral, competent, and deserving, and thus, not susceptible 
to conflicts of interest”. Since perceiving of ethical problems is found to already necessarily 
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include a value judgment, the process of ethical decision-making can consequently not be 
considered as four separate (and casually linked) steps as suggested by Rest.  
 
The view that “automatic egocentrism” often precedes an evaluative moral judgment helps to 
better understand the concept of moral blindness (or “ethical fading”) in business, in addition 
to the view that moral awareness cannot be considered a purely “technical process” of rational 
thought as suggested by Rest and Kohlberg. The difference of this former view to traditional 
approaches becomes more obvious when comparing business decisions to medical decisions. 
The decision of which medicine to prescribe for a particular condition of a patient involves 
not just making a technical decision about efficacy, but is also a value judgment concerning 
the relative acceptability of various side effects and risks, as MacDonald (2002) correctly 
asserts. The same accounts for business decisions. However, often in business, due to very 
salient technical or financial dimensions of a problem, as well as the tradition and habit to 
“camouflage” ethical issues as e.g. financial ones, managers often fail to “sense” that their 
decision has important moral implications and therefore do perceive problems wrongly and 
are morally blind. But in business as in medicine, if the clinical picture is wrong, even the best 
medicine does not help to cure the disease and can even lead to serious damage.  
 
Based on the above presented limitations of the cognitive moral development theory, the 
position is developed that managers can be “blind” to ethical dimensions of problems e.g. 
when they think that a decision can be made based purely on technical or financial criteria. 
Unethical behavior does then not necessarily have to be due to the lack of moral reasoning 
skills and moral “intensions”, as individuals do sometimes not “sense” the moral significance 
of the situation at hand. Consequently it can be argued, as Blum (1991) claims, that although 
many individuals may act unethically because they intend to, others do not “perceive” the 
relevant moral aspects of a situation and thus do not initiate in a conscious moral reasoning 
process. This indicates that unethical behavior does not need to be intentional, but that moral 
perception involves other moral capabilities as conscious moral reasoning. Hence even if 
individuals attempt to act “ethically”, they are bounded in their ability to achieve ethical 
awareness and ethical decisions, a claim which is based on the concept of bounded rationality 
suggested by Simon (1957). 
The presented argumentation supports the idea that not only prescriptive, normative moral 
theories are of importance for improving ethical decision-making, but especially positive 
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approaches (i.e. the understanding of our cognitive shortfalls). The fact that theories of 
bounded ethicality and moral disengagement can be applied to some of the great (i.e. costly) 
ethical business fiascos of our time implies that by improving moral awareness and 
competence, some future ethical catastrophes can be avoided. Therefore, the third part of this 
paper is dedicated to investigate factors that constrain, and factors that facilitate individual‟s 
ability to perceive of and judge on moral problems. The focus lies on approaches on how 
ethical decision-making of (future) managers can be improved through “moral” business 
education, as business students are believed to be at a very critical stage regarding the 
development of their perceptions about important business topics such as capitalism and 
leadership theory
4
, hence areas in which significant moral problem dimensions can reside (in 
line with Piper, Gentile & Parks, 1993). Given the pedagogical focus of this part, existing 
teaching approaches at business schools will be critically assessed. Given the mentioned 
psychological barriers to sound ethical awareness, reasoning and judgment and the 
implications on the understanding of the ethical decision-making process, the third research 
question can hence be formulated as follows: 
 RQ3: In light of the barriers to “sound” ethical decision-making due to the individual’s 
boundedness, how can moral competence of future managers be improved through 
“moral” business education? 
 
The third part of this paper addresses the question how moral competence can be improved 
based on the earlier developed view of ethical decision-making as problem-solving. The focus 
of this part lies on developing an approach on how to promote “moral” unconscious/ intuitive 
judgments of future managers (i.e. on how to reduce cognitive shortfalls in a sense of aligning 
our more unconscious intuitive judgments with our normative views). Based on the work of 
Pederson (2009) on strategies to counteract moral disengagement, a framework is developed 
which claims that the promotion of ethicality of unconscious processes happens through the 
“right” conscious experiences, which ultimately allow individuals to de-bias their cognitive 
biases. The behavioral approach to business ethics is found to be a necessary complement to 
more traditional prescriptive normative approaches, as descriptive knowledge about how the 
human mind works is crucial in order to promote the individual‟s normative views of how he 
wants decision-making to be.  
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 Yet it must be acknowledged that an undeniably important part of moral competence is developed 
throughout life 
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Structure and motivation 
This paper is a theoretical-conceptual study which builds upon existing theories and 
approaches to ethical decision-making. The thesis is divided into three yet connected parts 
along the research questions. The first part aims to introduce the reader into main approaches 
towards moral decision-making, both descriptive and prescriptive. It critically discusses 
existing concepts of the cognitive moral development theory in the second part by identifying 
barriers to sound ethical problem-solving. Building on the view that the individual ethical 
awareness and judgments are bounded in several ways, the third part of this paper is dedicated 
to investigating factors that promote the ability of managers and business students to increase 
their moral competence through business education and thereby the ability to perceive of 
ethical problems. In this context, the role of (business) education especially in influencing the 
individuals‟ unconscious psychological responses to moral aspects of decisions is critically 
discussed, and recommendations of how to conceptually increase the individuals‟ moral 
competence will be presented. At the end of this paper, remaining challenges and future 
research implications are presented. 
 
The work on this paper involved besides the consultation of economic theories other concepts 
especially from (cognitive) psychology and moral philosophy. This “cross-fertilization” is in 
line with research on other recent theories such as relating to organizational behavior, role 
theory, social learning and conflict theory, which were all partly derived from other 
disciplines, as well as with the tradition of business of “borrowing” from other disciplines 
such as anthropology, philosophy, psychology and sociology (Ferrell, Fraedrich & Ferrell, 
2008). The thesis must consequently be situated in the crossroads between several social 
sciences.  
 
The overarching purpose of the thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of ethical 
decision-making and ultimately to building what Ulrich referred to as the “new basis for a 
socio-economic rationality” and to seeking a “fruitful cross-fertilization” of several social 
sciences with the core topics of economics and business administration (Ulrich, 2002 in 
Pedersen, 2009). This paper will hopefully serve as a basis for critical reflection and 
discussion on the nature of unethical behavior for managers, business educators as well as 
business students, sensitize them to psychological cognitive barriers of “sound” ethical 
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judgments and finally give inspiration on how to promote moral awareness and competence in 
order to “approach” both education and business practice differently. 
My personal motivation for this dissertation is the felt need for a more dedicated discussion of 
descriptive approaches of ethical decision-making and a better understanding of the 
interconnectedness between (business) ethical theories and psychological concepts, as my 
“journey” into the field of business ethics was dominated by purely normative approaches. 
With the desire to work in a business organization in my near future, I am extremely curious 
on more deeply discussing the cognitive mechanism at work when making (ethical) decisions, 
and in particular in understanding the role of moral awareness in this context, in order to 
pursue an engaged business career without “walking by” ethical challenges, while living a 
balanced life and continuing to grow as an integrated person. Looking back on my life I have 
seen me, as well as fellow students and work colleagues unconsciously “walk right through” 
ethical “dilemmas”, without allowing ambiguity and nuances of the situation to affect 
me/them. In this context I often observed that instead of adding moral content to decisions, 
managers and business students link decisions to outcome variables and thereby reduce 
ethical problems to numbers and measurements such as relationships and reputation. The 
strong believe that there might exist a lot of unintentional unethical behavior which can be 
avoided motivated me strongly to work on this topic. Agreeing with Jordan (2009), I hence 
consider uncovering the factors that ”bound” moral decision-making not only as interesting 
from a theoretical perspective, but is also imperative if we expect the existing challenges of 
management to be abated.  
I think that there is little question that the business domain and corporations have a significant 
role in our everyday life as well as in forming our behavior. In my opinion, the enormous 
power of corporations is increased by the power that resides in big parts of society, as 
members of a culture where pure economic thinking is obtaining a dominant position. In this 
paradigm, self-interest, in particular, acquired a social legitimation and acceptance it had 
never previously enjoyed. I think that this partly explains that today there is still a great 
perception among managers as well as business students but also some parts of the public that 
profits motivated by self-interest, regardless of most other considerations, are the major 
driving force of business and sometimes even unethical means are justified in the relentless 
pursuit of profit (Hendry, 2004). A growing body of evidence however suggests that this self-
interested behavior is learned behavior, and people learn it by studying economics and 
business (Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005). I consider especially business education affected 
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by an ethical malaise, with business schools around the world showing no effort to renew 
their “paradigm5” and thereby supporting that self-centeredness as a main characteristic of 
future powerful managers, while equipping them with highly specialized yet very fragmented 
concepts. Moreover, as this thesis claims, this paradigm or approach to problem-solving also 
strongly affects the values and intuitive, emotive responses to ethical features of situations of 
business students, which later have a strong influence on ethical behavior and the view of 
“ethicality”.   
I strongly agree with both Zsolnai and Ulrich and feel that it is time for a new ethics of 
responsibility, where we view ethics not only as inherent in business itself, but also as the 
foundation from which all business activities spring. In my opinion and as argued by Jonas 
(1984) there is no way out, since businesses cannot escape its responsibility in the future, but 
rather that this process will be intensified with every forward step in wealth and in power. 
The following background chapter shall touch upon this discussion and be understood as an 
introduction into ethical debate as well as an outline of the understanding of ethics of this 
paper.   
                                                 
5
 The mentioned paradigm is exemplified in the way business schools still teach the model of the individual 
as a self-interested homo oeconomicus- “a mean-spirited and distorted view of human nature” (Zsolnai, 
2002). That this model cannot only be criticized on normative ground, but also on empirical grounds, was 
shown conclusively by Zsolnai & Tencati (2009). The two business ethicists summarize overwhelming 
empirical evidence that suggests that the “homo oeconomicus” model of purely rational, self-interest-
maximizing beings or agents is not true in the real world. They argue that people do not just care about 
their own material payoffs but also consider the interest of others. Individuals are for example willing to 
sacrifice their own material well-being to help those who are kind to them and to punish those who are 
unkind to them and take into account the well-being of strangers whose interests are at stake. Zsolnai & 
Tencati (2009) consequently summarized that the “most detrimental effect of the self-interest doctrine and 
the culture of contract is dissemination of the belief that behavior inspired by motives other than self-
interest is conductive to economic disaster”. Quite the contrary, as Zsolnai (2002) conclusively assert, trust, 
reciprocity and altruism contribute significantly to the civilizing process our societies are and were 
undergoing. 
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Background 
“Relatively little reflection is necessary to understand that 
increasing commercial pressure on children, and exporting 
industrial production to countries with less strict 
environmental regulations are, to put it mildly, ethically 
dubious. It takes greater reflection to enable us to expose how 
our goal-directed economical choices might undermine our 
ability to be genuinely present in fragile social institutions 
outside economic life, or how our eye for the totality of nature 
is impaired by the fact that we are trained to evaluate it piece 
by piece and sectioned into resources that again create added 
value by economic standards” (Nyeng, 2007). 
 
Scandals periodically erupt in the media, renewing attention to business ethics and the 
responsibility of corporations and their managers. Nonetheless, many times it is not “real” 
ethical dilemmas that are discussed in public. Instead, cases are brought forward in which 
human rights or “common morality” is clearly violated and the “ethical” answer is clear. 
Luban (2006) argued that managers involved in such scandals discussed in public often either 
“were ostriches, hiding their heads in the sand or they were foxes who understood the 
importance of not knowing too much and then managed to persuade juries that their carefully 
contrived ignorance was exculpatory”. Whatever the technical arguments about legal 
culpability are, most reported business scandals represent actions of which the perpetrators 
surely knew or would have known that they were improper. They then decided to take those 
actions anyway, either rationalizing their decision or simply expecting not to get management, 
civil or criminal punishment (Kline, 2005). 
 
These above comments highlight that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is often 
considered to evolve when something obviously has gone wrong within - but not with - the 
market, as for example when weak, single parties were unfairly treated or when innocent third 
parties were directly hurt or threatened by corporate activity (Nyeng, 2007). More generally, 
most of today‟s CSR debates can be seen as a media phenomenon, in which the negative 
consequences of corporate “laissez-faire capitalism” action are discussed. 
The last decade has seen the growth of financial and business power, but - inseparable from 
this - also the growth of the power and prominence of economic and market ideas resulting in 
[what Ulrich calls] “economic imperialism”. As Ulrich (2006) states, neoclassical economics 
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is a result of a progressive, institutionally “unleashed” and normatively “disinhibited” 
economization of all areas of life. Due to this widely accepted “form of reasoning” those 
leaders seeking to maximize their earnings in ways that they think are legitimate based on a 
straightforward cost-benefit analysis get confused. Some do not understand that one does not 
necessarily have to break a law to be subject to “ethical” criticism. Consequently, just at a 
point when conversations (and the business case) turn to the unpleasant for corporations, these 
business leaders put huge efforts into avoiding (or assigning) blame. They then create new 
“rules” and “codes of conduct” in order to prevent a recurrence of the same or a similar 
failure, aiming to control and minimize the damage to relationships and to the reputation of 
the corporation. However, these approaches to CSR are reactive in nature. Due to their nature 
and the dynamics within the domain of business, these passive strategies seldom help to 
“prevent” a recurrence of an ethical failure. Furthermore, the creation of new codes of 
conduct is often only a response to a static snapshot picture taken of the “moral reality” which 
the firm faces in that particular moment. These snapshot pictures of obvious violations are 
mostly fractional and only apply to very specific business processes. Hence, the response is of 
too “low resolution” and does not offer a solution to the complex and constantly changing 
demands of CSR.  
As argued in the above paragraph, CSR is usually demanded (and put to test) when someone 
notices that something evidently has gone “wrong”. In most cases the CSR responses are 
passive and fractional, while the institutional framework within which it has gone wrong is 
not challenged. The most obvious (and simple) explanation for the unethical practice is the 
misuse of power and underdeveloped, pre-conventional moral reasoning of single managers -
so called “bad apples” - or entire corporate decision-making bodies. Seen from this 
perspective, the several high-profile cases of the past decade can be seen as nothing more than 
an “epidemic of dishonesty, cheating or even outright theft”. As Luban (2006) points out, they 
stand for a failure of single executives and professionals in which people trusted them to 
know better than and to do better than they did, expecting them to honor the most basic rules 
of Sunday school morality. 
 
However, as Ulrich (2006) postulates, business ethics cannot merely postulate more ethical 
obligation within the existing market economy. Rather, it should conceive of itself as critical 
ethics of economic reasoning as such, since the approach to business ethics that is currently 
being extolled in many business and academic forums as well as by the public still implicitly 
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contributes to the dissociation of ethics from business practice (Painter-Morland, 2008). 
Ethics is mostly portrayed as a set of given principles that must be applied to each business 
decision, where it then functions as a final hurdle in a deliberate decision-making process. 
The questions that inform business processes are usually similar to “May we do this?” or even 
more cynically “Can we get away with this?” (Painter-Morland, 2008). When approached in 
this manner, ethics must be considered more as a “mean” but not as a “chosen end”, which 
people consider after having interpreted events and determined what they want to do. In line 
with this, Ulrich (2006) argues that the status quo of business ethics is mostly either 
functional or corrective. Functional in the sense of promoting more power-based, benefit 
maximizing economic rationality, which follows the market principle and where only benefit-
oriented conditional cooperation between self-interested, mutually unconcerned individuals 
exists. Corrective as an antidote to too much economic rationality aimed at a justice-based 
ethical reasoning, according to which individuals are respected and the recognition of the 
equal dignity of persons is unconditional.  
 
Seen from the above described perspective, most existing CSR approaches are strongly 
disconnected from more fundamental questions of business activity, exemplified in strategic 
philanthropy, which can only be considered as “a bandage that misses the wound”. Thereby, 
as Kofi Annan in connection with the Global Compact asserted, CSR does “not request 
companies to do things different from their normal business, but to conduct normal business 
in different ways”. However, seeing ethics as an external element or some value that can be 
added to business has the consequence that most everyday business decisions are pursued 
either without or with only partial explicit ethical justification. This idea of simply “keeping 
business clean” is opposed to what is needed. 
The alternative view sees corporations (amongst other things) as critically questioning their 
existential rights and if their corporate activity is in the interest of society and able to promote 
the “good” society and human “flourishing”, rather than improving single processes within 
the existing economic reasoning. As Nyeng (2007) asserts, the basis for all discussion about 
social responsibility has to be “our experience of the relationship to other citizens as a real 
community, and consequently that a viable civil society exists, a society where we are able to 
discuss and assess the role of the economy in the community”. If not understood in this way, 
we - instead of ethical responsibility - have to talk about an “extended economic 
responsibility”, a responsibility for making profit-seeking behavior decent - a concept that 
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does not question economic goal development and growth itself (Nyeng, 2007). This line of 
reasoning can be translated into critical comments on the existing shareholder maximization 
paradigm, according to which shareholders want their managers to get on with the job in hand 
and not to constantly worry about why they are doing it. Here, managers are held responsible 
for the means by which corporate goals are to be achieved, not only for the goals themselves 
(Hendry, 2004).  
 
Through globalization and technical progress, transnational corporations have become more 
powerful (i.e. physically, financially and intellectually) than probably ever before. They are 
able to influence society to the good and to the bad. As Zsolnai (2006) states, economic 
globalization has resulted in shifting power away from governments which are responsible for 
the public good towards “a handful of corporations and financial institutions often driven by a 
single imperative - the quest for short-term financial gains”. This partial reversal of the power 
between business and governments was accompanied by an economic globalization that 
outpaced the political globalization, especially in an international context. Corporations 
nowadays debate important matters such as taxation, human rights and environmental impact. 
In the existing market logic, managers commonly claim to have little opportunity to take a 
moral stance in public companies, even if they want to. Shareholders demand returns, which 
means that stock values need to appreciate at least as fast as the market average. Otherwise, 
incumbent managers will be removed and new ones appointed. This limits existing CSR 
interventions to those which can be seen as strategically sensible, by markets and customers. 
By reifying economic laws and the market mechanism, managers and decision-making bodies 
conjured up an idea of “powerlessness” in regards to more ethics in business.  
However, in the light of the perspective proposed by (amongst others) Ulrich, the argument of 
“powerlessness” is weak. Ghoshal (2005) argues that when managers justify their actions by 
pleading powerlessness in the face of external forces, it is to “the dehumanization of practice 
that they resort”. Consequently, when managers claim that competition and capital markets 
are “relentless” in their demands and that there is no room for managers to choose between 
different options, it is “on the strength of the false premise of determinism that they free 
themselves from any sense of moral or ethical responsibility for their actions” (Ghoshal, 
2005).  
Ethics needs to be viewed as an integral part of the practice of business and as the basis for a 
different socio-economic rationality. This implies that every one of us needs to view ethics 
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not only as intrinsic for business in itself but as the basis from which all business activity can 
spring. Only then do ethics inform individuals‟ perceptions of events and play an important 
part in shaping their responses. However, as Painter-Morland (2008) writes, this kind of ethics 
is not based on the deliberate application of general principles, but instead draws on tacit 
knowledge and individual discretion. It makes business clearly more complex and 
challenging. It is also opposed to what most business schools aim for, which is to make 
management more efficient with the application of general principles.  
 
Summary 
This paper argues that the mainstream conception according to which ethics is only an 
instrument for improving business functioning is wrong. The argument has previously been 
put forward by the New Agenda for Business Ethics presented by Zsolnai (2006). In order to 
make sure that business serves society and promotes the conditions for human flourishing all 
over, business ethics must be seen as being fundamental for all economic activity. It should 
conceive of itself as critical of existing economic reasoning as such. This understanding of 
ethics builds on the critique of scholars such as Ghoshal who claim that while morality is 
inseparable from human intentionality, the denial of any moral or ethical considerations in our 
theories and prescriptions for management practice has been a “precondition for making 
business studies a science” (Ghoshal, 2005). The perspective of viewing ethics as the 
foundation of business has in fact strong historical roots. For several millennia, economics 
was a subcategory of moral philosophy. In ancient Greek philosophy and in religion, the 
discourse on the nature of economic activity and ethics was often intertwined and business 
was viewed as an integrated part of social life (Pedersen, 2009). 
 
Since CSR is not only a whole which needs to be filled with moral content, today‟s managers 
need to also develop a thorough understanding of the social challenges that we currently face. 
Seeing ethics as the foundation from which all business activity springs also necessitates 
deeply engaging with existential questions of business activity. Ethics should as well, as 
Nyeng (2007) conclusively asserts, be reserved for the “reflections that really challenge our 
predominant thoughts, reflections that make us conscious of the thoughts that are connected to 
a given view of human nature and society”. The latter claims are especially salient in an 
international context, e.g. when operating in states with weak governance and inadequate 
background institutions. These circumstances require managers for example to critically 
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engage with questions regarding the commonly accepted division of responsibilities between 
the state and the private sector as well as with common business practices and motives such as 
the shareholder-value-maximization paradigm. In practice, asking oneself how to contribute 
to a better society and to improving conditions for humans is complex and challenging. The 
implications of this perspective are manifold. For oil companies taking an “ethical” view on 
their business activity can e.g. lead to the conclusion that they are not only responsible for 
violations of e.g. human rights in their production process or oil spills, or for engaging in 
corrupt practices or similar. Beyond these “obvious” considerations, engagement with more 
existential questions might result in the acknowledgment of responsibility for their 
contribution towards the decline of non-oil-producing sectors of an economy; or for 
responsibilities which are assigned to governments; or for acts which are exercised by 
inadequate governments, financed and indirectly supported by taxes from oil revenues.  
 
Implications of this perspective for individual managers are also many-sided. The view which 
has become commonplace, that is to see managers as “morally neutral technicians” engaged 
in a world of rational problem-solving in the pursuit of economic efficiency, is no longer 
valid, since in this perspective ethics is an integral part of the practice of business, if explicitly 
and consciously so or not. Also the often found argument of business leaders that “ethics” 
might divert their companies from its “primary” objectives and, as a result, cause them to be 
inefficient and to deprive stockholders of their “legitimate” return becomes inconsistent in 
itself. It shows that as a term, “ethics” is commonly misused to signify some ideal but 
unrealistic standard that bears little relationship to practical daily decisions (Kline, 2005). 
Thereby, the logic barely follows an ethical taught at most business schools such as the neo-
liberal views on business activity, which states a clear-cut division of responsibilities and the 
provision of public goods between governments and corporations and a shareholder value 
maximization paradigm within, as Milton Friedman asserted, “the rules of the game”.  
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1. Part one: Understanding ethical decision-making 
 
As asserted in the background part of this thesis, when facing an ethical problem, managers 
cannot escape moral decisions. They cannot remain neutral on moral issues as not to decide is 
to decide by default; consciously or unconsciously. This chapter introduces the main 
approaches of ethical decision-making.  
 
Decision-making research commonly distinguishes between actual (descriptive or positive) 
and ideal (normative or prescriptive) decision-making (Ayton, 2005). The psychologist Lopes 
asserts that whereas “economics considers itself a normative science, the very term an 
oxymoron of ought and is”, to psychologists it is evident that people cannot conceivably take 
into consideration all the relevant information that normative models require for judgments 
and decisions (Lopes, 1994).  
Traditional descriptive ethical decision-making models generally divide the influences on the 
individual‟s decision behavior into two broad categories. The first category includes variables 
associated with the individual decision maker. The second category consists of variables, 
which form and define the situation in which the individual makes decisions (Ford & 
Richardson, 1994). 
 
Ethical decision-making is a topic of great interest in the literature of business ethics. In an 
effort to explain and predict the process by which a manager makes (ethical) decisions, a 
number of authors have proposed a variety of theoretical models. Initially, taking ideas from 
psychology, scholars such as Kohlberg proposed that the concept of cognitive moral 
development may be useful in understanding the ethical decision-making process in business 
(Nelson & Obremski, 1990). 
Rest‟s Four Component Model - which is presented in detail in the following chapters - is 
probably the most well-known descriptive ethical decision-making model. His model focuses 
exclusively on morality and Rest is very explicit about the psychological processes that he 
considers as relevant prior to moral behavior: 1) interpret situation and create alternative 
actions 2) choose alternative based upon some form of consideration 3) prioritize this morally 
value-laden choice above amoral values and associated choices 4) intend to perform action 
(Rest, 1986). In order to be able to allocate Rest‟s descriptive model of the ethical decision-
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making process in the theoretical context, an overview over the main approaches and 
extensions to decision-making models (both normative and descriptive) is presented in the 
following chapter. 
 
1.1. Existing theoretical conceptions of moral decision-making 
This chapter aims to provide an overview over existing theoretical approaches to moral 
decision-making. Research on moral decision-making process was for millennia dominated by 
normative models, but descriptive (positive) models have been gaining momentum lately. The 
research object has traditionally been the individual decision maker, increasingly including 
contextual variables. Existing theoretical ethical decision-making models have presented 
numerous variables that are thought to influence ethical choice, and thereby provide a 
knowledge base for which factors might influence ethical decisions. Variables related to an 
individual decision maker are e.g. nationality, religion, sex, age, education, employment, and 
personality. Situation specific variables typically examined are reference groups, rewards and 
sanctions, codes of conduct, type of ethical conflict, organization effects as well as industry 
and business competitiveness (Ford & Richardson, 1994).  
Normative models have traditionally focused on principles and rules for “ethical reasoning” 
(similar to Rest‟s second step). The most influential normative approaches shall therefore be 
discussed shortly later in this chapter in the ethical reasoning paragraph. The reason that they 
will be discussed at a later stage displays one major lack over descriptive theories - the fact 
that they are not able to fully account for the process when the individuals become aware of 
the ethical issue. This highlights why normative approaches are often considered insufficient 
for explaining the entire decision-making process, since as argued in the introduction and as a 
main assumption of this paper, some people act unethically because they decide to; others 
may fail to “sense” the ethical aspects of the situation at hand and thus run the risk of acting in 
an unethical manner because they do not “initiate” conscious ethical reasoning (Reynolds, 
2008). De Cremer, van Dick, Tenbrunsel, Pillutla & Murnighan (2011) highlight that a 
normative perspective suggests, or at least implies, that “people can interpret moral problems 
in a conscious manner and that cognitive guidelines can be used to avoid ethical lapses”. 
Criticisms of normative models of business ethics, which often assume absolute truths about 
appropriate decision-making, therefore led to the development of positive perspectives and 
models. Positive models of ethical decision-making intend to describe what actually occurs in 
the organization and the individual, versus normative models that address what should occur. 
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Unlike normative models, which specify decision rules for how to make an optimum or 
correct decision, positive models are more readily evaluated, using scientific modes of inquiry 
(Ferrell & Thorne, 1993). 
 
Individual approaches 
The two psychologists Lawrence Kohlberg and James Rest mainly defined individual 
approaches in positive theories. Their models were extended in order to emphasize both the 
individual role and situational variables in “producing” (un)ethical behavior. Many important 
contributions to business ethics have used these approaches in the modeling and research of 
business decision-making and behavior (e.g. Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Hunt & Vitell, 1986; 
Treviño, 1986; Jones, 1991). The theoretical underpinnings of the cognitive moral 
development theory identify key constructs that are believed to have the greatest effect on an 
individual‟s ethical decision-making. Most positive models building on this work continue to 
propose that cognitive moral processing of the individual is the key element within the 
context of ethical decision-making. For this reason unethical behavior in organizations has 
until very recently mostly been attributed to person-based characteristics (such as the “bad 
apples” approach). As Ford & Richardson (1994) assert, several different individual factors 
have been found to influence ethical decision-making. These factors include variables that are 
a result of birth (personal attributes as e.g. nationality, sex, age) as well as those that are a 
result of human development and socialization process (as education and employment 
background, personality as e.g. attitudes, values, religion, gender; moral philosophy etc.). The 
resulting influences on ethical decision-making found empirically were mixed. In other 
words, the mentioned factors could be related to an individual‟s ethical beliefs and decision-
making behavior in some studies but not in others. For example, Treviño & Youngblood 
(1990) found that people at higher stages of moral development were more likely than those at 
lower stages to behave ethically in a business situation. Similarly, some investigations (Ferrell 
& Fraedrich, 1992) and theoretical models (Hunt & Vitell, 1986) have proposed that one‟s 
personal moral philosophy strongly affects ethical decision-making. 
 
Kohlberg  
Kohlberg‟s Theory of Moral Development provided what is generally regarded as the first and 
one of the most thorough psychological treatment of ethical decision-making (Reynolds & 
Ceranic, 2009). Jean Piaget originally constructed moral development theory and its 
   22 
methodology as a result of studying children‟s morality. In the mid 1950‟s, Kohlberg 
expanded Piaget‟s stage model from three to six stages and intended to also draw inferences 
about adults. Kohlberg constructed, and has periodically refined, a qualitative interview 
method. His stages of moral cognitive development range from the overly simplistic pre-
conventional stages (i.e., Stages 1 and 2) where the decision-maker reasons based on rewards 
or punishments from an authority figure to the post-conventional stages (i.e., Stages 5 and 6) 
where the decision-maker reasons apart from an authority figure‟s wishes and understands 
that moral decisions involve relativism (Jordan, 2009). As already mentioned in the 
introduction, Kohlberg (1981) asserts explicitly that “the nature of our sequence is not 
significantly affected by widely varying social, cultural, or religious conditions. The only 
thing that is affected is the rate at which individuals progress through this sequence”. 
 
Rest 
Using Kohlberg‟s work as a basis, Rest (1986) developed a refined measurement instrument 
(the Defining Issue Test or DIT) directed at the study of both children and adults. The 
ultimate goal of his studies was to better understand and predict the process of ethical 
decision-making and ethical behavior. In order to determine the stage of moral development 
of individuals, Rest - like Kohlberg - let individuals judge on pre-defined cases of ethical 
problems and then ranked these individuals on the basis of their moral development. Unlike 
the systematic stages Kohlberg (1969) proposed, Rest (1986) offered a continuum model in 
which there are no distinctions between stages. Rest (1986) extended Kohlberg‟s model and 
identified four discrete steps involved in ethical decision-making: moral awareness, moral 
judgment, moral intention, and moral behavior. In his influential analysis of moral 
development, Rest argued that the process of ethical decision-making contains four 
components in which the ethical agent 1) recognizes an ethical issue, 2) makes an ethical 
judgment, 3) establishes ethical intent and 4) acts on the ethical concerns (Rest, 1986). His 
process theory of moral development represents a logical and systematized approach to ethics, 
where the most common moral philosophies (i.e. normative approaches to ethics) are 
represented in Kohlberg‟s six stages (Marnburg, 2001). 
 
Figure 1: Rest’s Four Component Model (own graph) 
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Rest‟s model begins, as mentioned, with an individual‟s “interpretation” of an ethical 
problem. Rest posits that the recognition by a moral agent that a situation raises an ethical 
issue describes the first component “moral awareness”. Specifically, the individual is believed 
to identify various actions that may be possible and determines what the consequences on the 
parties involved would be. Moral awareness is understood to be the first step in an unfolding 
ethical decision-making process because issue interpretation is likely to set the premises 
within which subsequent thought processes take place. Secondly, the individual makes a 
moral judgment about the possible actions, which allows him to choose one action as being 
considered morally “right”, “sound”, “just” or “fair”. Intention is the feature of the third 
component of the model. The moral intent or moral motivation identifies which values should 
take priority in the decision and expects the individual to intend to act in the morally right 
manner. The fourth component of the model involves action and describes acting on ethical 
decisions as moral behavior or moral character. That is, the individual follows through on the 
intention to perform in the morally right way (Rest, 1986). Effectively completing one stage 
does not imply the success of subsequent stages. Thus, an individual may possess moral 
judgment but fail to establish moral intent, and ultimately fail to behave ethically (Shu, Gino 
& Bazerman, 2011). 
 
Situational approaches 
It was argued that positive approaches towards ethical decision-making have mostly 
considered the individual and his level of moral cognitive development as the “major 
ingredient” for (un)ethical behavior. Especially the business discipline has focused on 
developing alternative models to describe the ethical decision-making process in the context 
of a business organization. Criticizing individual approaches to ethical decision-making with 
a widely documented cognitive bias that psychologist label the “fundamental attribution 
error
6” - the tendency to overvalue the importance of individual character and undervalue the 
role of situational factors in shaping behavior - these models dominant in critical management 
literature try to explain (un)ethical behavior with reference to contextual and situational 
factors (Rhode, 2006).  
                                                 
6
 This is indeed a well-documented tendency in social psychology research and highlights the fact that 
individuals tend to overweigh the importance of the individual and underweight the importance of the 
situation. 
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Although several different scholars have tried to account for context/situation-related 
variables, they still mostly built on the theoretical base of the cognitive moral development 
theory as proposed by Kohlberg and Rest. Of these models, which included factors associated 
with the situation, some make the distinction between situations specific, overall 
organizational, and general environmental variables. They have in common that they claim 
that the variety of situational forces are conceptually distinct from the individual factors (Ford 
& Richardson, 1994). Among the other situational factors proposed to influence ethical 
behavior were e.g. reference groups (such as peer group influence, top management influence) 
rewards and sanctions, codes of conduct; organizational factors such as organization effects, 
organization size, organization level; and industry factors including industry type, business 
competitiveness etc. (Ford & Richardson, 1994). 
Jones‟ (1991) moral intensity model provides a relatively comprehensive synthesis model of 
the mentioned approaches to ethical decision-making. The model tries to integrate previous 
ethical decision-making models representing overall agreement regarding the variables that 
influence ethical decision-making. Jones believed however that previous studies failed to 
consider the “nature of the ethical issue”, which is why he defined moral intensity as the 
“extent of issue-related moral imperative in a situation” (Jones, 1991).  
 
Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s theory of moral development were often believed to insufficiently 
describe the fact that personality and situation interact to generate behavior, an idea that is 
considered a truism in psychology. Treviño (1986) proposed an interactionist model of ethical 
decision-making in organizations. Treviño‟s model combines individual variables (moral 
development, etc.) with situational variables to explain and predict the ethical decision-
making behavior of individuals in organizations. She identified three individual variables (ego 
strength, field dependence, and locus of control) and proposed that they influence the 
likelihood of an individual to act according to his or her cognition of what is right or wrong 
(Treviño, 1986). Furthermore, she identified situational variables arising from the immediate 
job context and the broader organizational culture to “moderate” the cognition/behavior 
relationship. These variables included the organization‟s normative structure, referent others, 
obedience to authority, responsibility for consequences, reinforcement contingencies, and 
other pressures (Treviño, 1986).  
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However, despite explicit attempts to steer research in the direct where the individual interacts 
with the situation such as by Treviño, ethical decision-making research has failed to 
sufficiently address the interaction between the individual and the environment. This is also 
noted by Painter-Morland (2008) who claims that the existing approaches have not yet 
adequately captured the important interfaces among individual and situational variables. She 
asserts that most existing moral theories are incapable of simultaneously accommodating both 
the role of the individual moral agent and that of the community in which he participates, and 
the institutions with which he associates. The locus of control in morality is still - almost 
invariably - exclusively associated with either one or the other (Painter-Morland, 2008). 
 
Concluding, most existing descriptive models based on the cognitive development theory 
posit that the identification or “recognition” of an ethical issue triggers the process of ethical 
decision-making. If the individual fails to recognize the presence of an ethical issue, 
subsequent steps (e.g., reasoning, judgment, intent, and behavior) do not launch (Hunt & 
Vitell, 1986). Trying to explain for the lack of initiating a moral decision-making process, 
models first focused merely on the individuals, whereas later especially business ethicists 
tried to integrate individual approaches with the context of their application. However, since 
most models have not managed to do this successfully, this shows that morality must be 
understood as antithetical to the theory-practice divide on which most modernist approaches 
to ethics are based (Painter-Morland, 2008). In order to fully understand ethical decision-
making, the possibility cannot be excluded that we need to change our understanding of how 
individuals make sense of situations, with regards to the individuals‟ psychological make-up 
as well as contextual/situational factors. 
 
To investigate on this possibility, existing theoretical approaches must be understood 
thoroughly. As Rest‟s Four-Stage-model is considered the theoretical base of descriptive 
approaches to ethical decision-making, and most complementary theories build on his 
concept, this paper uses his four component division as an organizational scheme to 
summarize existing contributions to the topic in more detail. The main focus of this thesis is 
on the initial stages of ethical decision-making, hence the role and understanding of moral 
awareness and moral reasoning/judgments. To clearly differentiate descriptive approaches 
from normative approaches, main theoretical contributions for both approaches shall be 
summarized. Although not being the focus of this paper, normative theories are considered 
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important to better understand descriptive approaches to ethics, in accordance to Robbins and 
Wallace who claim that in order to develop a complete decision support system for ethical 
problem-solving, an understanding of both normative and descriptive theories of ethical 
behavior is necessary (Robbins & Wallace, 2006). The different categories of normative 
ethical decision-making techniques that “stand out” (as such character-based, consequences-
based and virtue-based) are therefore introduced under point 2.1.4 within the moral reasoning 
/ judgment component of Rest‟s model. 
 
1.1.1. Moral awareness 
According to Rest‟s conceptual model of ethical decision-making, moral awareness is 
considered a fundamental part of ethical decision-making. This first stage is considered 
critical because identifying an issue as “ethically significant “is believed to initiate the ethical 
decision-making process, making ethical behavior possible in the first place. 
Weaver, Morse & Mitcham (2008) assert that the notion of ethical sensitivity
7
 was originally 
introduced to caring sciences (i.e. nursing ethics) to describe the first component of decision-
making in professional practice (as the applied field of ethical decision-making); that is, 
recognizing and interpreting the ethical dimension of a care situation. Scholars of different 
professional disciplines have since then conceptualized the notion in various ways. A majority 
of these notions are - in accordance with models on the entire ethical decision-making process 
- indirectly or directly derived from the cognitive moral development paradigm, as Patterson 
(2001) points out. However, while most scholars agree that moral awareness is vital to 
practice, there has been no consensus regarding its definition and its characteristics or the 
conditions needed to become morally aware (Weaver, Morse & Mitcham, 2008).  
 
Rest (1986) explicitly describes the first stage of the ethical decision-making process as a 
conscious and reflective process. He argues that identifying a moral issue involves an 
interpretive process during which the individual recognizes that a moral problem exists, or 
that a moral standard or principle is relevant to the circumstances. Rest emphasizes that an 
                                                 
7Moral sensitivity was Rest‟s label for component one; Jordan (2009) on the other hand used moral 
awareness in her research claiming that the cognitive basis used for the main hypotheses stems from 
research on cognitive awareness (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) and because all other investigations within the 
business domain have also used this label (such as Butterfield, Treviño & Weaver, 2000; Reynolds, 2006). 
This paper will use the expressions similarly.  
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individual must first recognize the moral component of a given situation before moving on to 
further processing. This is in accordance with Kohlberg‟s (1969) notion that a moral judgment 
requires a conscious cognitive activity that results in a qualitatively more or less complex 
cognitive assessment of the situation, depending on the stage of moral development (Seiler, 
Fischer & Ooi, 2010). This causality connection found in Rest‟s and Kohlberg‟s study is 
adopted by most other scholars. E.g. it is argued that moral issues are rarely equipped with 
“red flags” identifying them as morally questionable, but must be recognized first 
(Butterfield, Trevino & Weaver, 2000). When lacking moral awareness, such as in the famous 
Ford Pinto case, individuals - in the words of Rest - do not interpret situations in ethical terms 
and do not engage in further ethical decision-making stages.  
Rest‟s assumption of moral awareness as recognition of ethical problems that objectively exist 
made him believe that its‟ intensity can be measured and ranked by scoring on predefined 
questions on ethical dilemmas, since individuals do recognize the ethical content “to different 
extents”. His approach could thereby be applied to Kohlberg‟s theory of moral development, 
although Rest denied the strict stage division of Kohlberg. The importance of the individual‟s 
moral cognitive development on ethical awareness has also been analyzed by various other 
scholars. Shaub (1989) for example finds the relation to be insignificant. Other studies, such 
as the investigation of Treviño & Youngblood (1990), report that individuals with higher 
levels of moral development are more likely to identify and report unethical behavior.  
 
Jones‟ (1991) issue-contingent model of ethical decision-making in organizations builds upon 
Rest‟s model and includes other social cognition research. Jones argues that the characteristics 
of the ethical issue, the moral intensity, increase the social-cognitive encoding process. This is 
according to him in line with social-cognitive theory, as he argues, which states that decision-
makers easier perceive and encode information that is vivid, salient, accessible and 
emotionally interesting (as claimed by e.g. Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Consequently Jones 
theorized that the recognition of moral problems is not only influenced by the individuals 
level of cognitive development but also by the multi-dimensional construct “moral intensity”, 
which incorporates the amount of “moral imperative” attached to an issue or situation (Jones, 
1991). Moral intensity is conceptualized as a characteristic of the issue, and not of the moral 
agent confronting the issue. According to Jones, moral issue recognition has two main 
elements: First, a person recognizes that a decision or action has consequences for other 
human beings or constructs; and second, the person has some choice and volition to deal with 
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the issue. Jones (1991) identified six dimensions of moral intensity: 1) magnitude of 
consequences 2) concentration of effect 3) probability of effect 4) temporal immediacy 5) 
social consensus and 6) proximity.  
Since Jones‟ issue contingent research the recognition of ethical issues has been engrained in 
the moral intensity construct, as Jordan (2009) recently noted. In line with Jones approach, 
Rhode (2006) summarizes exemplarily that moral awareness reflects both personal and 
situational factors, where one perceives the moral intensity of the issue at stake. Intensity, in 
turn, is affected by both a social consensus on the ethical status of the acts in question and the 
social proximity of their consequences, as he further asserts. For example, magnitude of 
consequences of the issue concerns the amount of harm (or benefit) that could be caused by a 
particular decision or action. In addition to consequences, moral intensity is in his view 
concerned with the social consensus, or “the degree of social agreement that a proposed act is 
evil (or good)” and with proximity, “the feeling of nearness” that the moral agent has for 
victims.  According to this understanding, when issues arise in the context of work, it is 
mainly the degree of perceived consensus (e.g. of coworkers and the problem environment) in 
these settings that has a great influence on moral awareness. Also Jones (1991) explicitly 
suggested that the “feeling of nearness” (social, cultural, psychological, or physical) that the 
decision maker has for victims or beneficiaries of the act in question affects moral intensity. 
Individuals‟ capacity for empathy and their sense of human or group solidarity was therefore 
considered important and understood to positively affect moral awareness, which encourages 
altruistic action and receptiveness to principles of justice, equality and fairness. Conversely, 
peoples‟ capacity to distance, devalue or dehumanize victims leads to moral disengagement 
and denial of moral responsibility, as Rhode (2006) argues. Rhode (2006) sees these moral 
capabilities (i.e. part of the moral competence) to be strongly influenced by childhood 
socialization, religious and political commitments, direct exposure to injustice, and 
educational approaches that build awareness of others‟ needs. 
 
Butterfield, Treviño & Weaver (2000) go somewhat “beyond” issue characteristics by 
suggesting that other contextual factors influence moral awareness. They hypothesize that 
moral awareness is influenced by both issue-related factors (such as the magnitude of 
consequences) as well as social context-related factors (as e.g. the perceived social consensus 
that an issue is ethically problematic). Their scenario-based study finds that both the existence 
of a competitive framework as well as the use of moral language can influence moral 
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awareness (the latter by triggering a moral issue schema), along with the earlier mentioned 
issue characteristics (such as magnitude of consequences and social consensus). 
 
To summarize, Rest‟s understanding of moral awareness is somewhat different from how 
other scholars conceive of this component, despite the fact that they mostly build on his 
theory. Some scholars define moral awareness solely as a recognition-based ability of the 
individual, conceptualizing the construct as the ability to detect moral issues within a broader, 
amoral context. However, as elaborated by the above mentioned moral intensity concept and 
as asserted by Sparks and Hunt (1998), even if moral issues are recognized and elicit an 
affective-response, if an individual places little or no importance on them, it is “doubtful that 
they will be factored into the decision-making process”.  
Taking this critique into consideration, other definitions of moral awareness emphasized 
awareness as both the recognition that a decision-making situation has ethical content and, in 
addition, sensitivity as interpretation and ascription of importance to ethical issue (Sparks & 
Hunt, 1998). This highlights an agreement on two different but related aspects that influence 
moral awareness. First - as highlighted correctly by Jordan (2009) - theoretically, if one does 
not recognize a moral issue, he or she will be unable to factor the issue into the judgment 
process, leading to a poor prognosis for the likelihood of later moral action. Secondly, if the 
moral intensity of a stimulus is high, the stimulus is more vivid and salient and therefore 
attracts the individual‟s attention. Agreement on this view led the conception of moral 
awareness which is still often referred to: Moral awareness as consisting of two elements; 
“moral sensitivity” referring to an individual‟s capability to identify relevant moral aspects in 
a morally ambiguous situation; and “moral intensity” to the salience of moral aspects in a 
given context, which influences the ability to ascribe importance to these issues. 
The above mentioned distinction has led to the more recent definition of moral awareness of 
Butterfield, Treviño and Weaver (2000) defined as “a person‟s recognition that his or her 
potential decision or action could affect the interests, welfare, or expectations of the self or 
others in a fashion that may conflict with one or more ethical standards”. 
 
Reynolds (2006) however argues that despite this definition being more precise than earlier 
ones, it is overstated on several accounts. First, he claims that “the need for a decision often is 
not apparent until after the issue has been identified as a moral issue”. Consequently, he 
argues that the requirement that the individual has first to identify the magnitude of the 
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consequences of his decisions “limits the number of issues that could possibly be recognized 
as moral issues”. Secondly, the comparison if a personal decision is in conflict with certain 
ethical standards “requires an analysis of how the decision compares against standards of 
moral behavior”. This process “threatens to confound the constructs of moral awareness and 
moral judgment”, as he correctly asserts, since what is needed for being aware of a moral 
issues is “merely an acknowledgment that such comparisons are appropriate”. Reynolds 
(2006) refers to Baier (1958) claiming that decision makers must barely acknowledge that “a 
moral point of view is a valid point of view”. He thereby illustrates a point which also in this 
thesis is found to be central: moral awareness in the traditional conception also involves a 
moral judgment in itself and cannot be as strictly divided into components as claimed by Rest. 
Including this elementary claim into his definition, Reynolds writes that moral awareness 
shall be understood as “a person‟s determination that a situation contains moral content and 
legitimately can be considered from a moral point of view”. 
 
Apart from the presented theoretical conceptual contributions, there are also some empirical 
contributions to the notion of moral awareness, despite the fact that this has been largely 
neglected in research. Most research on moral awareness is, as the theoretical approaches, 
grounded in the moral intensity construct and has generated a certain amount of knowledge 
about the characteristics of moral issues that are believed to facilitate moral awareness. A 
majority of the empirical studies mentioned in a review by Loe, Ferrell & Mansfield, (2000) 
utilize student samples (nine) and the corresponding findings - which are very diverse - are 
mostly based upon the goals of the studies. Several evaluate the role of codes of conduct in 
generating awareness of ethical problems. Others consider individuals‟ awareness of their 
own ethical behavior relative to others‟. The main findings of the empirical research of ethical 
decision-making in business suggest that (1) individuals perceive their own behavior to be 
more ethical than that of others, (2) “ethical orientation” influences moral awareness, (3) 
awareness of codes of conduct does not necessarily have a significant impact on ethical 
decision-making or behavior and (4) individuals with higher levels of cognitive moral 
development are more likely to identify unethical behavior (Loe, Ferrell & Mansfield, 2000). 
1.1.2. Moral reasoning and judgment, motivation and behavior 
Rest argues that once an individual becomes aware of an ethical issue, ethical reasoning and 
judgment processes are triggered (Rest, 1986). Much research of ethical decision-making is 
devoted to this second component of moral reasoning and judgment. However, as Treviño, 
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Weaver & Reynolds recently noted, the interface or link between moral reasoning and 
judgment and moral awareness has rarely been investigated (Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 
2006). Moral reasoning and judgment is “traditionally” considered a separate component from 
moral awareness and understood to be the judgment of what potential identified action line is 
most moral or just after being aware of an ethical problem. In this light, the following 
definition presented by Velasquez (2002) is to be viewed as representative of the “traditional” 
conception of moral reasoning as a “separated” component.  
Rules and principles for moral reasoning and judgment are the major focus of normative 
approaches to ethical decision-making, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Descriptively, as asserted by business ethicist Velazquez, moral reasoning can be viewed to 
involve two components: (1) an understanding of what “reasonable” moral standards require, 
prohibit, value, or condemn; and (2) evidence or information that shows that a particular 
person, policy, institution, or behavior has the kinds of features that these moral standards 
require, prohibit, value or condemn (Velasquez, 2002).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Moral reasoning process as according to Velasquez (own graph) 
 
According to this understanding of moral reasoning, after an individual becomes aware of an 
ethical issue, he is expected to justify and clarify his moral standards and values through a 
conscious, reasoned debate and argument. Velasquez (2002) asserts that moral standards are 
not established by authority and their validity does e.g. not rest on voting procedures. Instead, 
he claims that the validity of moral standards rests on the “adequacy of the reasons” used to 
justify them. This indicates that e.g. a legal framework cannot be considered as an omnipotent 
“normative yardstick” to judge on ethical problems. The question what constitutes “adequate 
reasons” has led to an ongoing discussion within the field of moral philosophy and beyond.  
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Important for this thesis is that the traditional understanding of moral reasoning, based on 
Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s cognitive moral developmental approach, established the rationalist 
position that moral judgment is reached based on conscious, language-based processes of 
moral reasoning and moral reflection (Seiler, Fischer & Ooi, 2010). Kohlberg distinguishes 
different developmental stages of moral reasoning with which he describes the level of 
cognitive complexity an individual applies when making moral judgments. As these stages 
include the main normative approaches to ethical decision-making, the following paragraph 
1.2. discusses the most influential of these normative approaches to ethical decision-making 
based on Kohlberg‟s stages of moral development. Finally, it shall be discussed shortly how 
these main philosophical approaches have been applied to business ethics in practice, and 
what the implications of these conceptions of CSR and organizational development constitute.  
 
Moral motivation and behavior 
Moral motivation has been described as a person‟s “degree of commitment (once the need for 
action is identified) to taking the moral course of action, valuing moral values over other 
values, and taking personal responsibility for moral outcomes” (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & 
Thoma, 1999). This final component before moral behavior is hence understood to describe 
the courage and initiative to act upon this commitment.  
 
1.2. Moral standards/ main normative approaches to ethics 
What Velasquez referred to as “adequate moral standards” has been discussed in business 
ethics and moral philosophy for centuries, if not millennia. This section reviews those 
normative theories of ethical behavior found to be most relevant for moral reasoning (in the 
understanding of Rest and Kohlberg) shortly. Three major approaches in normative ethical 
decision-making are commonly distinguished in the philosophical literature: consequences-
based (teleological), character-based (deontological) and virtue-ethics. 
All these approaches to normative ethics find their philosophical justification in a specific 
worldview and anthropology, as Painter-Morland (2008) asserts. Consequentialist approaches 
do not focus on the character of the problem solver, or on the moral worth of acts “within” the 
ethical problem, but instead focus on the potential. Acts are hence judged as right or wrong 
based on their possible consequences (Robbins & Wallace, 2006). Consequentialist or 
teleological theory is probably most knowingly represented by the utilitarian writings of John 
Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. This theory seeks the greatest good for the greatest number 
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of people barely focusing on consequences (Kline, 2005). Utilitarianism is a general term for 
any view that holds that actions and policies should be evaluated on the basis of the benefits 
and costs they will impose on society. Utilitarians hold that the best way to evaluate the 
ethical propriety of a business decision - or any other decision - is by relying on utilitarian 
cost/benefit analysis. Following this logic, acts are ethical only if they (follow institutions 
which) maximize happiness for the whole “sentient creation” (Falkenberg, 2004). In many 
respects, utilitarianism is indeed considered as an attractive ontological belief. For one thing, 
it matches fairly nicely the views that we tend to advocate when discussing the choice of 
government policies and public goods. Most people agree, for example, that when the 
government is trying to determine on which public projects it should spend “a finite amount” 
tax money, the proper course of action would be to implement those projects that objective 
studies show will provide the greatest benefits for the members of society at the least costs. 
However, this belief has been challenged on several grounds. Whether the consequentialist 
view of the invisible hand argument justifies unrestrained profit-maximization does for 
example not depend on what the government should do, but only on what it does in fact do. 
Furthermore, according to consequentialism, it does not matter morally that people do not 
intend the good consequences of their actions, but first the outcome. Another major set of 
problems attached to the theory of utilitarianism is centered on the difficulties encountered 
when trying to measure utility and comparing utility across individuals. Further, utilitarianism 
by itself seems to deal inadequately with situations that involve “rights and justice”, although 
some have tried to remedy this deficiency by restricting utilitarianism to the evaluation of 
rules (Velasquez, 2002). Concerns that the utilitarian outcomes could prove to be “unfair” to 
individuals and minorities spurred the interest in deontological or character-based theory, 
drawing heavily on the writing of Immanuel Kant, who focused on what a person “deserves” 
and an action‟s motivation rather than its outcome (Kline, 2005). In effect, deontological 
ethics advise to strictly follow laws, duties and rules. They do not give any weight to the 
consequences of the actions taken but judge the morality of an action based on the adherence 
to laws, rules and principles. Deontologists, who are also moral absolutists, believe that the 
morality of a particular course of action cannot be determined at all by its anticipated 
consequences. The main theorist in this school of thought, Kant, suggested that deontological 
ethics could be condensed to one single rule, what he termed the categorical imperative - an 
unconditional moral obligation that is binding in all circumstances and is not dependent on a 
person‟s inclination or purpose. Deontological ethics prescribe the ethical solution to be the 
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one that contains acts that have “intrinsic moral worth”. Hence, certain acts are, at their very 
core, considered as “right” or “wrong”. The probably most obvious “foundation for a global 
moral consensus” of duties or rules is the idea of individual human rights (Hendry, 2004). The 
concept of human rights attempts to set out global deontological standards that place priority 
value on the individual rather than on groups or institutions. In theory, these basic individual 
rights cannot be ethically overridden by teleological claims that outcomes in particular cases 
would yield better results, even for a majority of people (Kline, 2005). This theoretical belief 
to ethics assumes that there are basic moral rules, which are universally applicable because 
they are necessary for a society to function or for a business transaction to take place. The 
theory of human rights ethics has been extended in the sense that an act is considered ethical 
only if it “follows institutions which are in compliance with basic human rights” (Falkenberg, 
2004). One of the major challenges concerning this approach is the difficulty to specify 
universally binding obligations as there are differences in moral standards between cultures as 
well as diverging views within cultures. Formulating a list of rights beginning from a blank 
slate often asks which rights would individuals consider basic or fundamental, a type of 
ethical minimum condition inherent as a right for every human person, if such rights were 
chosen without knowing in advance where in the world each individual would reside, and 
under what conditions (Kline, 2005)? This had led to Rawls‟ “justice as fairness” approach 
that suggests that in order to guarantee that society is organized in a way that is fair to all, the 
formulation of its organizing principles should take place behind a hypothetical “veil of 
ignorance”. This veil of ignorance is a test to determine which principles are termed “just” or 
“fair” by individuals who do not know their position in society. However, as Painter-Morland 
(2008) rightly asserts, this approach also has major limitations. One problem with establishing 
principles for fair business institutions from behind a veil of ignorance is that they are likely 
to be too general and vague to account for all the “context- and relationship-specific variables 
that continually inform dynamic stakeholder relationships”. Hence, there are also severe 
problems with employing only the Kantian ontological belief in business ethics. These also 
have to do with Kant‟s postulation of a rational, independent moral agent, capable of 
distancing himself from personal prejudices and contextual biases for the sake of objective 
moral deliberation. Moral agency, as Painter-Morland (2008) correctly claims, is “a far subtler 
and more complex affair than Kant‟s idea of an enlightened rational agent suggests”. This 
topic will be caught upon when reconsidering the theoretical base of the moral cognitive 
development theory.  
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The third main normative ethical problem-solving technique that “stands out” is the virtue 
ethics perspective (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007). Virtue ethics is a broad term 
for theories that emphasize the role of character of a moral agent as the driving force for 
ethical behaviour rather than duties and rules, or consequences of particular actions. Most 
virtue ethics theories take their inspiration from ancient Greek moral tradition, particularly to 
Plato and to Aristotle
8
 (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007). One likely reason why 
virtue ethics is considered as one of the most important contemporary normative ethical 
theories is because it emphasizes the central role played by motives or desires in moral 
decision-making. Therefore, most virtue-based ethical approaches to behaviour focus on 
helping people to develop good character traits, such as - for example - kindness and 
generosity. However, there are also certain challenges with applying virtue-based ethical 
systems to all moral questions. Most virtue theorists would for example argue that virtuous 
persons act in virtuous ways as the result of rational thought due to ideal character traits. As 
this paper will argue, humans are bounded in several ways, and they can e.g. be “blinded” by 
cognitive biases and thereby be driven by “unethical” desires. Moreover, virtue ethics 
proponents claim that moral motives and intention is not dependent on “situational” factors 
but only on the agent‟s character, a claim with which this paper fundamentally disagrees. 
 
1.2.1. Different stages of moral development  
The central thoughts of the presented normative theories can be found in Kohlberg‟s different 
stages of moral development. As stated previously, Kohlberg defined moral reasoning as 
consisting of a series of six developmental stages that describe the level of cognitive 
complexity one applies when making moral judgments (Kohlberg, 1969). Kohlberg presented 
participants with dilemmas in which moral and non-moral claims were present on both sides, 
and he then looked to see how people resolved the conflicts (Haidt, 2001). By letting 
individuals judge on a number of different pre-defined ethical dilemmas, his research clearly 
concentrates on the reasons given why certain actions were perceived as morally just or 
preferred. The reasons given were considered the indicators of the stages of moral maturity. 
His approach to ethical decision-making is emblematic of these ideas about moral 
development. Kohlberg‟s research led him to conclude that individual‟s moral sensibilities 
                                                 
8
 Key concepts being arête (excellence or virtue) phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia 
(usually translated as happiness or flourishing) 
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develop progressively, through stages, as the individual learns to think about moral issues, 
first in a “pre-conventional”, then in a “conventional “ and finally in a “post-conventional” 
way (Painter-Morland, 2008). According to his theory, individuals move through stages in an 
invariant, irreversible sequence, because higher stages depend upon cognitive capacity that is 
unavailable at lower stages. Hence, higher stages are “more advanced” as the individual 
includes a wider and fuller perspective and better ways of justifying its decisions (Velasquez, 
2002). Since Kohlberg believed that moral reasoning involves conscious, language-based 
thinking, individuals could be explicitly ranked on the basis of the extent to which their 
judgment on the pre-defined cases was considered as “advanced”.  
 
Kohlberg (1981) argues that, initially, the individual has a very self-centered view of morality 
but with time, experience, and exposure to new perspectives, the individual can adopt 
different approaches to moral matters that are more sensitive to the needs and rights of others 
and are ultimately based on universal law. Kohlberg‟s research finds that most adults are at 
the conventional level, meaning that their thinking about what is right is largely influenced by 
significant others as well as rules and laws. According to Kohlberg, a disturbingly high 
percentage (about 80 percent) of the adult population never gets beyond the conventional 
stages. Painter-Morland (2008) claims that this is largely due to the specific philosophical 
demands of stages five and six, which require embracing leading elements, first, of social 
contractarian and utilitarian ethical theories (stage five) and finally, of the moral philosophy 
of Kant (stage six).  
 
Kohlberg distinguished the following six stages of moral cognitive development:  
 Pre-conventional (stage one and two) 
For Kohlberg, the morality in infancy is based on the authority of parents; obedience is in 
one‟s immediate interest (Shionoya, 2005). At the two lowest stages (pre-conventional 
level), the self-centered egocentric, yet outward-looking individual reasons about what is 
right based upon either concern for obedience to a powerful authority and fear of 
punishment (Stage one) or mutual exchange in relationships (e.g., one hand washes the 
other) (Stage two). 
 Conventional (stage three and four) 
During this stage, the morality of association is based on mutual interpersonal 
expectations, maintaining trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude (Shionoya, 2005). Kohlberg 
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finds moral judgment to be more externally oriented at the middle two stages, and 
classifies the stages as judgment relying on the expectations of significant others, such as 
social groups (Stage three) or rules or laws of the nation or society (Stage four).  
 Post-conventional (stage five and six) 
Here, the morality of principle depends on an understanding of the universal principles of 
justice irrespective of one‟s own interest or others‟ expectations (Shionoya, 2005). At these 
highest stages, the individual autonomously determines what is right by adhering to 
universally held principles of justice and rights. Hence, for those who reach the post 
conventional level and take a reflective and critical look at the moral standards they have 
been raised to hold (Velasquez, 2002).  
 
What Haidt (2001) referred to as the “Cognitive Revolution” has coined research on ethical 
decision-making for a long time. Therefore, before shedding a more critical light on 
Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s theory, it shall exemplarily be discussed why their theory was and is 
still often considered useful. Firstly, their theories help to understand how our moral 
capacities develop and they reveal how we can become increasingly sophisticated and critical 
in our use and understanding of the moral standards we hold. Furthermore, Kohlberg and 
others have also argued that, although people generally progress the stages in the same 
sequence, not everyone progresses through all the stages. Kohlberg finds that many people 
remain stuck at one of the early stages throughout their lives, which was used to explain for 
individual differences in ethical decision-making and behavior. Lastly, cognitive moral 
development theory has proved to be applicable to the study of cross-cultural business ethics, 
as types of moral reasoning were found to be universal (with similar age and education trends 
found across cultures) (Treviño, Weaver & Reynolds, 2006).  
 
1.3. Moral development of organizations - CSR and the business context 
Kohlberg‟s stages of moral development have often been linked to business ethics and 
especially phases of organizational development and stakeholder orientation. Clarkson (1995) 
and Carroll (1991) give examples of how the individuals‟ configurations described above can 
be related to the different styles of responsiveness towards stakeholders of organizations. In 
this context, four different kinds of stakeholder orientation are generally distinguished: the 
reactive (neutral), defensive (pragmatic), engaged (accommodation), proactive (idealistic) 
configuration. Whereas the pre- and conventional stages of moral development are linked to 
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reactive or defensive strategies towards CSR and stakeholders, recognizes the first post-
conventional stage an interconnectedness of all stakeholders, who are both marked and non-
marked based, in a social contract (as e.g. suggested by Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999). The 
second post-conventionalism is linked to the “idealistic” configuration and is considered as 
the highest stage of development, on which ethical principles guide ethical reasoning, 
irrespective of market imperatives, which means that corporations consider themselves 
responsible to all stakeholders and “above the letter of law”.  
 
More generally, debates on stages of moral organizational development often begin with two 
contrasting views regarding the scope of business obligations. One perspective - typically 
associated with Milton Friedman - claims near-exclusive primacy for the fiduciary obligations 
owed to a firm‟s owners (shareholders for publicly traded companies). Friedman theorem is 
well known in today‟s business environment: increase profits as long as it stays within the 
rules of the game. It is argued that when “morality” intrudes into the business organization, it 
has the potential to divert business leaders from the organization‟s primary objectives and, as 
a result, causing it to be inefficient and to deprive stockholders of their returns. Managers who 
pursue broader social goals - say, by adopting more stringent emission standards than required 
by law or by donating corporate funds to charitable organizations - are, according to this ethic, 
“spending other people‟s money”. Firms run by such managers have higher costs than those 
run by managers whose goal is to maximize shareholder wealth. According to the standard 
theory of competitive markets, the latter firm will attract more capital and eventually drive the 
former firms out of business. Frynas (2005) asserts that given the scenario that a “business 
case” still mainly drives CSR, it is not surprising that many corporate social initiatives do not 
go beyond narrowly philanthropic gestures. Obviously, Friedman‟s theorem diverts severely 
from the understanding of ethics and CSR presented at the background chapter of this paper, 
and his view of “buy low/ sell high” mentality or pure shareholder capitalism has been 
criticized frequently.  
One of the critics, Edward Freeman, poses the question whether the corporation is to be 
understood solely as a means to the creation of wealth for shareholders, or if it can be 
understood as a social contract among shareholders, suppliers, employees, and communities? 
And if it is to be understood differently, which obligation does a company have to the 
communities in which it operates (Freeman, 1984)? He emphasizes that stakeholder 
relationships - hence a more “proactive” organizational development - are the key to 
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understanding the functioning of business in today‟s world. Identifying and analyzing 
stakeholders is a way to acknowledge the existence of multiple constituencies of a 
corporation. The more the different stakeholders participate in the decisions that affect them, 
the greater the likelihood that they will be committed to the future of the corporate enterprise, 
and thereby contribute to long term sustainable success (Freeman, 1984). This (on the first 
glance) differing viewpoint asserts broader corporate responsibilities to stakeholders 
(incorporating groups such as employees, consumers, suppliers and local communities, along 
with the shareholders). Opposite to the shareholder perspective (Friedman‟s theory combined 
with the homo oeconomicus), which focuses on a firm‟s founding financial contract and 
expected return on investment, the stakeholder approach is often considered to use social 
contract notions to extend responsibilities to groups that significantly affect, or are affected 
by, the corporation‟s activities9(Kline, 2005). It must be noted that despite the fact that the 
                                                 
9
 The classical Friedman-Freeman dilemma indicates that acting “ethical” is often understood as not putting 
self-interest or profit maximization before “legitimate” interests. It is a main line of attack whether CSR is 
feasible in a competitive economy. The relationship between CSR and corporate financial performance has 
been vastly discussed and studied empirically in existing literature. Initially, many argued that CSR 
requires a sacrifice of profits, a commitment that is not possible to fulfill when competition is intense. 
However, in recent times, the renewed interest in ethics leads one to believe that the business community 
no longer sees business ethics necessarily as an oxymoron. In fact, as Painter-Morland argues, an 
“investment in business ethics” has become a prerequisite for an organization‟s continued participation in 
formal business networks (Painter-Morland, 2008). One important contributor to the question “if it pays to 
be ethical” is Robert Frank. He shows that although at first glance, it would appear that the answer must be 
no, for if defecting were indeed a dominant strategy, then socially responsible firms (or firms that 
cooperate) would always have lower returns than pure “profit maximizers”. Frank presents five possible 
avenues along which the socially responsible firm might compensate for that disadvantage of higher costs, 
assuming that these occur when a business confronts an ethical dilemma and “takes the high road”. In his 
influential study mechanisms, Frank (2004) showed that a socially responsible firm might compensate for 
the higher direct costs of its actions. This allows the socially responsible firm to be better able to solve 
commitment problems than its opportunistic rivals. These problems arise between owners, managers, and 
employees, with customers, and with other firms. As Frank (2004) argues, socially responsible businesses 
are able to attract and retain higher quality employees, suppliers and investors, which can lead to a stronger 
financial performance. Also, buyers are often willing to pay more for the products of socially responsible 
firms. Hence, it can also “pay to be ethical”. However, this is though not always the case. Ethics -in the 
“classical” sense of applied rules and regulation - generally does not solve business problems. On the 
contrary, following ethical consideration usually imposes restraints on corporate activities and normally 
increases costs. More importantly, a consumer goods company, which resists corrupt demands associated 
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stakeholder perspective offers some elementary insights into business obligations, this view 
cannot be viewed as omnipotent. As a concretization of the diversity of the interests that a 
company manages, and for pointing out that stockowners are only one group among the many 
contributors to a company‟s resources, this model is valuable, as Nyeng (2007) correctly 
asserts. However, in the light of viewing ethics as the source of all business activity, related to 
the concept of social responsibility and as a basis for overall analysis of power and value - as 
Nyeng claims –“it fails to be complete”. 
 
Based on the different ethical perspectives and views on organizational development and CSR 
presented, contract theories emerged in the field of business ethics, often also associated with 
the former work of Hobbes and Rousseau. Contract theories claim that a contract, usually 
considered to be implied or hypothetical, is made between citizens for the organization of the 
society and as a basis for legal and political power within a society (Crowther & Rayman-
Bacchus, 2004). Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) posit that a problem with existing approaches 
to business ethics is their inability to deal with “the nature of the business world and the 
specific challenges that it poses to decision-making” (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999). They 
argue that in the business world, corporations and individuals deal with “bounded rationality”. 
The concept of “bounded rationality” draws attention to the fact that human cognition is 
always framed by physical and psychological variables. Because of this, systematic errors are 
common in the way individuals think. Decisions are often made unconsciously, on the basis 
of insufficient information and under significant time constraints. This critique will be 
devoted a deeper discussion in the 2
nd
 part of this paper. Of importance until now is the 
introduction of the thought that the business world is institutionally “thick”. Business 
organizations must be considered as human creations, designed for the pursuit of particular 
                                                                                                                                                 
with overseas investment, only because it is afraid of losing its strong international brand recognition 
cannot be considered to be acting truly “ethical”. If the company is only afraid of the loss of brand value, 
doing business like this is nothing more than “business as usual” on a cost-benefit analysis. Ethics should 
not be seen as a value adding tool for increasing profits, but as the foundation of all business activity. If 
CSR approaches can be turned into profits is - from an ethical perspective - the wrong question and can be 
regarded as “vulgar reductionism” (Nyeng, 2007). 
Hence although Frank and other authors on this topic discuss positive effects of ethical behavior, it should 
not matter from an ethical perspective if CSR influences corporate financial performance, vice versa, or if 
the two variables can be considered as mutually reinforcing. Increased profit can only be considered a 
positive “side-effect” of corporate action with a “truly genuine” ethical motivation (Collins, 2009). 
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goals. For this reason, Donaldson & Dunfee argue that the formulation of normative 
guidelines for business requires an “unique” approach. Their contractarian model is born out 
of an analysis of a variety of the earlier-mentioned ethical approaches. In their analysis, the 
two authors looked at the attempts of business ethicists such as Freeman to utilize Kantian and 
Rawlsian thinking in business ethics. They also studied rights-based approaches informed by 
deontological theories and theories of social justice. Lastly, they examined attempts made to 
utilize utilitarian thinking in business ethics. To this end, Dunfee & Donaldson introduce an 
approach which they nominated “Integrative Social Contract Theory” (ISCT). This theory 
combines a variety of different philosophical approaches in a contractarian model, in which 
the normative standards that guide stakeholder management are context-specific. The model 
combines procedural guidelines with substantive, normative content. According to the ISCT, 
normative content is provided by so called “hyper norms”, which have to be validated at 
various levels of consent. Donaldson & Dunfee insist that ISCT does allow contextual 
contingencies and individual biases to come into play in the formulation of micro-contracts at 
the individual and community level. The ISCT also recognizes the existence of a “moral free 
space”, which allows an individual or community to self-define significant aspects of their 
moral commitments (Painter-Morland, 2008).  
 
1.4. Moral reasoning in practice 
“Business ethics is not about “Just say no” “Just say yes”, 
clear-cut alternatives on pre-defined cases. It includes 
discovering, anticipating, encountering and constructing of 
moral problems, some of which are bona fide dilemmas, and 
the creation of workable solutions”(Freeman, 1984). 
 
This is neither the time nor the place to go into details as to 
what these differing theories of ethics are. Suffice it to say that 
they have been developed by some of the best minds that the 
world has ever seen. Now it is not the case that these so-called 
“brilliant minds” were entirely right, but rather it is through 
an engagement with their thoughts that we clarify our own 
values (Mitroff, 2004). 
 
As the discussion of the normative theories of moral reasoning as well as the discussion of the 
existing conceptions of CSR and profit making showed, there is no simple algorithm or 
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formula to follow in making ethical judgments in practice.  All the different schools of moral 
philosophy and business ethics have difficulties defending their positions in practice. 
Therefore, “ethical” moral reasoning in practice is commonly viewed to necessarily contain 
different theories, as each approach of moral evaluation employs distinct concepts and 
emphasizes different aspects of morality that are neglected or not emphasized by the others. It 
is therefore broadly claimed that practical ethical decision-making should focus on bringing 
the different moral standards together in order to understand how they relate to each other.  
Conscious moral reasoning in practice must incorporate different moral considerations, 
although only one or the other may turn out to be relevant or decisive in a particular situation. 
It is therefore necessary to systematically inquire into the utility, rights, and justice involved 
in a given moral judgment by asking a series of questions about the intended action (also 
referred to as “checklist approach”).  
 
This perspective of “good” moral reasoning in practice allows even diverging interpretations 
of what constitutes “moral” action to be justifiable, and there is not necessarily one once-and-
for-all action imperative as well as course of action that can be considered “best” or most 
moral. That is, there are some moral problems for which utilitarian considerations might 
rather be found decisive by some people, whereas for other problems the decisive 
considerations are the rights of individuals or the justice of the distributions involved, and for 
others the most significant issue is how those close to us should be cared for
10
.  
Since ethics in practice can be viewed as being concerned with including a multitude of moral 
reasoning and reflection into decision, it is often claimed that it is possible to distinguish 
individuals to the extent to which (and how) they are able to include broader reasoning and 
reflection into their decisions, despite the fact that no optional decision and clear-cut answer 
to the ethical problem can be defined. This thesis argues that this might only be true to a 
certain extent. As Robbins & Wallace note, this understanding of moral reasoning in practice 
where the different moral standards can be used as practical moral reasoning heuristics 
focuses mainly on the conscious ethical problem-solving process (Robbins & Wallace, 2006). 
This paper on the other hand argues that important processes in ethical decision-making 
happen outside the level of awareness, hence unconsciously, as well as that the psychological 
setup of the human being is bound in several ways leading to cognitive biases, which 
complicate the assessment of the individual‟s ethical competence.  
                                                 
10
The decisive criteria could of course also be a combination of these main ”moral” considerations 
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1.5. Critical assessment of the moral cognitive development approach 
The moral cognitive development theory of Rest and Kohlberg has been subjected to several 
criticisms, some of which were already mentioned earlier. The main critique from business 
ethicists is related to the employment of the theory in a business context, Rest‟s and 
Kohlberg‟s measurement tools and the strict stage procession of moral development. 
However, most critique “stayed within” the theoretical base of the cognitive moral 
development approach seeing ethical problems as objective entities and individuals as being 
able to follow rational thought to different degrees. This section shortly summarizes some of 
these more “traditional” critiques.  
One major line of criticism is related to the reach of the possible employment of the theory, 
stating that Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s theories are only limitedly applicable to business (ethics). 
In this line of critique, it is argued that their measurement tools
11
 were not constructed for the 
business population and that it is therefore reasonable to suggest that people confront, 
perceive and judge on moral dilemmas differently in the business context than in other 
contexts. Marnburg (2001) asserts that if moral cognitive development is indeed “dependent 
on contexts”, as often claimed in the business domain, the measurements carried out in 
business ethics research do not produce the same results as in other contexts. Hence, as 
Treviño, Weaver & Reynolds (2006) summarize, moral judgment of business practitioners 
related to non-business oriented cases does not necessarily give an indication of how business 
practitioners “reflect and act within a business context”.  
Psychologists and business ethicists have moreover criticized Kohlberg‟s rigid stage 
progression and the reliance on verbal self-reports as a primary data source. This criticism of 
the strict stage progression has also been linked to Rest‟s claim of a strict causal relationship 
of the decision-making process. It originates from Kohlberg‟s statement that an individuals‟ 
moral development is invariant, i.e. that development only moves in an upward direction 
through the stages (except under psychological regression) and never downwards. As clear 
distinctions and direct causal relations among the cognitive and behavioral stages are posited 
that may be untenable, insofar as e.g. cognition and judgment are not fully separable, Rest‟s 
four-component model has potential problems. 
Further criticism of the cognitive moral development theory regards the normative judgment 
involved when creating the measurement test cases. In order to compare individual‟s moral 
                                                 
11
 Such as Rest‟s paper and pencil survey instrument, the Defining Issues Test (DIT) or the revised version 
(DIT2) 
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reasoning capabilities, the test answer has to deem some judgments as the most advanced and 
thereby as the “right”, “just” or “fair” judgment to a given scenario. Evidently, as earlier 
discussed, this is problematic. Ferrell, Fraedrich & Ferrell (2008) rightly points out that a 
serious constructional issue of the cognitive moral development approach is the choice of 
ethical “values” in moral development theory.  
 
Rarely discussed in existing literature is that Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s did not “test” moral 
awareness as an important component of ethical decision-making at all, as their findings rely 
on the judgments of individuals on pre-defined scenarios. Kohlberg and Rest assumed that 
individuals with high moral development skills were also able to identify ethical problems, a 
claim from with which this paper fundamentally disagrees. The fact that models which are 
based on the cognitive moral development theory “anticipate” the problem identification by 
providing individuals with pre-defined cases for their consideration sheds new light on the 
deficit of this approach to answer the questions raised by Blum (1991). As pointed out earlier, 
Blum claims that some individuals score very high on judging the “right” answer to the 
problem at hand, but don‟t judge (or act) in this way in real life since they might not sense an 
ethical problem in the first place. This not only fundamentally challenges models that built on 
Kohlberg and Rests‟ theorem, it also allows to question e.g. if moral awareness and 
competence can be measured in such manner or at all in beforehand, since due to the ever-
changing domain of business new problems are continuously “produced” (as e.g. “new” 
stakeholders emerge).  
 
The fact that moral awareness as an important part of ethical decision-making was not 
explicitly tested by the measurement tools used by Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s approach, it can 
indeed have severe implications not only on the Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s understandings of 
ethical decision-making, but also on other models which build on their findings. In fact, a 
huge amount of ethical decision-making literature is occupied with the individual and its level 
of moral reasoning, which has led to an overemphasis on applying the right normative 
concepts and principles for moral reflection and behavior, rather than correctly identifying 
(and formulating) the moral problem in the past. Most business ethicists relied in their 
research on a linear model of moral development and see the moral development of the 
individual as the fundamental explanatory variable for (un)ethical behavior (Painter-Morland, 
2008). Exemplarily for this kind of argumentation are critical comments on management 
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practice as so by e.g. Falkenberg who states that “a number of multinational enterprises have 
come under ethical scrutiny over the recent decades” due to “lack of maturity of corporate 
moral reasoning” and thus concludes that pre-conventional and conventional moral 
development is “insufficient as a basis for ethical guidance”.  
The following second part will elaborate on this common understanding of “lack of moral 
maturity”. As it was described in this chapter, the presented perspective requires conscious 
reasoning in a principled manner, where moral reality exists and is recognized by individuals 
to different degrees. This will prove to be fundamentally opposed to the findings of this paper 
that individuals may have sophisticated moral reasoning skills, but, if it is inconsistent with 
the judgments prescribed, will be poorly scored. As this argumentation highlights, a strong 
need to reconsider the theoretical base of the cognitive development theory is identified. 
Reynolds & Ceranic (2009) correctly argue that the depth and the breadth with which 
Kohlberg covered the phenomenon provided a foundation upon which others could build. 
However whether they were pursuing or criticizing their theory, other scholars used the 
cognitive moral development theory as the central stake upon which to “pitch their research 
tent”. This means that although many business ethicists found constructional issues or 
objections in regards of the employment of the theory and the normative judgment involved, 
their critique mostly remained within the theoretical base of the field. But while Kohlberg‟s 
theory created a remarkable surge in ethics research, it also entrenched the field into his 
cognitive approach. Unfortunately, the approach has major limitations, which will prove to be 
relevant not only for the understanding of moral awareness but the entire decision-making 
process. The first is its‟ emphasis on the role of rational thought to the point of excluding 
other decision-making processes such as intuition and emotions. Second, it fails to adequately 
account for the role of contextual factors (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2009). Lastly, Kohlberg‟s and 
Rest‟s theoretical base doesn‟t account for the fact that judgments and thought is often 
motivated to avoid conflicts of interests and to protect the individual‟s ethicality. The 
following chapter will be dedicated to understanding the limitations in more detail by building 
a critique towards “sound” moral awareness and judgments.  
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Summary & Limitations 
In the first part of the paper, existing theoretical approaches of ethical decision-making 
models were presented and critically discussed. Until very recently, the state of the field was 
one where responsibility for unethical behavior in the business domain was mainly attributed 
to the lack of personal reasoning skills of individuals which follow rational thought only 
partly considering situational and contextual variables (e.g. Jones, 1991; Treviño, 1986), 
rather than to the other intuitive emotive and cognitive mechanisms that operate when 
individuals face ethical situations. Hence it was concluded that without (enough) moral 
awareness (i.e. cognitive moral development), some decisions will more likely be evaluated as 
a straight-forward financial decision.  Most approaches have in common that they claim that 
individuals can make “sound” ethical judgments (hence judge in objective impartial terms) 
independent of their context, as the cognitive moral development theory assumes morality to 
be a relatively stable character attribute, which individuals possess or not, “settled in a 
particular stage of moral development”. However, as Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe (2008) 
highlight and already mentioned in the introduction, the empirical study of ethics that has 
surged in the past two decades provides “clear evidence that ethical thinking and behavior is 
prone to many of the same mental processes and pitfalls, some outside of consciousness, as 
the rest of human thinking and behavior”. Individuals across the board perceive themselves 
e.g. as much more moral than their peers. Due to the clear empirical evidence which 
contradicts the main (implicit) claims of the cognitive moral development theory, the 
following chapter will address the second research question in depth, discussing what 
potential barriers to sound ethical judgment are and built on that discussion, elaborate if 
existing descriptive approaches of ethical decision-making sufficiently describe the ethical 
decision-making process. 
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2. Part two: Barriers to “sound” ethical decision-making 
  
The concept of boundedness leads us to the important 
distinction between descriptive and normative views of human 
behavior. A normative view of behavior is grounded in the 
assumption that the operation of the human mind is not 
constrained.  A descriptive view of behavior is grounded in the 
assumption that mental processes are constrained in ways that 
make normative operations impossible (Chugh, Banaji & 
Bazerman, 2005). 
 
As argued in part one, when seeking to elucidate ethical failures, explanations rooted in the 
cognitive moral development theory focus mainly on the level of cognitive moral 
development of the individual. This is in line with the idea that most business scandals are the 
responsibility of “bad apples”. As DeCremer (2009) asserts, this assumption is intuitively 
compelling and attractive to use because it is a simple and straightforward solution, which, at 
the practical level, facilitates the identification and punishment of those deemed responsible. 
However, as already mentioned in the introductory part, several empirical findings indicate 
that individuals can be “blind” to ethical problems despite being aware of advanced normative 
theories (e.g. as demonstrated by their ability to consciously consult a broad range of different 
moral consideration/perspectives in moral reasoning), which according to Kohlberg should 
indicate a high level of personal moral cognitive development. Moreover, numerous studies 
find that individuals across the “defined different levels of cognitive development” perceive 
themselves as more moral than their peers. As these findings cannot be explained by models 
which are rooted in cognitive moral development theory, this paper proposes that all people 
can behave unethically given the right “circumstances” due to certain constraints of the 
human mind and cognitive biases of human thought. In order to support this argument, this 
chapter critically questions some of the main assumptions of the cognitive moral development 
theory. This thesis contributes to a new stream of research arguing that much (unethical) 
decision-making occurs outside the individuals‟ awareness. This is in contrast to the common 
assumption of deliberate “cheating” in traditional normative principal agent models (De 
Cremer, van Dick, Tenbrunsel, Pillutla & Murnighan, 2011). Moreover, arguments are 
presented that support a new line of provoking research (with authors such as Ayal & Gino, 
2011; Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2009; Gino, Norton & Ariely, 2010), which suggests that while 
people are sometimes not “aware” of an ethical problem at hand, in other situations they are 
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able to knowingly behave unethically (cheat with full awareness), explicitly violating their 
own ethical standards while maintaining a positive view of themselves and their ethicality. 
In order to support the above-presented perspectives, this paper applies a positive/descriptive 
approach aiming to examine how individuals actually make decisions and how they “react” 
and “interact” with a situation where an ethical problem dimension resides. As the positive 
approach applied focuses on actual behavior of individuals, this paper draws largely from 
work in (cognitive) psychology, which is considered “the scientific study of human behavior 
and thought processes” (Quinn, 1995).  
 
So far, the path from moral awareness to moral behavior has been conceptualized as a 
decision-making process. According to Robbins, Wallace & Puka (2003), in psychology, 
decision-making is generally only considered to be a stage within a broader problem-solving 
process of the individual. Kilmann (1979) highlights the centrality of problem-solving to 
business practice, decision-making and the managerial role in general: “One might even 
define the essence of management as problem-defining and problem-solving, whether the 
problems are well-structured, ill-structured, technical, human or even environmental. 
Managers of organizations would then be viewed as problem managers, regardless of the 
types of products and services they help their organizations provide”. Following this line of 
thought, and in order to better understand ethical decision-making from a descriptive 
viewpoint, this paper elaborates profoundly on the perspective of seeing ethical decision-
making as part of a broader problem-solving process of the individual. The focus of this part 
of the paper will then lie on barriers that inhibit “sound” ethical problem-solving. It begins by 
looking at how individuals become aware of and construe (ethical) problems.  
 
2.1. On (ethical) problems 
Rest defined the “recognition” of ethical problems as an interpretive process. He understood 
ethical behavior as the culmination of a multi-stage process initiated by this recognition, with 
a set sequence of steps and causal relationships within this process. In order to not build on 
the theoretical base of the cognitive moral development theory, this chapter investigates how 
individuals formulate and conceive of ethical problems “from scratch”.  First, the “nature” of 
an ethical problem from a cognitive psychological perspective is discussed. Following this, 
Pedersen‟s (2009) approach on the content of the process how individuals become aware of 
and conceive of ethical problems is presented. 
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2.1.1. Nature of an ethical problem 
In the field of cognitive psychology, the definition of a problem often refers to and relies on a 
statement by Duncker. Duncker (1945) referred to the situation when “a living organism has a 
goal but does not know how this goal is to be reached” as a problem. According to the 
definition, a problem consists of three components: a starting state, a goal state and a set of 
possible actions to move from the starting to the goal state (Green & Gilhooly, 2005). Until 
today, many psychologists find this definition helpful. It follows that, what constitutes a 
problem for one individual may not necessarily constitute a problem for another, as for 
example the other person might know how to reach the desired goal state, or might “sense” or 
“interpret” the start state or construe or see the goal state differently.  
Building on the distinction of different dimensions of problems by Mitroff (1998), Pedersen 
(2009) suggests that ethical problems are typically part of a broader problem set consisting of 
n-dimensions
12
, as for example ethical, financial and interpersonal. This is in line with 
statements of scholars such as MacDonald (2002), who argue that, e.g. due to the rather 
technical nature of a problem, “managers fail to conceive the moral dimension of a problem”. 
Hence, an ethical problem can be understood as being one dimension of a broader problem 
context.  
In abstract terms, ethics is considered the “branch of philosophy dealing with values related to 
human conduct, with respect to the rightness and wrongness of certain actions and to the 
goodness and badness of the motives and results of such actions” (Random House Inc, 1987). 
In other words, ethics generally defines what appropriate actions “constitute for an individual 
or a group in a moral dilemma” or problem set. As discussed in part one of this paper, ethical 
considerations can be based on the choices “right” versus “wrong” action (i.e., means), 
“good” versus “bad” results, or “virtuous” versus “vicious” character. Combining the two 
perspectives of ethics and problems leads to an understanding of ethical problems as one of 
the dimensions of a broader problem set, in which ethical values are at stake and a “judgment” 
on a moral issue is necessary. This is in line with Mitroff‟s understanding of ethics as “being 
fundamentally about justifying one‟s values in the light of the arguments that various theories 
of ethics address to our values” (Mitroff, 2004).  
 
 
                                                 
12Mitroff‟s (1998) problem dimensions were “Technical-scientific”, “Social-interpersonal”, “Existential-
spiritual” and “Systemic” 
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Problem-solving 
There are some theoretical contributions to ethical problem-solving in the field of psychology 
which claim that not only the cognitive moral development is relevant to predict an 
individual‟s problem-solving processes, but also other factors. These theories will be 
reviewed here before developing and discussing a perspective building on a newer stream of 
research.  
 
Describing ethical problem-solving, Robin & Wallace (2006) assert that there are, despite the 
dominance of the cognitive moral development theory, other important theories for 
understanding ethical decision-making, such as the “taxonomy of ethical ideologies”, as well 
as “theories of personal values”. As extensively discussed in the first part of this paper, moral 
cognitive development theory postulates that individuals can move sequentially through six 
stages of development, beginning with a person following rules in order to avoid punishment 
and ending with a stage where individuals act in accordance with self-chosen principles. 
Painter-Morland (2008) asserts that the research tradition employed in moral reasoning and 
cognitive moral development approaches has focused on “moral justice”. Criticizing Rest‟s 
and Kohlberg‟s theory, Gilligan (1993) indicates that, within the theory of cognitive moral 
development, a bias exists in favor of individuals that generally hold a more justice-oriented 
view (especially at the highest stages). Building on these same lines of critic, Robbins & 
Wallace (2006) conclude that, while people may not only be on a “particular developmental 
level” when solving ethical problems, they also use particular “ethical perspectives” (i.e. 
ideologies), which can be considered “lenses” through which ethical problems are seen. These 
ethical ideologies, according to the two authors, vary between individuals and describe their 
“location” with respect to different “dimensions” such as relativistic/universalistic and 
idealistic/pragmatic
13
 orientation. Moreover, Robin & Wallace (2006) point out that in order 
to fully understand and simulate a particular person‟s ethical problem-solving process, one 
needs to know more than his or her ethical ideology and his or her moral development level - 
one also needs to understand what he or she “values”. This is in line with other literature 
                                                 
13
 Davis and colleagues find idealism and relativism to account for differences in ethical judgments in 
business practices and reports that “differences in relativism and idealism influence the individual‟s 
emphasis on various moral criteria when making ethical judgments. For example, individuals high in 
idealism display a predilection for invoking rules about justice and fairness” (Davis, Anderson & Curtis, 
2001 in Robin & Wallace, 2006). 
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within cognitive psychology, according to which personal values often “underlie ethical 
decisions” (see e.g. Ayton, 2005). The concept of values is especially important when 
building on the view of moral awareness presented in the first part of this paper as both the 
“interpretation of” and ascription of importance to (i.e. value-based judgment) ethical problem 
features. Rokeach (1973) claims that to have values can be understood as having a relatively 
“enduring prescriptive or proscriptive belief that a particular mode of behavior or end-state of 
existence is preferred to an opposite mode of behavior or end state”. He also asserts that 
values can be regarded as serving different functions, such as adjustive, ego-defensive and 
self-actualizing. The different functions will be discussed in more detail at a later stage in this 
chapter. This short introduction into the concept of values indicates that they must be 
considered as a social psychological concept with broad implications for ethical decision-
making (i.e. for management and business ethics). DeCremer (2009) claims that, as a concept, 
values have both a cognitive and an emotive/ intuitive foundation, which provide the basis for 
“formulating long term goals, for reflecting on individual and organizational identity and 
responsibility, and for measuring and communicating corporate success using an increased 
repertoire of measure and indicators”. The presented arguments indicate that values influence 
our expectations “to create and recreate our social reality” (Nyeng, 2007) while providing us 
with the vocabulary and tools for developing new perspectives on e.g. identity, responsibility, 
but also leadership and success. Since ethics should be about creating and recreating our 
social reality, as argued in the background page of this paper, values are indeed of high 
importance for better understanding ethical problem-solving and decision-making. This then 
leads to the question where ethical values of the individual “come from”. 
 
Ethical values are often considered to be the result of a (relatively long) socialization process. 
This is in contrast to attitudes, which are seen as more dependent on particular situations and 
experiences (Morsing & Pruzan, 2006). Haidt (2008) contributes to a different understanding 
of ethical values by suggesting five “foundations of morality”, which he believes are “written 
on the first draft of the mind”14. He argues that these five different moral intuitions are diverse 
systems in the moral mind. Based on this view, Haidt describes (for example) liberals and 
conservatives as differently “programmed” with regards to these intuitions. This allows the 
perspective that, even if acknowledging that there might be similar “response mechanism” of 
                                                 
14
Haidt suggests these five foundations of morality to be harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, 
authority/respect, purity/sanctity 
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individuals across the world (a claim which could be discussed), the “programming” of 
morality (i.e. the human “values”) can differ across individuals. This perspective adds an 
important dimension to the understanding of values as well as of the nature of ethical 
problems. According to this view, ethical problems can be viewed as both defined by 
psychological moral “response mechanisms” (or an individuals‟ psychological response to the 
moral features of a situation at hand), as well as the “programming” which incorporates 
categorically similar thinking into the earlier “lenses” perspective of Robin & Wallace and 
other theories of moral values. 
 
The implications of the line of argument presented above are of high importance for the 
perspective on ethical decision-making and problem-solving presented in this paper. Arguing 
that individuals use different “lenses”, are differently “programmed” or possess different 
values leads to the conclusion that ethical problems are, at least partially, “constructed” and 
individually “perceived” by individuals. This is different from a perspective, which sees 
moral reality as something which can be defined in objective terms. The presented view is in 
line with Pedersen (2009), who, when discussing the ontological status of ethical problems, 
offers a “remedy” in terms of viewing ethical problems “as qualitatively personal, and thus to 
some extent subjective, but that the actual moral features of ethical problems are not 
subjectively construed and that we differ in our ascription of moral significance to these due 
to individual differences in psychological characteristics”. 
The perception of moral problems cannot only change between distinct cultures, among 
different groups within one culture and individuals, but also over time. In other words, this 
conception of ethical problems implies that there is no “universal” moral content of a 
problem. Rather, ethical problems are better understood as being partially “designed” by 
moral agents and hence be seen as a fluid concept.  
 
The implications of this view on ethical problem-solving and decision-making are manifold. 
“Response mechanisms” which define the individual‟s psychological response to the moral 
features of a situation as well as the value-laden ascription of importance to these 
psychological reactions not only strongly influence the process of the individuals constructing 
of (ethical) problems, but also the subsequent problem-solving. This highlights once again the 
central importance of the first stage of problem-solving, which has been referred to as moral 
awareness. In this context, Haidt (2008) presents a provocative view of the moral awareness, 
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which allows for a more detailed discussion in the next chapter. He claims that our minds are 
“not merely designed to unite us in teams or divide us against other teams, but also to “blind 
us from the truth”” – he argues that our psychological setup is “bounded” and creates a certain 
awareness bias. This is why he considers it of utmost importance to understand our moral 
psychology in order to comprehend why “everybody thinks he is right”.  
Another important implication of seeing ethical problems as partially constructed by 
individuals is that, as values (similarly to the concept of “programming”) cannot be 
considered deterministic, ethical problem-solving can be “learned” and trained. This is of 
major importance for the role of education. The fact that moral “lenses” and “values” (which 
influence the ascription of importance to moral features of a situation) can be “developed” 
differently can generate socially powerful, as well as “problematic” tendencies, as Hendry 
(2004) claims. He, by way of example, states that large businesses e.g. dictate their “values 
and terms” to those developing countries in which they operate, and that they control the 
agendas of major international agencies. According to him, they successfully “impress their 
own values upon the world at large” and thereby also influence the way individuals construe 
ethical problems. He further argues that, through expensive public relations expenditures, 
through the media and through involvement in educational programs, businesses are able to 
communicate the value that for example business itself, as a social institution, is important 
and to be trusted
15
, that businesses are “responsible and caring”, and that any curtailment of 
their power would damage the prosperity of society. This can influence the ethical “lens” of 
society as a whole as Hendry (2004) argues.  
 
2.2. How individuals construe (ethical) problems 
The position developed in the previous paragraphs has important implications for the 
understanding of the entire ethical problem-solving and decision-making process. One of the 
main assumptions of the cognitive moral development theory highlighted in part one was that 
moral awareness is an interpretative process, where the individual “recognizes” moral reality 
to different extents. However, the current chapter outlined that the interpretation of ethical 
problem features cannot be considered as universally “true” and that, instead, it must be 
considered as socially constructed. As this contradicts one of the main underlying 
                                                 
15
 This seems to work as the debt ratings of the large TNCs are higher than those of many smaller countries, 
and they also own a large proportion of the world‟s physical, financial and intellectual assets. 
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assumptions of cognitive moral development theory, are consideration of the understanding of 
how individuals become aware of and construe ethical problems, and therewith the theoretical 
base of the cognitive moral development theory, is necessary.  
2.2.1. Emphasis on rational thought 
According to the theoretical base of the cognitive moral development theory, when 
individuals do not “recognize” moral problems and subsequently display behavior that 
violates “accepted” moral standards, this is due to “bad apples” which are believed to have 
underdeveloped moral awareness (i.e. cognitive development). As Butterfield, Treviño & 
Weaver (2000) write, an individual at a certain development stage in a morally laden situation 
should realize - to different degrees- “that his or her potential decision or action could affect 
the interests, welfare, or expectations of the self or others in a fashion that may conflict with 
one or more ethical standards”. An important assumption of this perspective is that underlying 
is the idea that moral awareness is a rational process. According to literature supporting this 
view, people interpret moral problems in a conscious manner in which cognitive corrections 
can be applied (Sparks & Hunt, 1998). However, this view is problematic in different ways. 
As elaborated earlier, moral awareness must be understood as incorporating a judgment in 
itself and can therefore not be considered as a pure “technical” process. 
 
Blum (1991) offers a major critique of rational thought approaches in ethical decision-making 
by differentiating between two stages of moral awareness. A central point Blum raises is that 
perception of ethical problems - as the very initial phase of moral awareness - involves moral 
capacities not encompassed by moral judgment (which is a part of moral awareness). In other 
words, he argues that certain aspects of moral perception cannot be identified with the same 
capabilities as a moral judgment, but precede a moral judgment. Blum argues for the notion of 
perception claiming that knowing how to apply a principle and to pick the best among the 
possible actions, involves a moral capacity beyond “commitment of adherence to, or 
recognition of the validity of, the principles itself”. This view contradicts the cognitive moral 
development view as talking of an awareness of a situation existing “at different levels”. 
Blum highlights that the notion of salience (or thinking about degrees in which ethical reality 
can be interpreted) preserves the idea of reasoning in a principal manner; as by contrast that of 
“perceiving situations under different descriptions” - as used to express the way the same 
situation can be seen differently by different perceivers - does not (Blum, 1991). Blum 
illustrates this with the example that when a person is confronted with a specific situation, 
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he/she has to be aware of the fact that promise-keeping and harm are morally relevant 
features, while taking a walk or eating cereals normally are not. Build on this argument, he 
concludes that it must be moral perception which “constructs the problem” when an agent is 
faced with a (moral)problem in the first place, while the moral judgment bridges general rule 
in a particular situation depending on the prior “individuating” of the situation (Blum 1991). 
Hence existing conceptions of moral awareness must be considered as exaggerated regarding 
the fact that they do not include the process of “individuating” which precedes and defines 
latter processes. Here, Blum highlights a central point: In order to understand moral decision-
making (as well as to improve moral competence), we cannot easily say that individuals 
become aware of moral issues or problems to different extents (or degrees of principled 
reasoning), but that we need to understand how the individual construes problems. To better 
understand ethical decision-making, we therefore need to pose the questions Blum asks to all 
of us: “How do agents come to perceive situations in the way that they do? How does a 
situation come to have a particular character for a particular moral agent?” 
2.2.2. Role of intuition and emotions 
…the idea that our decisions and judgments are not always colored by 
conscious reasoning processes is supported by recent research on 
morality, intuition and affect. This intuitionist framework suggests that 
moral judgments and interpretations are the consequence of automatic 
and intuitive affective reactions (De Cremer, van Dick, Tenbrunsel, 
Pillutla & Murnighan, 2011). 
 
Many moral philosophers and business ethicists are committed to the idea of a “free”, or 
independent moral agent, who makes his or her decisions based on conscious reasoning in an 
objective and impartial manner. Since moral imperatives are thought of as being articulated in 
“objective” terms, according to these philosophers, it is possible to establish their universal 
validity beyond doubt. As it is believed that “other factors” would introduce an unacceptable 
form of subjective bias into the process of objective moral deliberation, most of their models 
take care to exclude from consideration the singular contingencies and dynamics that pertain 
to particular relationships and situations, as well as emotions and intuitive responses to 
(ethical) problem features (Painter-Morland, 2008). This was highlighted in the first part of 
this paper. 
According to rationalist approaches, moral judgments are primarily reached by a process of 
conscious reasoning and reflection on the moral problem and the recognition of an ethical 
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problem (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932). In order to prove this fundamental assumption 
wrong, Haidt (2001) presented a group of participants with scenarios that included obvious 
violations of “moral rules” that needed to be judged morally “right” or “wrong”. Analyzing 
the process how individuals become aware of and solve ethical problems made Haidt believe 
that an individual‟s judgment in a moral conflict situation is often intuitive and emotional. In 
other words, he found that moral stimuli are often identified “spontaneously, unconsciously 
and automatically”.  
 
Haidt (2001) concluded that, while his participants were able to decide whether they found the 
actions of the fictional actors morally right or not, they often could not provide an immediate 
reasonable, principle-based argument for their decision. Based on this, they concluded that 
their participants judged the scenarios intuitively without evaluating all available facts. He 
consequently asked himself if reasoning in these cases was the cause, rather than the 
consequence of a moral judgment - since people in their cases “undeniably” engaged in 
conscious moral reasoning. Based on subsequent studies, Haidt (2001) gives several reasons 
for the hypothesis that conscious moral reasoning does not always cause moral judgments; 
rather, conscious moral reasoning is often a “post-hoc construction”, generated after a 
judgment has been reached and a problem has been “constructed”. Haidt argues that the 
conscious moral reasoning process is often “more like a lawyer defending a client than a 
judge or scientist seeking truth” in order to exemplify the problem of “motivated reasoning” 
inherent in the human nature. He asserts that the reasoning process readily constructs 
justifications of intuitive judgments, causing an illusion of objectivity (or objective 
reasoning). He claims therefore that moral behavior many times co-varies more with moral 
emotions and intuitions than with conscious moral reasoning “outcomes”. 
After having presented Blum‟s claim that moral perception involves different moral 
capabilities rather than moral judgments, Haidt‟s research strongly doubts the causal 
connection between awareness and reasoning as proposed by Rest and Kohlberg. Moreover, 
Haidt questions one of the fundamental assumptions of the cognitive moral development 
theory as described in approaches by Kohlberg and Rest. He argues that at least two cognitive 
processes are at work - conscious moral reasoning and automatic reflexive emotive intuitive 
responses to moral problems, which are “motivated” and biased.  
Haidt (2001) posits that moral intuitions precede moral reasoning, arguing that one‟s overall 
moral judgment is heavily biased toward the leanings of a rapid and automatic process, rather 
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than a slower, more thoughtful one. Based on his fundamental critique of existing ethical 
decision-making models building on the cognitive moral development theory, Haidt 
developed an alternative model of ethical decision-making, the social intuitionist model 
(SIM). In this model, he links rational and intuitive processes in a dual-process model 
following the tradition of dual-process models of persuasion in attitude research (such as e.g. 
Chaiken, Libermann & Eagly, 1989). He emphasizes that moral judgments are mainly 
dependent on moral intuitions, claiming that they are caused by quick moral intuitions and are 
followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto moral reasoning. However, Haidt does not 
deny that judgments can be “rationalized” (i.e. overridden) post hoc by conscious reasoning. 
This may trigger a new intuition that contradicts the initial one (Seiler, Fischer & Ooi, 2010). 
Hence he suggests a circular, interactional perspective on the process of how individuals 
construct and solve ethical problems. Haidt finds his views supported by neuro-scientiﬁc data 
which proves that the areas of the brain tooled for cognitive reasoning and those that generate 
more automatic responses are both activated during moral decision-making (Greene, 2009). In 
fact, the importance of intuitive and automatic processes has recently been supported strongly 
by research in the field of social neuro-cognition. It shows that relatively automatic and 
intuitive affective reactions often play a much bigger role in our judgments than initially 
thought. 
 
Haidt (2001) defined moral intuition as “the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral 
judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious 
awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a 
conclusion.” Reynolds and Ceranic (2009) argue that emotions and intuitions arise from the 
appraisal of “significant” objects, where emotions provide the individual with a form of 
judgment indicating how to respond to any given situation. However, despite the widespread 
acknowledgement that emotions and intuitions affect judgment, there is little research on the 
role of emotions within the business ethics domain (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2009).  
Kahneman (2002) supports the above perspective on at least two cognitive processes/families 
of thought (intuition and reasoning) at work when solving (ethical) problems. Intuition, he 
argues, is responsible for both “marvels and illusions”. Kahneman writes that the good thing 
about intuition is its “quite” good accuracy and the long time it takes to form. The bad part is, 
as he argues, that it cannot only be erroneous, but also that the systematic errors are very 
“difficult to correct”. This claim will be discussed in more detail in the third part of this paper. 
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It is nowadays commonly accepted terminology in cognitive psychology to hold a two-system 
view, which distinguishes intuition and reasoning. While the former is described to be rather 
automatic, effortless, associative, fast yet slow-learning and emotional, the latter is conscious, 
slow, controlled, effortful, rule-governed, flexible and (emotionally) neutral. The best way to 
tell if you are in system one or two is, according to Kahneman, to do an “effort diagnostic”. It 
is argued that you are in system 2 if an interruption by a concurrent activity - for example 
somebody making noise while you are trying to study - proves irritating (McManus, 2004). 
 
Kahneman (2002) argues that the core concept to understand intuitive judgments and 
preferences is accessibility. Accessibility can be understood as the ease with which particular 
mental contents come to mind (Higgins, 1996). A defining property of intuition for Kahneman 
is that they “come to mind spontaneously”, like percepts. He argues that in order to really 
understand our intuitive and emotive thoughts, one must understand why some of them are 
more easily accessible while others are not. Accordingly he argues that e.g. category labels, 
descriptive dimensions (attributes, traits) or values of dimensions, all can be described as 
“more or less accessible for a given individual exposed to a given situation at a particular 
moment” (Kahneman, 2002). Kahneman further asserts that the concept of accessibility 
subsumes the notions of stimulus salience, selective attention, and response activation or 
priming, which will be referred to in the next chapter. 
 
Kahneman goes as far as calling his theory of how the human mind works an “evolutionary 
speculation”. He claims that intuition is an “adaptation of human perceptual systems over 
time”, including seeing, hearing, and “all the modes by which we try to make sense of the 
world” (Kahneman in McManus, 2004). He claims that contextual and situational variables 
determine how we interpret the things we perceive, and that our minds often rush toward 
single interpretations while actively suppressing alternative interpretations. Kahneman 
considers doubt as a pure product of System 2 as it is a “consideration of the possibility of 
alternate perceptions”. Kahneman also offers the warning that “we‟re not aware of cases in 
which our intuition is leading us astray”. 
The presented 2-System view is also referred to by Brooks (2011). “Emotion assigns value to 
things”, he writes and argues that “reason can only make choices on the basis of those 
valuations”. Of the two levels of the mind, the unconscious and conscious, Brook, as several 
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other researchers on this topic, argues that the unconscious is of major importance for 
(ethical) decision-making. 
Brooks view moreover illustrates well the problems of terminology which authors who write 
on this topic typically face. Whereas he describes the contents of the unconscious mind as 
“emotions, intuitions, biases, longings, genetic predispositions, character traits and social 
norms, sensations, perceptions, drives and needs”, it can be claimed that these processes are 
partly “conscious,” in the usual sense of the word, since they are parts of conscious 
experience (Nagel, 2011). Hence, the sense in which they are unconscious, which is maybe 
what Brooks and Haidt were referring to, is that they were outside direct conscious control. 
2.2.3. Role of contextual factors 
Our analysis of business organizations as complex adaptive 
systems suggests that the ineffable sense of normative 
congruence that develops among those who participate in an 
organizational system over time may be of a far more complex 
and relational nature (Painter-Morland, 2008). 
 
As argued throughout the paper, the theoretical base of the moral cognitive development 
theory treats ethical imperatives as if they were immutable truth and as if the validity of them 
remains unaffected by the particularities of interpersonal and contextual variables. Little 
consideration is given to the need for an “appropriate” context of particular relationships and 
situations (Painter-Morland, 2008). Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s theories of moral development 
thereby insufficiently take into account that - a truism in psychology - personality and 
situation “interact” to influence awareness and judgments, as do cultural and societal 
influences. The lack of attention paid to context must clearly be considered another major 
limitation of the cognitive moral development approach. Despite relevant theories in other 
closely related fields (such as e.g. Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and explicit attempts to steer 
research in this direction (as for example Treviño, 1986; Jones, 1991), business ethics 
research has generally failed to adequately address the social “interaction” between the 
individual and the environment during the decision-making process (Reynolds & Ceranic, 
2009). 
 
Ethical problem-solving does not occur in a vacuum. The well-known Stanford Prison 
Experiment demonstrates that the power of a situation can play an important role for moral 
behavior. Monin & Jordan (2009), amongst numerous other researchers, argue that our own 
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conception of the moral self is not stable and trait-based; but rather “dynamic and influenced 
by situational factors that fluctuate from moment to moment”. The cognitive approach tacitly 
elevates the individual and his or her cognitions without fully acknowledging the role that the 
environment plays in shaping awareness and behavior. Current theories building on 
Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s theoretical base are unable to capture this important feature of ethical 
decision-making. In order to try to make sense of the content of the process how the 
individual becomes aware of ethical problems and the role of contextual and situational 
factors in this process, some theoretical contributions to this topic are reviewed, before a more 
advanced conception, developed by Pedersen (2009), is presented.  
 
Several scholars (Treviño, 1986; Jones, 1991) have tried to include contextual variables in 
their models of moral behavior. However, most of them were rooted in the cognitive moral 
development approach. Jordan (2009) argues that, from a social cognition perspective, 
“recognition” of moral issues requires one‟s selective attention to, encoding of, and recalling 
of “moral-related stimuli”. This “awareness as recognition” perspective has a long history in 
social cognition research. Fiske and Taylor (1991) argue that since all situations present large 
amounts of stimuli, it is necessary for an individual to attend to some stimuli while ignoring 
others. Those stimuli that are salient and most likely to be encoded into memory are believed 
to be the ones that are compatible with the individual‟s existing “schemas” for a situation. A 
schema is considered “a cognitive structure [representing] knowledge about a concept or type 
of stimulus” and is - according to Fiske and Taylor (1991) - developed based on one‟s goals, 
motivations, and social experiences related to a given situation. Schemas can be understood as 
providing “scaffolding” for assimilating information, one that structures memory, aids in 
recalling, and edits data that is deemed relevant (Anderson et al., 1983 cited in Monin & 
Jordan, 2009). Because these schemas are thought to be used to interpret stimuli, they are also 
believed to affect moral awareness and the process of how the individual “recognizes” ethical 
problems. 
 
Butterfield, Trevino & Weaver (2000) argue that the individual‟s relevant social sphere is 
important in determining whether an individual “recognizes” a moral issue. They suggest that 
the awareness that a particular activity is ethically problematic is more likely to be triggered if 
an individual perceives a social consensus within the organization/ profession than if not. 
Thus, Butterfield, Trevino & Weaver (2000) indicate that ethical problem-solving is very 
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much a social process (while still assuming moral awareness is an interpretive process of 
moral reality). Consequently to these approaches, it is commonly argued that when business 
organizations do not involve moral language into their daily routine, “straightforward, non-
moral scripts guide much routine decision-making”. Hence, since selective attention and 
recall are thought to be necessary for moral awareness, the use of euphemistic or unemotional 
language to describe ethical problems is argued to be one example of how one can have 
muted or underdeveloped “ethical prototypes” or schemes (Gioia, 1992). 
 
Reynolds (2006) approaches the question how individuals construe/ recognize ethical 
problems from a neuro-cognitive perspective. He refers to neuro-cognitive processes of 
“reﬂexive pattern matching” to explain the initial stage of moral perception. He writes that 
electrochemical signals produced by stimuli from the environment are compared to and 
matched with existing “prototypes” in the brain, which are dependent on prior experiences 
with problem-solving. These prototypes then allow the decision-maker to react accordingly. 
Hence, if the pattern matches a prototype related to an ethical problem, the information is 
“transmitted to consciousness”, allowing the decision-maker to apply conscious ethical 
reasoning processes. Thus, Reynolds claims, moral awareness is dependent on the existence 
of such ethical prototypes. Monin & Jordan (2009) theorizes that since prototypes are 
developed through prior experiences, it can be assumed that the type and magnitude of former 
experience with and exposure to “ethical problem situations” shapes the presence and nature 
of existing ethical prototypes. 
Moreover, Reynolds (2006) argues that individual differences interact with issue 
characteristics to shape moral awareness, which is to a certain extent different compared to 
the presented other approaches. He draws from the social cognitive perspective on attention 
and concludes that individuals can be more “attentive to information based on their cognitive 
predispositions”. Based on this perspective, Reynolds (2006) suggests that the stages of moral 
decision-making may not be discrete elements of a formulaic thought process but may 
actually be interrelated in a very way such that the stages of moral intent, moral judgment, 
and moral behavior influence moral awareness as well as the other way around. Staying 
within the research paradigm of moral awareness as recognition, he suggests that the 
relationship between ethical predispositions and moral awareness is rooted in the aspect of 
attention.  He derives a major implication for theories of moral cognitive development from 
these findings: Although “somewhat maligned over the years”, theories of moral cognitive 
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development offer a “reasonable basis” for understanding the effects of ethical predispositions 
on moral awareness (Reynolds, 2006). 
 
As the above summary of existing conceptions of the process how individuals perceive of 
ethical problems highlights, contextual variables are often believed to influence the 
“recognition” of ethical problems. Theories of stimuli, schemes, ethical prototypes, attention, 
and attentiveness have been proposed to explain the process. However, as outlined by 
Pedersen (2009), “we must understand what triggers an individual‟s moral sensitivity in a 
given situation in order to adequately understand that a moral judgment is not only an analytic 
or epistemological issue, but indeed an ontological one”. Most approaches agree that the 
ethical content of a problem “exists”, in the sense that contextual variables influence the 
process of “recognition” of ethical problems. In contradiction with these views, also this 
thesis argues that ethical problems are better understood as being partially a social 
construction of the individual based on the moral features of a problem which evoke an 
emotive, intuitive, and thereby partly unconscious psychological response which the 
individuals interprets and uses to “construct” a problem.  
In order to describe the process of how the individual conceives of an ethical problem, 
Pedersen (2009) refers to the notion of “stimulus dependence”. He writes that ethical 
problems can be real even if it is problematic to conceive of them as “objective entities”. Lai 
(1991) argues that” the objectivist conception of problems as representations of objective 
entities existing independently of the observer implies that individuals recognize problems, 
whereas the subjectivist conception of problems as mentally projected categories (or labels) of 
events and situations implies that individuals construe problems” (Lai, 1991 in Pedersen, 
2009). Believing that problems can be both objective and subjective, Lai proposes that 
problems are defined by different degrees of “stimulus dependence”, meaning that they stem 
from the combination of moral stimuli of the situation (as interpreted by the individual) as 
well as the individuals‟ response to these stimuli.  
 
Pedersen (2009) writes that the conception of stimulus dependence implies that rather than 
seeing problems either as objective representations of reality or as subjective constructions of 
the individual‟s perceived reality, some problems can be characterized as “more directly 
dependent on the potentially problematic features of the situation, while on the other hand of 
the scale, problems are less directly constituted by the actual stimuli, and rather a result of the 
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individual‟s psychological processes in perceiving and interpreting the problem, such as 
framing, creativity and cognitive style” (Pedersen, 2009). This approach is clearly opposed to 
the cognitive moral development theory, which understands moral awareness solely as the 
individual‟s active interpretation of the problem in the situational context. It implies that the 
individual indeed partially “constructs” the ethical problem through the psychosocial 
perceiving and interpreting processes. This perspective sees moral blindness as being 
constructed by the individual himself, as opposed to the common understanding as lack of 
ethical problem recognition capabilities. The awareness of ethical problems can differ to the 
degree of which moral features are represented, as the individual is necessarily interpreting 
the content of ethical problems “into” the situation. Following this argument, the perception 
of ethical problems may differ to the degree to which they directly reflect moral features of a 
situation - as opposed to being “read into” situations by individual, as Pedersen (2009) 
conclusively argues.  
 
Pederson‟s (2009) perspective on the process how individuals become aware of ethical 
problems helps to better understand (as well as to see differently) Chugh & Bazerman‟s 
(2005) claim that moral awareness of individuals is bounded. The two former authors claim 
that most predictions offered of how individuals react to external stimuli have shared the 
implicit assumption that humans are able and actually do perceive the stimuli available to 
them “accurately”.  They however, as well as several other authors (such as De Cremer, van 
Dick, Tenbrunsel, Pillutla & Murnighan) have challenged this tacit assumption and provide 
evidence that individuals often as well as systematically “fail to see and use stimuli and 
information easily available to them”. This more recent view allows to view individuals as 
being “bounded aware” to both objective and subjective moral features of problems, which 
prevents them sometimes from focusing on easily observable and relevant data, or 
respectively common, simple interpretation processes. This claim in combination with 
Pederson‟s (2009) perspective goes somewhat behind the more common view of the 
phenomenon of moral blindness as situations in which humans do not “see” accessible and 
perceivable moral information during a problem-solving process, but “see” other equally 
accessible and perceivable information. Consequently it can be argued that not only ”useful 
information” remains out of focus for the decision-maker, but also that some simple cognitive 
interpretative processes of the individual are bounded, which lead to bounded awareness of 
individuals.  
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2.2.4. Moral disengagement 
A central concept that helps to understand how individuals can differ in perceiving of moral 
content of a situation, as well as the extent to which moral blindness is “produced” by the 
individual, is the psychological process of moral disengagement. Moral disengagement is a 
term from social psychology describing the process of convincing the “self” that ethical 
standards do not apply to oneself in particular contexts, hence disabling the mechanism of 
“self-condemnation” (Fiske, 2004).  
Bandura (1999) proposed the idea that most people are guided by personal standards of 
ethical behavior, and when these standards are activated, they play a self-regulatory role 
reflected by guiding good behavior (consistent with the standards) and deterring misconduct 
(which would violate the standards). He writes that people generally do things that give them 
“self-satisfaction and a sense of self-worth”. They normally refrain from behaving in ways 
that violate their own moral standards. However, as Bandura (1999) also argues, moral 
standards only function as fixed internal regulators of conduct when these self-regulatory 
mechanisms have been activated.  And there are many psychological processes to prevent this 
activation. He proposes that people often disengage these self-regulatory processes through 
anticipatory “moral disengagement” processes. Moral disengagement processes “free” 
individuals from self-sanctions and guilt that would normally accompany the violation of 
one‟s own moral standards. Bandura clearly conceptualizes moral disengagement as 
“anticipatory”. When morally disengaged, unethical behavior becomes more likely, as moral 
features of situations are only conceived poorly or not at all. In a way, moral disengagement 
can thus be seen as protection or “buffer” that allows people to free themselves from feeling 
guilty and at unease with the idea that they may have violated accepted moral standards. 
Moral disengagement is particularly successful to reduce feeling of dissonance that would 
normally occur if an individual has strong moral awareness when harming the interest of 
others, Shu, Gino & Bazerman (2011) assert. Bandura (1999) proposes different categories of 
moral disengagement mechanisms, each one of which can manifest itself in multiple ways: 1) 
cognitive reconstruction of behavior (moral justification, euphemistic labeling, and 
advantageous comparison); 2) minimizing one‟s role in the harmful behavior (displacement of 
responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, and disregarding or distorting of the consequences) 
and 3) focus on the targets‟ unfavorable acts (dehumanization and attribution of blame).  
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2.2.5. Implications 
The presented understanding of how individuals perceive of ethical problems fundamentally 
departs from the traditional measurement process where human beings can be ranked 
according to their cognitive moral development, i.e. the extent to which they “recognize” 
moral reality. Rather it is proposed that the “ethicality” of a given problem depends on a 
combination of the individual‟s psychological response to moral features of the situation at 
hand, as well as the individual‟s interpretation of and interaction with these features. 
The position was presented that it is wrong to believe that we mainly think through principles 
to come up with morality, but rather that these processes are largely influenced by the 
individuals‟ emotions and intuitions. It was moreover argued that situational and contextual 
factors can strongly influence the process when the individual becomes aware of an ethical 
problem. This view helps to understand De Cremer, van Dick, Tenbrunsel, Pillutla & 
Murnighan‟s (2011) position that “some contexts may be sufficiently compelling for almost 
anyone to engage in unethical behavior”, as they argue that the perception of the ethical 
dimensions of problems heavily depends on the problem environment. Hence, arriving at a 
more complete understanding of these circumstances must be considered as one essential part 
to improve business practice.  
The presented process of how ethical problems are perceived based on Lai‟s stimulus 
dependence construct as proposed by Pedersen (2009) must be placed between perspectives in 
which the characteristics of the individual are emphasized and critical management 
perspectives in which situational and institutional constraints are emphasized. Pedersen‟s 
“third way” both acknowledges the importance of the individual‟s moral competence, while 
also allowing the hypothesis that inadequacies in ethical problem-solving may stem from 
boundaries of seeing ethical dimensions of problems, and that these may be externally 
inflicted on the individual in terms of education, societal and organizational regulations or 
social arrangements (Pedersen, 2009).  
 
Subscribing to this view, the fundamental assumption of the cognitive development approach 
that an individual can gain a completely objective, rational understanding of what is morally 
required of him/her is not tenable. This is in line with Painter-Morland‟s view who argues that 
it is impossible to think of individuals as isolated, rational agents who are capable of 
objectively operationalizing rational protocols whenever and wherever it is deemed necessary 
to arbitrate in matters of ethical significance. The fact that individuals often do not perceive of 
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the moral dimension of a problem is hence not necessarily due to them being “morally 
uneducated”, but possibly due to psychological processes such as moral disengagement which 
lead to “ethical fading” (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). 
 
2.3. How individuals solve (ethical) problems 
The huge submerged bulk of the mental iceberg, with its stores 
of memory and acquired skills that have become automatic, 
like language, driving and etiquette, supplies people with the 
raw materials on which they can exercise their reason and 
decide what to think and what to do (Nagel, 2011). 
 
The previous chapter elaborated on the idea that perceiving of moral problems includes itself 
value judgments, which are traditionally believed to be moral reasoning features. The strict 
division between moral awareness and moral reasoning of Rest‟s Four Component model 
does not support this perspective. Rest‟s approach must hence be abandoned, as the cognitive 
processes at work when perceiving of and judging on moral problems are interrelated. 
Another central thought of the previous chapter is that the individual is bounded in its ability 
to perceive of ethical problems due to psychological processes such as moral disengagement.  
The cognitive mechanisms at work when perceiving of ethical problems strongly “influence” 
(subsequent) problem-solving processes. However, problem-solving processes are not only 
integrated into as well as dependent on a previous perceiving of ethical problems, but the 
cognitive processes when trying to identify a solution to an ethical problem at hand are also 
subjected to the same or similar errors in moral thought (i.e. the psychological processes that 
bound the individual). This chapter further elaborates on this claim by discussing 
contributions from the cognitive psychology domain on how individuals commonly solve 
(ethical) problems. Focus lies on the different cognitive mechanisms that bound the 
individual.  
 
Scholars within the psychology domain have defined problem-solving in different ways. 
Generally it is understood to encompass a broad range of activities in which the individual 
tries to identify a solution to a problem to reach the goal state. Green & Gilhooly (2005) assert 
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that problem-solving takes place over time, “interleaving” a range of cognitive and emotional 
processes and drawing upon pieces of knowledge, which are represented in various ways
16
.  
2.3.1. Problems with “sound” problem-solving 
Despite this robust evidence about boundedness, humans tend 
to view their own ethicality as unbounded. In fact, decision-
makers are psychologically motivated to maintain a stable view 
of a self that is moral, competent, and deserving, and thus, 
immune from ethical challenges. Because individuals view 
their immunity as more powerful than the situation (moral, 
competent), and view any gains incurred as appropriate 
(competent, deserving), this view is a barrier to recognizing 
and addressing conflicts of interest (Chugh, Bazerman & 
Banaji, 2005). 
 
As mentioned earlier, a well-documented empirical fact of ethical decision-making research is 
that individuals across the board perceive themselves (i.e. their “solution” to the ethical 
problems) as more “moral” than their peers. This allows the assumption that they not are 
bounded when they perceive the start state (i.e. the moral problem), but also in identifying 
“ethical” solutions to construed problems. However, as argued before, a clear division 
between perceiving of problems and problem-solving is not possible, as the subjective 
perspective implies that relevant processes are interwoven.  
The above empirical finding suggests that in every “ethical situation” psychological/cognitive 
mechanisms are at work which lead to an illusion of moral rectitude and objectivity of the 
individual. To better understand this tendency of individuals, problems to “sound” ethical 
decision-making shall be discussed in more detail. The approach chosen is descriptive, largely 
drawing upon psychological concepts and theories.  
 
                                                 
16
Based on Robbins and Wallace (2006) definition of ethical problem-solving and the perspective 
developed so far, the process of problem-solving can be understood as “the iterative process of 
“interacting” with one's environment, construing the start state of an ethical problem based upon both what 
one values morally and the moral features of the situation while potentially engaging in moral 
disengagement processes, framing and re- framing the problem or sub-problems from various morally value 
laden perspectives to reach the goal gate, applying knowledge to develop and consider alternatives, 
choosing an alternative or alternatives, intending to act morally, and then acting towards achieving those 
alternative(s). 
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Literature on problem-solving in the field of psychology suggests that when solving a 
problem, individuals often perceive to “encounter” (i.e. construe) problems that are similar to 
problems they have encountered (construed) previously, and moreover, they often only think 
that problems they encounter (construe) are similar to previous ones. In the former case, even 
if a solution (i.e. how to reach the goal state) to a “thought to be similar but indeed new” 
problem is unknown, individuals are reminded of a previous solution of a (thought-to-be) 
similar problem and suggest the previous (or somehow similar) solution to the “new” 
problem. That is, they are guided to the solution by the use of analogy (Green & Gilhooly, 
2005). This indicates two central points. Firstly, it highlights again the elementary role of 
moral awareness for sound problem-solving- i.e. that the ethical dimension of a problem is 
perceived of in a rich manner in order to distinguish the construed problems from similar 
ones. Secondly, it indicates that previous solutions and strategies to problem-solving influence 
actual problem-solving. Hence, the experience with problem-solving as e.g. experiences 
during school and university education, affect actual problem-solving strategies.  
 
The use of analogy can on the one hand be considered a positive feature for ethical decision-
making. For example, Moran, Bereby-Meyer & Bazerman (2008) found that individuals who 
were encouraged to see and understand the common principle underlying a set of seemingly 
unrelated tasks demonstrated an improved ability to discover solutions in a different task that 
relied on the same underlying principle. Moreover, Thompson, Gentner & Loewenstein 
(2000) argue that existing learning styles often “distract” us from seeing important 
underlying, generalizable principles, which is where analogical reasoning appears to offer 
“hope for overcoming this barrier to decision improvement” (Milkman, Chugh & Bazerman, 
2008). 
On the other hand, however, it can also provoke problematic practices as it can lead to a 
conviction of moral rectitude and objectivity independently of the underlying principle and 
thereby a cognitive bias. A core argument supporting this claim is that humans rely on 
simplifying strategies or “cognitive heuristics” (i.e. rules of thumbs). While these heuristics in 
general offer “useful” short cuts, they also lead at times to systematic unethical judgments 
(Bazerman & Chugh, 2005). 
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Tversky & Kahneman (1974) point out that while the use of analogy leads to a storage of 
problem-solving strategies, another phenomenon labeled availability heuristic
17
- the process 
of e.g. predicting the frequency of an event, or a proportion within a population, based on how 
easily an example can be brought to mind - leads to a cognitive bias of human problem-
solving strategies. Kahneman (2002) argues that the availability heuristic is based on an 
assessment of accessibility of attributes, in which frequencies or probabilities are judged by 
“the ease with which instances come to mind”. Related heuristics are the “representativeness 
heuristic” - the tendency of individuals to judge probabilities on the basis of resemblance, as 
well as the concept of “affect heuristic”, referred to as the inclination of human beings to base 
their decision on their emotional reaction rather than a more conscious cost-benefit 
calculation of risks and profit. Moreover, the term “attribute substitution” is used to describe 
the occurrence when human beings make judgments of target attributes that are 
computationally complex, but automatically intuitively substitutes the attribute with an easier 
judgment/heuristic attribute. According to this finding, people often make complex judgments 
by unconsciously substituting for an easier judgment.  
Tversky & Kahneman presented several of these heuristic principles in 1974. When being 
awarded the Nobel Prize in 2002, Kahneman (2002) reiterated in his speech the claim “that 
people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of 
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations”. Kahneman 
(2002) asserts that reliance on e.g. the availability heuristics leads to predictable and 
systematic cognitive biases (Evatt, 2010). The cognitive biases then help to explain the 
perception of moral rectitude and objectivity of the self. The concepts of the use of analogy, 
the cognitive heuristics and attribute substitution are similar in many ways. They all intend to 
describe psychological processes, which are believed to underlie several cognitive biases as 
well as perceptual illusions. The terms hence unify a great number of separate explanations of 
barriers to sound ethical problem-solving. 
 
Although Kahneman & Frederick (2002) admit that their initial discussion of accessibility 
effects has been rather “restricted” to the differential accessibility of attributes (such  as  
probability and similarity) on which judgment objects vary (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), 
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Availability, salience and vividness are terms which refer to very similar things in social psychology but 
have slightly different meanings. They may actually all refer to the same underlying concept, and they 
positively influence one another, but they are each used consistently in different theoretical contexts. 
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they suggest that a similar  analysis  can be applied  to  the  accessibility  of particular values 
of attributes. This is highly relevant for ethical decision-making, as easier accessible values as 
well as solutions can be “overweighed”, and when these values are considered as possible 
solution to ethical problems they can become ”potent  anchors”  (Epley & Gilovich, 2002).   
A common business practice (and business education practice) is the reduction of complex 
(ethical) problems to simple financial cost-benefit business cases. This practice can (partly) be 
explained by referring to the above-presented concepts. McCoy (2007) writes that “the 
socialization process in a new business situation, or even a new client situation, always 
involves sensitivity to what is going on around us” and “[…] not all the signals will be 
explicit, and it‟s easy to misread a situation”. This suggests that since not all dimensions of a 
problem are always equally salient, information overload might increase reliance on learned 
approaches and the use of analogy, which in our business paradigm suggests a simple 
cost/benefit analysis. The consequence of this is that ethical problem-solving is reduced to a 
pure cost-profit calculation. This means that acting on legitimate interest of stakeholders 
beyond legal requirements is only a viable alternative if money is to be made this way. The 
tendency of “bounded” ethical problem-solving might even be increased if a lot of financial 
information is available, as ethical content is competing even more “strongly” for attention 
with other salient (i.e. how easy features can be brought to mind) dimensions of the problem. 
Bazerman & Chugh (2005) suggest four similar conditions that correspond to the types of 
information and tasks that compete for the decision maker‟s attention, leading to a “focusing 
failure”. According to the two authors, this occurs when (1) another task competing for 
attention; (2) the primary task is seemingly clearly defined with narrow default assumptions 
(3) the information provided is “affective” (d) the information is relevant to the self 
(Bazerman & Chugh, 2005). 
 
The presented concept of the use of analogy when solving (ethical) problems suggests that 
problem-solving strategies of business practitioners strongly rely on strategies learned at 
home, business school and workplace. The reduction of ethical problems to one-dimensional 
economic problems can hence be regarded as the result of a “learning process” and as one 
reason why managers vote for the “non-ethical” alternative more often than their “personal 
morality” (conscious normative beliefs) with less “experience and knowledge of cost/benefit-
approaches” would suggest. In general terms, as De Cremer, van Dick, Tenbrunsel, Pillutla & 
Murnighan (2011) correctly assert, people are “limited” or “bounded” in “updating their 
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beliefs continuously and can thus not always take perfect and accurate decisions”. Many of 
our decisions are biased in the sense that we make use of different kinds of cognitive 
heuristics and stereotypical beliefs which many times have an intuitive character. This was in 
a similar vein claimed by Chugh, Banaji & Bazerman (2005) who argue that the impact of 
psychological biases leads individuals to engage in unethical behavior that does not respond 
to their own normative beliefs. The claim that our mind is bounded is supported heavily by 
research outside the domain of ethics, and has even been empirically documented by several 
cognitive scientists. 
The following two examples of typical cognitive processes (priming and framing) indicate 
how these heuristics can be used for “immoral” marketing and sales (i.e. business) practice, 
although we might not be aware of it. Nagel for example claims that “if you tell people to 
write down the first three digits of their phone number and then ask them to guess the date of 
Genghis Khan‟s death, they will be more likely to put it in the first millennium, with a three-
digit year, than those who are asked without the preliminary” (Nagel, 2011). Hence 
individuals seem to prime information unconsciously in certain ways which later bounds their 
conscious reasoning. Moreover, the example of “framing” shows how the way (ethical) 
information is presented is relevant for problem-solving, as showed by the following claim: 
“If a surgeon tells his patients that a procedure has a 15 percent failure rate, they are likely to 
decide against it; if he tells them the procedure has an 85 percent success rate, they tend to 
choose it” (Nagel, 2011). 
 
Related to the illusion of objectivity through analogical reasoning, Keltner, Langner & 
Allison (2006) describe how power
18
 can affect “sound” problems solving of individuals. 
They first argue that the acquisition or distribution of power is not random. Instead, as they 
assert, power normally “tends to be given/to be taken to people who are more likely to act in 
an impulsive and self-interested fashion”. Their main claim is that this acquired power affects 
moral judgments through a process of disinhibition
19
 leading to impulsiveness and, as a 
consequence, often to the rationalization of the perceived self-interest. They propose that this 
can even evoke a social consensus - and that this social consensus tends to entrench the 
“views and values” of those in power. Using a cost-benefit analysis as a moral guide of 
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 As the ability to control one‟s environment or other entities 
19
 Experimental psychological research suggests that the powerful people are, the less they take on the 
perspective of others, implying that the powerful have less empathy (Collins, 2006) 
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powerful actors can hence have self-fulfilling effects
20
. Ghoshal (2005) claims that by 
“propagating ideologically inspired amoral theories, business schools have actively freed their 
students from any sense of moral responsibility”. He thereby highlights a major weakness of 
management theory vs. “hard sciences” that “if a theory assumes that the sun goes round the 
earth, it does not change what the sun actually does. So if the theory is wrong, the truth is 
preserved for discovery by someone else. In contrast, a management theory - if it gains 
sufficient currency - changes the behaviors of managers who start acting in accordance with 
the theory” (Ghoshal, 2005). This perspective allows to better understand Ulrich‟s (2002) 
claim that today‟s neoclassical economics is the consequence of a progressively and 
institutionally “unleashed” and normatively “disinhibited” economization of all areas of life, 
as “bounded” ethical problem-solving can have self-fulfilling effects. Hence, “unethical” (i.e. 
often self-interested, impulsive) behavior can gain a social legitimization, which is why 
managers often experience feelings of moral rectitude of their action. This perspective also 
highlights that all the approaches, strategies and vocabulary individuals (or managers) acquire 
when learning to deal with problems - which are often supported by formal institutional forces 
- are of major importance for ethical problem-solving and business ethics.  
In the previous chapter it was argued that moral disengagement processes can lead to ethical 
fading (moral blindness). Related to the discussion of this chapter on the barriers on sound 
ethical problem-solving, Chugh, Bazerman & Banajis‟ concept of bounded ethicality makes a 
similar argument, arguing that individuals are cognitively limited based on earlier research on 
the notion of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). 
2.3.2. Bounded ethicality 
Some of the presented barriers to sound ethical problem-solving can probably be included 
under the definition of bounded rationality and have recently been conceptualized in the 
notion of “bounded ethicality”. As intensively discussed by Chugh, Bazerman & Banaji 
(2005), individuals tend to view themselves as moral, competent, and deserving, and this view 
obstructs their ability to see and “recognize” (construe) conflicts of interest when they occur. 
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Robert Merton defines a self- fulfilling prophecy as a prediction that “is, in the beginning, a false 
definition of a situation evoking a behavior which makes the originally false conception come true” 
(Merton (1948) in Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton (2005)).  
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Bounded ethicality refers to the idea that our moral and ethical concerns are colored by self-
favoring interpretations. This leads people to display behavior that contradicts their own 
ethical/moral standards when applying it to others.  
Chugh, Bazerman & Banaji (2005) argue that in the bounded ethicality model, self-processes 
can work unconsciously to protect a particular view and this view “binds” sound ethical 
decision-making. Ethical decisions are, according to the authors, always biased by a 
“stubborn” view of oneself as moral and thus, not susceptible to conflicts of interest. This 
allows individuals to dramatically vary their interpretation of a situation, even when given 
identical information. Individuals begin to construct problems with their preference for a 
particular outcome, e.g. motivated by self-interests, and then justify this view on the basis of 
fairness through a biased perspective on which attributes constitute fairness. Importantly, the 
“ethical failure” does in this case not lie in the commitment to fairness but in the biased 
interpretation of information and the biased construction of the problem
21
. The authors 
mention the example of an individual who puts effort into recycling, but refuses to take public 
transportation may justify this decision by convincing him - or herself that recycling is the 
most important way of addressing environmental degradation (Chugh, Bazerman & Banaji, 
2005). 
The concept of bounded ethicality helps to understand what Hendry (2004) referred to when 
he argued that while we may condemn “fat cat” CEOs for taking massive salaries and stock 
options while closing pensions schemes and making workers redundant and while given the 
chance - as he asserts - “most of us would “gladly” swap places with these managers and take 
whatever reward we could, without any sense of moral guilt”. The described bias exaggerates 
a conflict of interest as the decision-maker retains an unrealistic confidence in his or her 
“perception” of data about the situation. This effect of bounded ethicality might be even 
increased when acting in different cultural, socio-economic contexts, as he asserts. 
 
To conclude, the concept of bounded ethicality claims that individuals are constrained in 
systematic ways that favor self-serving perceptions and interpretations, which lead to a feeling 
of moral rectitude (i.e. a cognitive bias) and result in behaviors that (may) contradict our own 
ethical standards (Banaji, Bazerman & Chugh, 2005). Bounded ethicality can therefore be 
regarded as the manifestation of Simon‟s bounded rationality in the domain of ethics. 
                                                 
21
The paper only refers to the interpretation and perception of the data 
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2.3.3. Cognitive biases  
Help comes from the strangest places. We are living in the 
middle of a revolution in consciousness. Over the past few 
decades, geneticists, neuroscientists, psychologists, 
sociologists, economists, and others have made great strides in 
understanding the inner working of the human mind. Far from 
being dryly materialistic, their work illuminates the rich 
underwater world where character is formed and wisdom 
grows. They are giving us a better grasp of emotions, 
intuitions, biases, longings, predispositions, character traits, 
and social bonding, precisely those things about which our 
culture has least to say. Brain science helps fill the hole left by 
the atrophy of theology and philosophy (Brooks, 2011).  
 
The previous chapter presented psychological mechanisms which where claimed to result in 
different forms of cognitive biases. Indeed the presented concepts such as the use of analogy 
and the different cognitive heuristics such as the availability heuristic are regarded as the main 
theoretical causes leading to a broad range of cognitive biases.  
The term cognitive bias is generally used to describe different kinds of “distortions” in and of 
the human brain, which are considered as relatively persistent (hence difficult to eliminate), 
and which result in behavior based on these “errors”. It is important to note that the cognitive 
biases, although mainly unconscious, both are responsible for human perceptual distortions 
(hence poor or wrong perception of situations/problems), as well as unreasonable 
interpretations of attributes and problems features (i.e. hence both intuitive and conscious 
thinking), finally leading to non-sound, faulty, inaccurate (ethical) problem-solving (i.e. 
judgments) and/or distorted views of reality.  
 
In what follows, a carefully selected list of biases documented in cognitive psychology that 
also apply to business ethics is presented. The list is the result of an analysis of how common 
biases can inhibit ethical decision-making in business. However, mostly only the theoretical 
part of the bias will be presented, and several examples of areas of application are imaginable. 
In the third part of this paper it will be argued that being aware of (as well as right-mindedly 
being “exposed” to) common biases is believed to contribute to promoting moral competence, 
as self-awareness of bias blind spots is a critical component in acknowledging that ethical 
decision-making is an act of balancing where the claim of moral objectivity and rectitude 
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needs to be constantly and critically evaluated by the individual. The presented overview is by 
no means exhaustive, but rather thought to contribute to better understanding some of the 
fundamental challenges (not only) managers are facing: 
- Cognitive psychology refers to the already mentioned “framing effect” as the tendency of 
human beings to (mostly unconsciously) draw different conclusions from information, 
depending on how the information is presented. The framing effect allows the idea that 
manipulating the way how information is presented can influence and alter how problems 
are constructed and situations are interpreted, and hence also judgments about that 
information (Bradley, 2010). Related to ethical decision-making in business, this effect 
also allows to make unethical behavior appear benign, and can thereby be related to the 
process of moral disengagement (especially advantageous comparison).  
- The term focusing effect or focusing failure is used to describe a common human error in 
thinking - the tendency of too heavily relying on one trait or piece of information, which 
generally is the piece of information “right in front of us”, or the piece with which we are 
most familiar, or which the one which is easiest for us to access or evaluate (Collier, 2010). 
A major underlying theoretical concept of this cognitive bias is the availability heuristics. 
Focusing failure can occur unconsciously (through emotions and intuitions) and even 
opposed to conscious moral principles or preferences.  
- The “primacy effect” refers to the tendency to weigh initial events more than subsequent 
events. This can narrow our sight same as the “anchoring effect”, a term which refers to the 
tendency to rely too heavily, or “anchor”, on a past reference or on one trait or piece of 
information when making decisions (also called “insufficient adjustment”) (Evatt, 2010).  
- The “term base-rate bias “is used to describe the tendency of individuals to ignore statistics 
and focus too much on (random) particularities (Evatt, 2010), while the term “clustering 
illusion” is referred to as the tendency of human being to see patterns where actually none 
exist (related to the “use of analogy” concept).  
- The ostrich effect is generally referred to when totally ignoring obvious (ethical) problem 
features. This is somehow similar to the “Semmelweis reflex”, which is a term used to 
describe the reflex-like rejection of new evidence that contradicts entrenched norms (i.e. an 
established paradigm, such as e.g. the homo oeconomicus view of economic behavior) 
(Kohavi, 2008). Both concepts when applied to ethical decision-making remind of moral 
disengagement processes described earlier in this thesis. 
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- The cognitive bias referred to as “selective perception” is the personal “filtering” of what 
we see and hear so as to suit our own “needs”, hence the tendency for expectations to 
affect our perception. Much of the related cognitive processes are claimed to be 
unconscious (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 1998). Whereas the term 
selective perception refers only to the “perception” of a situation, the term confirmation 
bias refers to a type of selective “attention, interpretation and reasoning” whereby 
individuals tend to notice and to search for what confirms one‟s perception/ beliefs/ 
position, and to ignore/ not look for/ undervalue/ dismiss evidence of what contradicts 
one‟s beliefs. Gilovich (1993) hypothesized in this context that the “most likely reason for 
the excessive influence of confirmatory information is that it is easier to deal with 
cognitively”. The effect is also referred to as “myside bias” used to describe the inclination 
of people to fail to look for or to ignore evidence against what they already favor. 
- Related to the earlier in this thesis mentioned fundamental attribution error, the term 
“actor-observer bias” is used to describe the tendency for explanations of other individuals‟ 
behaviors to overemphasize the influence of their personality and underemphasize the 
influence of their situation. For the business ethics context also the “deformation 
professionnelle bias” is relevant, which is a French phrase used to describe the tendency of 
individuals (i.e. business professionals) to look at things from the point of one‟s (their) 
own profession rather than from a “broader” perspective (Bönisch, 2007).  
- The halo effect refers to the tendency of individuals (and business professionals) to assume 
that personality traits “spill over” from one area of life to another. Halo effects occur when 
positive qualities about a human being in a certain area lead us to assume that he or she is 
able to perform in other areas of life as well (Evatt, 2010). 
- The term “bias blind spot” is used to describe the tendency of people to be unaware of and 
not compensate for their own cognitive biases. Individuals are often not able to recognize 
their own biases and idiosyncratic interpretations (nor the effects on their judgments and 
preferences). Instead, people often assume that others “share” the same preferences and see 
others as biased if they do not agree. Hence, individuals show a broad and pervasive 
tendency to see (and even exaggerate) the impact of bias on others‟ judgments while 
denying its influence on their own (Evatt, 2010). This bias bears strong similarities with 
the presented concept of bounded ethicality. Other related concepts are the “illusion of 
control” and “neglect of probability”. The term “illusion of control” is generally used to 
illustrate an individual‟s belief that they have “influence over the outcome of 
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uncontrollable events” when they clearly have not (Montier, 2007). Montier asserts further 
that the illusion of control (as well as the illusion of knowledge) stems “over-optimism and 
overconfidence”. The cognitive bias effect labeled “neglect of probability” refers to the 
tendency of people to completely disregard probability when making decisions when an 
outcome is uncertain (i.e. under uncertainty). Finally, the “better-than-average bias” refers 
to the human inclination to think we are better-than-average at many things (Evatt, 2010). 
The term self-serving bias is similarly used to describe the tendency to claim more 
responsibility for successes than failures. It may also manifest itself as a tendency for 
people to evaluate ambiguous information in a way beneficial to their interests (see also 
group-serving bias) 
- The term “omission bias” is generally used to describe the tendency to judge harmful 
actions as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful inactions (Baron & Ritov, 2004). This 
bias is closely related to the “outcome bias”. The former term describes the tendency of 
individuals to judge a decision by its eventual outcome instead of based on the quality of 
the decision (intention) at the time it was made. Gino, Moore & Bazerman (2009) 
described this bias in more detail in their paper “No harm, no foul: The outcome bias in 
ethical judgments”. The authors show that the same behaviors produce more ethical 
condemnation (judged as more blameworthy) when they happen to produce bad rather than 
good outcomes, even if the outcomes are determined by chance. 
- The “loss aversion effect” refers to the “disutility of giving up an object is greater than the 
utility associated with acquiring it”. This is also known as “sunk cost effect”. The principle 
of loss aversion was first introduced by Kahneman & Tversky (1979), and includes 
previous thinking such as the “status quo bias” (the tendency for people to like things to 
stay relatively the same) and the “endowment effect” (the effect of individuals to value a 
good/ service more once their property right to it has been established) (Montier, 2007). 
These biases can be theoretically linked to the positive outcome bias, which refers to the 
inclination of human beings to generally overestimate the probability of good things 
happening to them (also known as the “wishful thinking effect”). 
- Another often discussed cognitive bias is the “hindsight bias”, also sometimes called the 
“I-knew-it-all-along” effect. This term describes the inclination of people to see past events 
as being more predictable than they, in fact, were before they took place. The hindsight 
bias encourages a view of the world as more predictable than it really is (Shiller, 2010). 
Psychologists moreover labeled the tendency to incorrectly remembering one‟s past 
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attitudes and behavior as resembling present attitudes and behavior as “consistency bias”. 
This former bias makes it “difficult” to admit errors, especially in a business context where 
performance and track records are very important. It finally can lead to engaging in 
behavior that elicits results which (consciously and unconsciously) confirm our existing 
beliefs. Hence we are inclined to engage in behaviors that bring results which confirm our 
beliefs, which is also known as the “self-fulﬁlling prophecy” (Evatt, 2010) 
- The term “bandwagon effect” is used to describe the tendency of humans to believe and do 
things because many other people believe or do the same. The likelihood of a bandwagon 
effect is greatly increased as more and more people adopt an idea or behavior; this has led 
to the pejorative description “herd effect” in reference to this behavioral phenomenon 
(Smith, 2011). Similarly, the “group-think bias” refers to the tendency to do (or believe) 
things because many others do. The term “out-group homogeneity bias” is used to describe 
the inclination of people to see members of their own group as being relatively more varied 
than members of other groups. Closely related to this idea, the term “trait ascription bias” 
refers to the tendency for people to view themselves as relatively variable in terms of 
personality, behavior and mood while viewing others as much more predictable.  
- Finally, the “in-group bias” refers to the practice of individuals to give preferential 
treatment to others they perceive to be members of their own groups, such as e.g. shown as 
the recent study by Gino, Ayal & Ariely (2009). Gino, Ayal & Ariely found in their studies 
that individuals tend to cheat more after they had observed cheating behavior by an in-
group member and less when the observed cheating was committed by an out-group 
member. This and other studies allow the assumption that unethical behavior of in-group 
members is contagious. It hence seems that when individuals are exposed “in-group 
unethical behavior”, they more often align with the action resulting in unethical behavior 
committed by themselves, opposed to when an out-group cheats, which doesn‟t have the 
same assimilating effect. The authors therefore believed that whether a group member‟s 
cheating lead to contagion or restitution depends on the “presence of out-group observers”. 
This approach is somehow opposed (as well as additive) to prior research, which claimed 
that both individual (such as gender or age) and contextual (codes of ethics and personal 
incentives) factors mainly influence unethical behavior (summarized by e.g. Loe, Ferrell & 
Mansfield, 2000; Ford & Richardson, 1994).  This new idea suggests that while individual 
and contextual factors are important to understand the origin of unethical behavior, the 
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“example set by only one individual (e.g., a colleague or a peer) can also have large 
consequences” (Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2009).  
- The consequences of this bias are stereotyping (a member of a group is expected to 
have certain characteristics without having actual information about that member). 
This bias can also be related to the documented “racism bias”, the human inclination 
to mistreat individuals who act and look different (Evatt, 2010). 
 
The above presented different cognitive biases have in common that they all affect sound 
problem-solving, as well as many of them underlie common theoretical causes. The main 
underlying theoretical causes, the use of analogy and heuristics including the availability and 
affect heuristic, as well as the individuals bounded rationality have already been presented in 
the previous chapter.  
 
Shu, Gino & Bazerman (2011) interestingly highlight that while “the bounded ethicality22 
perspective emphasizes how unethical behavior results from our lack of awareness”, a new 
line of research (with authors such as Ayal & Gino, 2011; Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2009) 
suggests that many of us will explicitly cheat with full awareness, as just discussed. They 
argue that individuals explicitly violate ethical standards while maintaining a positive view of 
their own ethicality. Hence, it appears that there two different major mechanisms at work that 
lead to behavior inconsistent with beliefs, both of which can happen unconscious, one where 
the individual acts unethical without being aware of it and the other on where is he is fully 
aware but engages in self-serving interpretations of his act. In this context, Shu, Gino & 
Bazerman (2011) argue that morality and memory are both “malleable dimensions that reset 
to align with action”. Given the desire of the individual to perceive oneself as moral, when a 
mismatch between action (i.e. problem-solving strategy) and goal state occurs, people either 
change the action or change the goal (Shu, Gino & Bazerman, 2011). 
These conclusions are confirmed by common management practices, such as when choosing 
consciously between different solutions to problems. Managers often tend to “justify” 
unethical behavior by “external” circumstances, and hence turn to “amoral” approaches to 
problem-solving as the following statement by McCoy (2007) exemplarily illustrates: “I 
excused my actions by pointing to the high adrenaline flow, a super-ordinate goal, and a once-
in-a-lifetime opportunity, all common factors in corporate situations, especially stressful ones 
                                                 
22
 This can be related to other biases presented in this paper 
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[…]”. Reference to competitors, or in the words of Bandura “advantageous comparison”, is 
frequently used to excuse non-moral decision-making by arguing “everybody is doing it”. 
Naturally, it easy to respond to this argument because it is simply not true that “everyone is 
doing it”. Many companies refuse to engage in the practice in question, some even at the cost 
of not operating in the country or region in question at all (De George, 1993). A similar 
argument is often applied to justify ones‟ own position of business practices in a competitive 
environment. Here, the contextual reference is that managers often feel powerless and prefer 
to mortgage their “ethics” until they are the CEO of a company because they think that only 
those at the top can effectively take a moral stand. This leads to, often conceptualized in the 
prisoners dilemma, what economists termed, the “tragedy of the commons” or the fallacy of 
composition to describe behavior of those who do not believe that their actions, even in the 
aggregate, can make a difference. Hence the tragedy of the commons allows existing theories 
to continue to dominate the marketplace, while moral rectitude is perceived by managers and 
business practitioners. 
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2.3.4. Summary 
“I may consciously choose from a menu, but I do not 
consciously choose what foods to like” (Nagel, 2011.) 
 
As discussed in this chapter, several significant challenges to developing a rich and more 
complete body of knowledge regarding moral decision-making are rooted in the theoretical 
base of the field. The study of moral behavior is deeply entrenched in a cognitive approach 
and has focused primarily on understanding how individuals process and analyze information 
(Haidt, 2001). This can undoubtedly be traced to ethical philosophy, which for centuries has 
given primacy to rational thought of the individual (especially Kant), lately supported by 
cognitive psychologists Kohlberg and Rest. 
A core finding of this paper is that we are not only a product of our conscious thinking, but 
also of emotive and intuitive processes. While the conscious gives us one way of making 
sense of morality, the unconscious mind gives us other, more supple ways, which influence 
the perception of ethical problems and ethical problem-solving. It was suggested that moral 
judgments are (or at least can be) quick and affect-laden rather than elaborated and reflexive 
reasoning processes. The presented reviews provide compelling evidence that “hot” affective 
unconscious responses strongly influence the individuals‟ decisions and can lead to an ethical 
failure in the sense that the individual is not able to make a purely “rational” assessments.  
 
Moreover, the individual‟s moral awareness and problem-solving processes are limited by 
several cognitive biases. Several barriers to “sound” ethical problem-solving are identified in 
this paper, which support idea that even “ethical” people can engage in stereotyping, favoring 
their own group, being affected by conflicts of interest, and “overclaiming” credit (Chugh & 
Bazerman, 2005). 
A major barrier to ethical decision-making is the invisibility of cognitive biases. Biases in an 
ethical context lead to for example self-serving interpretations. People are usually unaware of 
the factors that bias or skew their ethical judgments, and they suffer from what can be called 
the “illusion of objectivity” (Messick, 2006). The cognitive biases further leads to individuals 
not “sensing” ethical problems when processes of moral disengagement are at work, which 
impact the individual‟s tendency to experience less or no conflict in the case of a moral 
problem situation. When construing and solving ethical problems, individuals automatically 
frame self-serving interpretations, as asserted by Chugh, Bazerman & Banaji (2005). This 
tendency might even create a broadly accepted social legitimation if combined with e.g. 
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power. Keltner, Langner & Allison (2006) argue that people who rise to power are often 
concerned with self-serving pursuits. Once given power, they argue, individuals are likely to 
pursue with little constraint their goals, desires, and impulses. And by their very action, 
powerful individual evoke social environments that become self-fulfilling. 
 
More generally, the psychological influence of processes such as bounded ethicality and 
moral disengagement impact the individual‟s tendency to experience less conflict in the case 
of a moral dilemma (i.e. moral awareness is reduced). Or in other words, these psychological 
processes clearly support the phenomenon referred to as moral fading. Tenbrunsel & Messick 
(2004) note, ethical fading is a “process that removes the difficult moral issues from a given 
situation, hence increasing the likelihood for unethical behavior”. The moral implications of 
one‟s decision thus fade away because of the underlying dynamics of people‟s self-serving 
and self-deceiving perceptions (DeCremer, 2009). Bazerman & Chugh (2005) refer to recent 
research in social and cognitive psychology, which, according to them, has documented the 
ability of the human mind to “focus on specific information while failing to incorporate other 
information that is readily available and relevant”. They defined this ability as “bounded 
awareness”, as the individual‟s failure to “see” and use accessible and perceivable information 
while “seeing” and using other equally accessible and perceivable information. This concept 
must be extended by the individuals‟ boundedness in perceiving of ethical problems, as the 
individual is limited in its ability to construe ethical problems, which involves the individuals 
active interpretation of moral problem features based on his “moral competence”.  
 
The distinction between intuitive and emotive sentiments and conscious reasoning has indeed 
been a topic of considerable interest within the cognitive psychology domain in the recent 
past. Kahneman (2002) asserts that there is agreement on the characteristics that distinguish 
the two types of cognitive processes, which Stanovich & West (2000) labeled System 1 and 
System 2. For this thesis, the perceptual operations as well as intuitive and emotive processes 
that generate impressions of the attributes of the moral features of the situation, the attributes 
of the situation and context, shall be referred to as System 1, whereas conscious reasoning 
processes are considered as System 2. Kahneman (2002) asserts that preferences are generally 
called “intuitive” if they come to mind quickly and effortlessly, like percepts. However, he 
asserts, intuitive judgments can be “modified or overridden in a more deliberate mode of 
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operation”. Also Gino, Moore & Bazerman (2009) acknowledge based on their studies, a 
“rational, analytic mindset can override the effects of one‟s intuitions in ethical judgments”.  
 
Greene (2010) summarizes that rationalist philosophers such as Kant or Plato conceived of 
sound (or “mature”) moral reasoning as a “rational enterprise”, where abstract reasons in 
themselves provide direction and motivation. Opposed to these philosophers, 
“sentimentalists” such as David Hume and Adam Smith argued that emotions are the primary 
basis for moral judgment. Green argues however in favor of a juxtapose of the two believing 
that that emotion and reason both play critical roles in moral judgment, and he claims that 
their respective influences have been widely misunderstood (Greene, 2010). Green proposed a 
“dual-process” theory of moral judgment arguing that characteristically deontological moral 
judgments are rather driven by automatic emotional responses, while consequentialist or 
utilitarian moral judgments according to him are driven by more controlled conscious 
cognitive processes (Greene, 2009) 
Brooks (2011) writes that we are now “children of the French Enlightenment”, referring to the 
paradigm of believing that reason is the highest of the faculties. He claims that the “British 
Enlightenment”, or the “Scottish Enlightenment”, with authors such as Hume in some sense 
better understood who we are and what we humans strive for. Brooks claims that reason is 
often weak, and that our emotive and intuitive sentiments are not only strong, but describe 
better what drives us human beings. Moreover, he claims that these sentiments are not only 
strong, but also trustworthy. 
 
The question based on the presented cognitive barriers which also elicit unconscious 
psychological reactions is however if they are all good and trustworthy? After having 
presented amongst others the racism bias, stereotyping effects, moral blind-spots and selective 
perception and attention biases, hence barriers to which are opposed to our conscious 
normative views, the answer must clearly be no. The third part of this paper elaborates on the 
question on what is needed to improve ethical decision-making from a pedagogical point of 
view. It is argued that in order to align (some of) our judgments and behavior more with our 
conscious normative views, we have to be aware of (and right-mindedly exposed to) our 
biases and blind spots in order to override some intuitive judgments. Moreover, it is discussed 
if it is also possible to change our intuitive judgments (i.e. correct our mainly unconscious 
cognitive biases) in order to behave more ethical.   
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3. Part three: How to promote moral competence  
 
The optimal moment to address the question of how to improve 
human decision-making has arrived. Thanks to fifty years of 
research by judgment and decision-making scholars, 
psychologists have developed a detailed picture of the ways in 
which human judgment is bounded (Milkman, Chugh & 
Bazerman, 2008). 
 
In the first part of this paper, Rest and Kohlberg‟s cognitive development theory was 
presented and it was described how theories building on their theoretical base conceptualized 
the process of ethical decision-making. Key underlying assumptions of the cognitive moral 
development theory were identified and discussed in more detail in the second part, 
concluding that they are not bearable and not only give an insufficient, but wrong picture 
about how individuals actually make decisions. Especially Kohlberg and Rest‟s claim of a 
rational ethical decision maker (to whom cognitive corrections can be applied) and who is 
independent of its environment was found to not describe the actual ethical problem-solving 
process. The focus of the second part was the discussion of how individuals become aware of 
ethical problems and on psychological barriers such as moral disengagement which bound 
“sound” ethical problem-solving.  
Building on the elaborated view of the nature of ethical problems as a social construction of 
the moral features of a situation and the individual‟s mostly unconscious interpretation 
processes, the third part of this thesis discusses major implications of the elaborated 
perspective on ethical decision-making with a focus on the question how moral competence in 
business can be promoted with a pedagogical approach.  
 
To recap shortly, the perspective presented in the previous chapter on the process how 
individuals construe ethical problems building on Lai‟s stimulus dependence concept (as 
suggested by Pedersen (2009)) is believed to much better describe the interactional nature of 
becoming aware of and solving ethical problems. It was argued that both the moral features of 
the situation as well as the individuals (relevant) psychological factors jointly characterize the 
conception of an ethical problem. Also, it was argued that it are not only conscious processes 
leading to the judgments involved during the construction of and reasoning on moral 
problems, but mainly unconscious intuitive and emotive processes. This position is supported 
by Brooks (2011) who argues that although we might think that what we believe and do is 
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largely under our conscious control, non-deliberate emotions and intuitions are much more 
important in shaping our perception of moral problems, as a big part of the “mental cognitive 
iceberg” leading to judgments are believed to be based on emotional intuitive processes. 
 
Pedersen (2009) refers to the System 1 vs. System 2 division of cognitive functioning as the 
“duality of ethical decision-making” and asserts that ethical decision-making involves both 
“hot” and “cold” responses, i.e. emotional response such as empathy as well as “conscious 
processing about the requirement for ethical deliberation”. Whereas this paper acknowledges 
that ethical decision-making can be partially impacted by a rational assessment of “right and 
wrong”, it sees unconscious processes as a key variable for ethical decision-making and 
behavior, which is in line with a growing body of research (e.g. Haidt, 2001; DeCremer, 
2009; Reynolds, 2006). Reynolds (2006) asserts that reflexive, automatic, or non-conscious 
decision-making processes “dramatically” influence the choices that individuals make. He 
claims that just as an individual can immediately “construe” a dog and “knows” that it pants 
and barks, it can often instantly “construe” a bribe and “get a feeling about” if this is morally 
wrong or right based on his/her moral intuitions. This perspective lead to the conclusion that 
human morality is reflected by a very complex interaction between unconscious intuitive-
emotional System 1 and conscious System 2 reasoning processes. Hence, neither a purely 
intuitionist-emotional nor a purely rationalist model can conceptualize the duality of moral 
decision-making.  
 
Besides the claim that there are at least two different “types” of processes at work leading to 
the perception of moral problems, it was argued that the individuals‟ cognitive processes are 
often “motivated”, for example causing immediate System 1 judgments to construct conscious 
System 2 post-hoc justifications (unless overridden). Different related psychological concepts 
such as moral disengagement and other cognitive biases were presented. It was argued that 
psychological processes such as bounded ethicality work as “barriers” to sound ethical 
problem-solving, leading the individual yet to experience an illusion of objectivity in his or 
her judgment. Chugh, Banaji & Bazerman (2005) describe motivated judgments as the 
sequence of “automatic egocentrism” processes preceding an evaluative moral judgment. It 
was stated that certain cognitive processes can even lead to behavior being inconsistent with 
(conscious) ethical beliefs through the reconciliation of immoral actions with ethical goals. 
The discussed processes also help to explain how even individuals with the same conscious 
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normative views on ethical behavior can construe an ethical problem differently, depending 
on their roles, ethical ideologies, values and the environment, as well as how individuals can 
act against their unconscious view of ethicality.  
 
3.1. Can ethical decision-making be taught? 
“Conventional approaches towards teaching ethics, borne of 
philosophical traditions, are [also] unhelpful, constrained by 
normative views of the ethicality rather than the more 
descriptive, psychologically based understanding of how the 
mind works” (Chugh, Bazerman & Banaji, 2005) 
 
Thanks to the descriptive view of ethical problem-solving elaborated in the second part of this 
paper, we can now much better understand how individuals solve ethical problems and make 
ethical decisions. Furthermore, as Milkman, Chugh & Bazerman (2008) assert, thanks to the 
normative models of economic theory (discussed in the first part), we also have a clear vision 
of how much better ethical decision-making can be. Unfortunately however, we have little 
understanding of how to help individuals overcome their many cognitive biases and behave 
more ethically. The focus of this third part is therefore to introduce strategies to promote 
moral competence given the above summarized view on ethical problem (solving). Especially 
it shall be discussed how mostly unconscious psychological processes such as moral 
disengagement can be counteracted and how cognitive biases can be reduced with a 
pedagogical approach. 
 
There has been a long debate about the question if (business) “ethics” can be learned or not. 
Documenting scores in principled moral reasoning across graduate programs, Rest (1986) 
found that students in business ranked lower than did graduate students in political science, 
law, medicine, and dentistry. In light of this finding, Piper, Gentile & Parks (1993) 
hypothesized that those attracted to business may be predisposed to take a more 
“circumscribed view”, leading to a higher-than-average motivation towards self-interest and, 
specifically money-making. Pedersen (2009) asserts that there is a common distinction 
between “(1) perspectives that build on the learning hypothesis, i.e. that the ethical thinking 
and behavior of business students changes during, and as a result of, business studies, and (2) 
perspectives that build on the selection hypothesis, i.e. that the students who self-select into 
business education are more inclined to specific types of behavior than others (cf. Carter and 
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Irons, 1991)”. Ritter (2006) summarizes that there is a great deal of disagreement, both 
theoretically and empirically, regarding the trainability of ethics during business university 
studies. She argues that the available literature suggests the possibility that both options are in 
some sense correct. That is, for those individuals with an “ingrained ethical background” prior 
to the “college classroom”, the implementation of an ethics curriculum may be quite effective 
in “supplementing their existing schemas”. For those individuals lacking ethical problem-
solving experience however, the current level of ethics training provided in business schools 
may not adequate to make ethical decision-making a „„habit‟‟ (Ritter, 2006). Ritter‟s 
perspective is provocative, as she claims that existing approaches to teaching ethics are only 
“effective” in training these students who already possess advanced moral competences, 
hence engage less in moral disengagement and tend to be less biased in their judgment. Also 
several other authors argue that it is too late to “raise questions of values and corporate 
purpose” with students who are in their twenties and thirties, that such student‟s characters are 
“totally formed and unchangeable” (McCoy, 2007).  
This point of view is rejected emphatically in this thesis. Based on the elaborated view of 
ethical problem-solving, this paper argues that the question if ethics is learnable or not is, in 
the words of Ghoshal, often discussed on “false premises”, hence assuming e.g. the existing 
learning style as given. It is believed that students have to be seen as being at a “critical stage 
in the development of their perceptions about capitalism, business practice, leadership and the 
appropriate resolution of ethical dilemmas” (in line with Piper, Gentile & Parks, 1993). This 
is in a similar vein argued by Eisenberg, Spinrad & Sadovsky (2006), who claim that although 
earliest experience have an indelible impact on the individuals problems solving skills (his or 
her moral competence), “the same is true for one‟s professional training”.  
 
Supporting this general perspective, Pedersen (2009) argues that the trainability of ethics 
strongly depends on the promoted learning style. He asserts that e.g. the production of moral 
blindness - similarly to the production of moral sensitivity (i.e. awareness) - can be seen as a 
learning process, instigated either by the individual himself or the institutional environment 
around him. He differentiates with reference to the existential learning theory of Kolb 
between learning by assimilation, where reflection and conceptualization are mainly leading 
to a refinement of the individual‟s moral reasoning skills to improve judgment (of those 
already possessing certain psychological features to construe the ethical problem from a rich 
perspective), and learning by converging where conceptualization and experimentation are 
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dominant, which he regards as elementary for the development of moral awareness and 
competence. 
 
Pedersen (2009) claims that knowledge and competence is best generated in an iterative 
process, where theory is developed, tested, modified based on those tests, and subjected to 
more empirical tests. Other of scholars have argued in favor and modeled this process (such 
as e.g. Reynolds, Schulz & Heckman, 2006). Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997) for example 
developed a theory of stakeholder salience arguing that stakeholders garner attention based on 
their power, legitimacy, and the urgency of their claim. Agle, Mitchell & Sonnenfeld (1999) 
provided an empirical test of these arguments. This started an iterative process wherein others 
have been able to develop and test other related ideas.  
 
The following chapter discusses central challenges to pedagogical approaches to promote 
moral competence including the findings of the previous sections. Specifically, this paper will 
refer to Stanovich & West‟s (2000) distinction between System 1 and System 2 cognitive 
functioning in ethical problems solving, since it is believed that their conception provides a 
good framework for organizing both what scholars have learned to date about effective 
strategies for improving decision-making and future efforts to uncover improvement 
strategies. Focus lies on developing a methodology to correct System 1 errors, opposed to the 
“traditional” focus on how to improve conscious System 2 reasoning. 
 
3.1.1. Challenges 
When faced with a situation, we all believe we’re weighing 
the facts objectively and making rational, thoughtful 
decisions. In fact, science tells us that in situations 
requiring careful judgment, every individual is influenced 
by his or her own biases to some extent (Bazerman & 
Moore, 2008). 
 
When in a situation that contains an ethical problem dimension, most of us like to think we 
stand up for our principles. The second part of this thesis gave some examples that indicate 
that we are not as ethical as we think we are. Bazerman & Tenbrunsel (2011) recently 
examined the extent to which we overestimate our ability to do “what is right” and how we 
act unethically without meaning to. Bazerman & Tenbrunsel (2011) argue that all individuals 
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have an “inflated perception of their own ethicality and think that they are more ethical than 
those around them”. They claim that these ethical illusions (or “blind spots”) about ourselves 
are driven by the “discrepancies between how we think we will behave when faced with an 
ethical dilemma, how we actually behave, and then how we recollect our behavior”. This view 
refers to several of the barriers to sound ethical problem-solving presented in the previous 
chapter, as well as the cognitive biases discussed.  
Milkman, Chugh & Bazerman (2008) moreover argue that “people often lack important 
information regarding a decision, fail to notice available information, face time and cost 
constraints, and maintain a relatively small amount of information in their usable memory”. 
They claim that the busier individuals are, the less time they have to make decisions, and the 
more they rely on unconscious, intuitive System 1 thinking. According to Milkman, Chugh & 
Bazerman, it is the “the frantic pace of life” that makes individuals rely on System 1 thinking. 
This view is supported by Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999), who assert that “willpower is weakened 
when people are placed under extreme cognitive load”, indicating that in a case of information 
overload, individuals rely much more on System 1 cognitive functioning than conscious, slow 
thinking. Milkman, Rogers & Bazerman (2007) add that the same happens in situations in 
which the individuals are inexperienced in a decision domain (which business students often 
are in the field of ethics). 
Generally, people put great trust in their intuitions (Brooks, 2011). However, the findings of 
the previous chapter (i.e. the presentation of the different “unethical” cognitive biases) have 
severely challenged this trust. Often, as Moore & Lowenstein (2004) exemplarily point out, 
our first impulses tend to be rather emotional than logical, indicating that out intuitive 
judgments can well contradict our conscious moral attitudes and values. Moore & Lowenstein 
(2004) moreover assert that our intuitive System 1 responses are more likely to be vulnerable 
to unethical temptations than our more reflective System 2 thoughts, although studies of Gino, 
Ayal & Ariely (2009) question this claim to some extent as they show that people are also 
able to act unethical with full conscious awareness. Nonetheless, it is suggested in decision-
making improvement literature that – in some situations – getting people to think more before 
acting, in more reflective and analytical ways, would be a useful way to “nudge our actual 
selves closer towards the ethical selves we imagine ourselves to be” (Milkman, Chugh& 
Bazerman, 2008). Milkman, Chugh & Bazerman (2008) correctly point out that one key task 
to improve ethical decision-making is to identify “how and in what situations people should 
mistrust their System 1 judgments and try to move from intuitively compelling System 1 
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thinking to more deliberative System 2 thinking”. Another related question is how and if we 
can design situations that make System 1 thinking work “in the decision-maker‟s favor” (i.e. 
in accordance to conscious normative views). 
 
The above proposition was that individuals rely often on highly “accessible impressions 
produced by System 1” (Kahneman, 2002), which thereby control judgments and preferences, 
unless modified or overridden by the deliberate operations of System 2. This allows the view 
that there exist ways in which people are for example racist or sexist (the respective cognitive 
biases have been mentioned in the second part) without knowing that they have these 
attitudes. In fact, substantial literature in psychology argues that many people have implicit 
attitudes that they would not endorse with their conscious awareness but on which they act 
unconsciously. However, it seems possible to move from System 1 to System 2, as the 
example of how the racism bias is managed (i.e. institutionalized) in our society shows. We 
are much better aware of some biases and have institutional legal frameworks to counteract 
some bias. Kahneman (2002) argues that in order to understand our judgment and choices we 
must study the determinants of high “accessibility”, the conditions under which System 2 will 
override or correct System 1, and the rules of these corrective operations (Kahneman, 2002). 
If one action to solve an ethical problem is more accessible than another (due to e.g. the use of 
analogy mechanism), this is believed to influence how we judge and act in the situation. 
 
Building on the perspective of Kahneman on the determinants of high accessibility, this paper 
addresses the question how System 1 cognitive functioning can be changed/influenced. So far, 
when it comes to changing the determinants of high accessibility, one main focus was on a 
“change of the problem environment”, i.e. the discussion how a change of the environment 
can influence intuitive judgments made by individuals. This “change the environment” 
approach contrasts sharply with the failure of “try harder” solutions (how to move from 
System 1 to System 2), which rely on conscious effort, as Milkman, Chugh & Bazerman 
(2008) assert. However, this thesis argues that these two strategies are not “enough” and 
elaborates a framework on how to change the unconscious, emotive intuitive System 1 
thinking (to make it better accessible through conscious experiences) to promote ethical 
decision-making competences. This framework is methodologically partly based on 
Pedersen‟s (2009) work on how to counteract moral disengagement.  
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In the upcoming chapters it is argued that in order to change and improve unconscious 
judgments, individuals must acknowledge the (negative) effects of their cognitive biases on 
decision-making through the study of descriptive theories of ethical decision-making. Once 
the need to engage in strategies that reduce their cognitive biases is acknowledged, 
individuals must consciously engage in situations where cognitive biases work (such as e.g. 
community outreach programmes) in order to change our unconscious thinking and make 
ethical considerations “automatic”. Finally, it is suggested that these strategies should be 
integrated into institutionalized educational programs at business schools.  
 
3.2. How to change System 1 thinking?  
The answer to the question if and if yes, how unconscious intuitive processes such as moral 
disengagement processes can be counteracted, is multifaceted. Business ethicists (such as 
Cragg, 1997 in Ritter, 2006) often argue that these processes cannot be learned nor taught at 
school because character and value development, which defines the psychological, emotional 
response to an ethical situation, has already occurred by the time individuals reach school or 
in particular college age. Other groups, including the Association to Advance Collegiate 
Schools of Business (AACSB international) and professional organizations such as the 
Academy of Management discuss ethical decision-making strategies and important ethical 
values in business decisions and advise them to be taught to students, obviously assuming that 
they can be trained (Ritter, 2006). Churchill (1992) suggests that the key to the question of the 
trainability of ethics lies in the distinction between “ethics” and moral values. In this 
understanding, ethics, as a systematic, conscious System 2 reflection upon a choice of 
behavior, he argues, can be taught. Moral values, which (in interaction with conscious 
cognitive processing) mainly provoke the emotive intuitive System 1 responses on the other 
hand, develop much earlier in an individual‟s life and the trainability during a short segment 
of time is questionable. Although this paper does not agree with Churchill‟s position 
questioning the trainability of values, as personal values are believed to be not deterministic, 
it acknowledges that the training of ethical values, which strongly influence the process when 
the problem is construed, is more difficult to “train” and clearly somehow different from 
existing learning approaches, especially from those applied today at most business schools. 
To develop a framework on how System 1 thinking can be changed, the contribution of 
Pedersen (2009) on strategies to counteract moral disengagement is reviewed in the following 
chapter. 
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3.2.1. How to counteract moral disengagement? 
Pedersen (2009) belongs to the school of thought believing that unconscious processes such as 
moral disengagement can be counteracted. As a reminder, moral disengagement “repackages” 
conduct into something that is personally acceptable by relabeling potentially questionable 
behavior as morally permissible (Bandura, 1999). Bandura conclusively points out that 
individuals tend to reconcile their immoral actions through anticipatory self-sanctions with 
their ethical goals. Moral disengagement is believed to be able to take different forms, e.g. by 
portraying unethical behavior as serving a moral purpose, by attributing behavior to external 
cues, by distorting the consequences of behavior, or by “dehumanizing” victims of unethical 
behavior (seeing affected people as non-humans). Pedersen (2009) argues that individuals can 
employ moral disengagement strategies to different extents, and thereby stifle their ability to 
conceive of moral features of problems. According to him, the production of moral blindness 
as well as awareness is “a learning process, instigated either by the individual himself or by 
organizations, communities or systems of which the individual is part”. Pedersen (2009) 
suggests that moral disengagement processes negatively influence the moral language 
employed by moral actors and the extent of taking multi-perspectives to problem formulation. 
Both influence the extent to which the individual unconsciously conceives of the ethical 
problem.  
 
Pedersen (2009) states that the individual‟s explicit inclusion of moral features in problem 
formulation is promoted to the extent that the individual possesses a broad moral vocabulary 
that allows the individual to better capture and express the complexity of a moral situation. 
Moreover, he argues that an inclination to reduce problems to legalistic terms (legalistic 
reductionism as the characteristic of “using” the law as a normative yardstick) inhibits the 
individual‟s mindfulness in problem formulation, which may reduce his or her ability to 
conceive of moral features in the given problem from multiple perspectives. 
Pedersen (2009) suggests that the development of moral disengagement strategies is promoted 
by an overreliance on assimilating learning at the expense of emotional awareness and 
meaning-seeking. Based on this perspective, he suggests that sensitivity to moral aspects of 
situations can be promoted by (1) a nuanced ethical vocabulary, (2) imaginative exploration 
of problems and situational factors that facilitate such exploration, as well as (3) active 
engagement in situations characterized by moral distress and values at stake, factors which are 
discussed in more detail in the following chapters.  
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3.2.1.1. Role of language 
“If we watch ourselves honestly we shall often find that we 
have begun to argue against a new idea even before it has been 
completely stated” Wilfred Trotter (1872 – 1939) – pioneer in 
neurosurgery. 
 
If we take the view that thought is embodied in language and 
language is embedded in a shared form of life, then it makes 
perfect sense that experience can enrich our concept of say, 
“honesty”, while the concept itself remains the same 
(Freeman, 1984) 
 
The language employed in a scientific field can be understood as being much more than a 
pure communication device. It is believed to trigger mental imagery and cognitive schemata 
that drive understanding and behavior, as Bicchieri (1998) in Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton (2005) 
asserts. Cognitive schemes are believed to be strongly influenced by language. Dominant 
assumptions and ideas of economics can exercise a subtle, unconscious but yet powerful 
influence through the language employed on behavior and judgment, through the formation of 
beliefs and norms about behavior that affect what people do and how they design institutions 
and management practices (Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005). Hence, language is believed to 
have the ability to evoke certain associations, motives and norms. When acting on the basis of 
language in ways consistent with the evoked norms and assumptions, we do things that 
produce behavior that is consistent with our “linguistic frame”. According to Ferraro, Pfeffer 
& Sutton (2005), language can be considered as producing a social reality that reinforces and 
validates the terminology we use. 
There is some agreement among business ethicists that linguistic practices within corporations 
can influence ethical behavior (Treviño, Weaver & Reynolds, 2006). This happens when 
theories become dominant (i.e. when their language is widely and “mindlessly” used) and 
their assumptions become accepted and normatively valued, even sometimes in contradiction 
to empirical findings (Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005). Following this line of reasoning, one 
can conclude that “the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood” (Keynes, 
1936). 
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It was previously argued that in the business domain, due to very salient technical or financial 
dimensions of a problem, as well as the “tradition” and habit to “camouflage” ethical issues as 
e.g. financial ones, managers often fail to “sense” that their decision has important moral 
implications and they therefore perceive of and formulate ethical problems wrongly. But in 
business as in medicine, if the clinical picture is wrong, even the best medicine does not help 
to cure the disease and can lead to serious damage. Bird & Waters (1989) denote the inability 
of individuals to talk about moral issues and instead “selling” them as purely financial or 
technical ones as “moral muteness”, which again indicates that the linguistic practices are of 
key importance to conceive the ethical problem from a “richer” perspective. Bird further 
asserts that organizational settings characterized by “moral muteness” appear to support 
ethically problematic behavior (Bird & Waters, 1989). Also, Bandura‟s (1999) paper on moral 
disengagement strategies offers several valid arguments on the key role language plays for the 
promotion of moral competence. Bandura mentions euphemistic labeling and advantageous 
comparison as key practices for making “harmful conduct respectable and to reduce personal 
responsibility for it”, hence claim that through “sanitized and convoluted verbiage, destructive 
conduct is made benign” (Bandura, 1999). 
 
Consequently, the moral language employed can be seen as having the power to consciously 
and unconsciously promote insensitivity to moral dimensions of problems. Social science 
theories can become self-fulfilling by shaping institutional designs and management practices, 
as well as social norms and expectations about behavior, thereby “creating the behavior they 
predict”. Hence, the language and assumptions of economics actively shape management 
practices - and theories can “win” in the marketplace for ideas independent of their empirical 
validity, to the extent they become taken for granted and normatively valued, creating 
conditions themselves which make them come “true” (Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005). When 
individuals disengage morally, they steer their attention to aspects of moral reality (the moral 
features of a situation) which are not relevant, indicating that they do not perceive of moral 
problems, which is likely to be correlated to their poor moral vocabulary.  
 
The “mindless employment” of professional languages thus threatens the individual‟s ability 
to conceive of moral features in organizational problem settings, as Pedersen (2009) correctly 
asserts. Consequently, an important question for business ethics is if business schools and 
business organizations promote the vocabulary necessary to conceive of ethical problems, 
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rather than only asking if they are teaching the correct normative theories to business ethics. 
Pedersen (2009) notes that by cultivating an ethical vocabulary and by seeing the world in 
ethical perspectives (additionally to other professional perspectives), individuals can gain 
experience in seeing, thinking, feeling and acting in face of ethical problems. He notes 
however that this relationship is not necessarily causal, i.e. it does not imply that increasing 
the complexity of one‟s moral vocabulary necessarily increases the individual‟s moral 
awareness. By stating this, he highlights that there is “a fallacy in overemphasizing the 
intellectual aspect of the individual‟s response to moral features in a situation”. The direction 
of causality can consequently also be reversed, i.e. advanced moral competence drives the 
development of a more developed moral vocabulary.  
 
It seems that an advanced moral language is supportive for both conscious and unconscious 
“moral” decision-making, but clearly not sufficient. Business students and managers might 
e.g. have general agreement on the merits of honesty, as Freeman (1984) writes. They might 
possess the “right moral concepts and linguistic tools” but cannot master them in the 
environment of business and the culture of particular organizations.  
“If we take the view that thought is embodied in language and language is embedded in a 
shared form of life, then it makes perfect sense that experience can enrich our concept of say, 
“honesty”, while the concept itself remains the same” (Freeman, 1984). On this theory of 
language, understanding is not reduced to definition, but must be expanded by experience.  
 
3.2.1.2. Experience 
Early experiences don’t determine a life, but they set pathways, 
which can be changed or reinforced by later experiences 
(Brooks, 2011). 
 
Pedersen (2009) claims that an “active engagement in situations characterized by moral 
distress and values at stake” can promote moral awareness. He argues that both the 
psychological characteristics of the individual as well as his or her repertoire of moral idioms 
are influenced by the individuals experience with ethical problem-solving. This is in line with 
Freeman‟s (1984) position that (moral) language as an indicator for moral development 
cannot be reduced to definition, but must be expanded by experience.  
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There is ample empirical evidence that experience in dealing with moral conflict situations 
has a positive impact on moral awareness, as Seiler, Fischer & Ooi (2010) highlight. 
Clarkeburn (2002) for example shows in a study with students that experiences of short 
discussions of ethical issues (real-life experiences) can have a significant impact on a 
students‟ ability to perceive of ethical problems. Also Ritter (2006) asserts that - from a 
neuro-cognitive perspective - if a decision-making schema includes “ethics” depends on past 
(learned) experiences. According to her the key to promoting ethical competence is to ensure 
the creation of ethical schemes in all individuals and to link it to decision-making in business 
(so that the ethical schema becomes activated in all future business decision-making). Oddo 
(1997) supports this idea by suggesting that if students get into the „„habit‟‟ of applying 
ethical decision-making strategies in a school setting, they will be more likely to use them in 
business situations (in Ritter, 2006). This is in line with the concept of the use of analogy, i.e. 
that individuals apply heuristics to solve (ethical) problems.  
 
Since experiences must necessarily be acquired through practice, the only way individuals can 
acquire moral competence is by “engaging in moral practice”, as Pedersen (2009) asserts. 
Moreover, he suggests that the relation between moral competence and ethical action is 
circular and reinforcing. Although he acknowledges that this might appear tautological, he 
asserts that it highlights a specific characteristic of social behavior, the one that “we as 
individuals develop our social capacities through experience, reflection and experimentation 
by example (i.e. learning from role models)”. Hence, in any situation, we are obliged to take a 
moral stance (since there is no morally neutral position), which consequently influences our 
ability to take a moral stance in a similar situation based on the experience we acquired. 
 
Haidt (2001) argues that actively “engaging in moral reality” is necessary since lack of moral 
diversity can make it harder to “seek a deeper understanding of the world”. This applies to 
experiences as well as concepts and learning styles as he argues. He asserts that when people 
share values and morals, they become a “team”. And when people use concepts they become 
used to it. Both processes shut down “open minded” thinking. Haidt (2001) labeled the 
personality trait the “openness to experience”. The position hold by Haidt is in line with 
Pedersen‟s claim that the dominance of assimilating learning, i.e. learning where reflection 
and conceptualization dominate “at the expense of emotional awareness and meaning-
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seeking”, may promote the individual‟s blindness to the moral features of problems 
(Pedersen, 2009).  
Pedersen (2009) comments that despite the importance of experience for ethical decision-
making, this finding has at least “two sides”. The view that professional as well as educational 
experiences influence the “lenses” through which we conceive of situations, allows Pedersen 
(2009) to assume that some professional perspectives are “more attune” to moral features of 
situations, and professional groups differ systematically in the degree to which they 
“facilitate” moral awareness. Hence experience can also shut down moral awareness 
capabilities. However, he acknowledges that this does not necessarily imply that some 
professional groups are inherently morally more competent than others, but that the chances 
that individuals are attentive to moral features of problem situations depends on their 
respective contexts (i.e. experiences).  
 
The “right” experiences (i.e. experiences that facilitate the perception of moral features of 
situations in a rich manner) are, however, not a panacea for more advanced moral 
competence. The individual must also be aware of his or her experience. Ruedy & Schweitzer 
(2010) argue that the awareness of former experiences is captured in the individuals 
“mindfulness”, which can be understood as the ability of individuals to perceive situations 
from different perspectives. Being mindful (correlated to being aware of one‟s experience) 
further involves “recognizing that there is not one optimal perspective, but rather that many 
possible, complementary perspectives” for a proper understanding of a situation. Ruedy & 
Schweitzer‟s (2010) research indicates that individuals who score high in mindfulness are 
more likely to act ethically, as well as to “holding up” their values and ethical standards, 
hence suggesting a positive correlation between an individual‟s mindfulness and his moral 
behavior.  
 
3.2.1.3. Mindfulness 
”When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail” 
- Abraham Maslow 
   
Pedersen (2009) suggests that the “mindfulness” of individuals, as for example reflected in 
their formulations of ethical problems, is related to the “richness” of ethically relevant factors 
conceived of by the individual and hence his or her moral competence. Brooks (2011) 
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identified mindsight – defined by him as the ability to enter into other people‟s minds 
(empathy) and learn “what they have to offer”- as a key “ingredient” for the promotion of 
ethical competence. The concept of mindsight can be regarded as part of the more 
comprehensive concept of mindfulness, as reciprocity is an important element in perceiving 
situations from different perspectives.  
When referring to the mindfulness of business students and managers, it is often claimed that 
it is less developed than of generational and professional peers. Frynas (2007) e.g. asserts that 
managers are often highly capable of dealing with technical and managerial challenges, and 
that this orientation is reflected in their “approaches to CSR”. It is argued that when there is 
corporate “will” and the “CSR challenge” can be reduced to distinct technical tasks, for 
example oil companies can perform these applied tasks to a very high standard. For instance, 
BP‟s target to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, led by the company‟s CEO John Browne and 
linked to performance-related bonuses, saw staff reportedly working hard and “enjoying” the 
technical challenge of suggesting changes to plant and equipment. A technical/ managerial 
challenge can mostly be reduced to “metrics”, “indicators” or “guidelines”, and job 
performance can be quantified. However, technical managerial approaches are generally 
insufficient when addressing complex social problems, where more mindfulness in problem 
formulation is needed (Frynas, 2007). The limitations of technical/ managerial approaches can 
be seen in the manner in which local communities are consulted. A consultation exercise is 
inherently discursive, requiring in-depth discussions and the establishment of a dialogue 
among the people involved in it. The Deepwater Horizon incident can be considered as a very 
recent example of a lack of mindfulness in problem formulation (i.e. the perception of the 
moral dimension of the situation). Setting yourself in the mind of (or alternatively the 
consultation) of various stakeholders prior to the accident in forms of a broader risk 
assessment might have prevented the catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico. This shows how 
closely the concepts of stakeholder management and mindfulness in problem 
construction/formulation are related.  
 
As argued, the ability to take multiple perspectives, apart from technical and financial 
perspectives, allows constructing ethical problems in a richer manner. Hill (2006) adds to this 
view that managers are often fully capable of critical thought and can work on a strategy 
within a given set of conditions. He adds that especially in the absence of significant adversity 
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and/or cross-cultural cognitive dissonance, most managers however have few experiences
23
 in 
recognizing and considering these conditions, as such the broader social, cultural, political 
and economic context within which the conditions themselves rest. Pedersen (2009) argues 
that for individuals and organizations to cultivate a mindful and creative approach to problems 
it is necessary to view “one‟s activities from completely different perspectives, which 
involves asking entirely novel questions about one‟s practice and by turning established ways 
of thinking upside down”. Mindfulness can hence according to him be viewed as both 
correlated to the ability to conceive of a broader set of moral problem features, as well as 
contributing to new and unique, creative solutions to existing challenges. 
 
Illustrated by the example on CSR, the role of mindfulness for conceiving of ethical problems 
can be exemplified in how ideological positions held on “responsibility” diverge between 
business students and generational and societal peers. Two ideological positions are 
particularly strongly coined at business students in assigning responsibility to different agents 
as Hendry (2004) claims: causation and accountability. Corporations whose actions cause 
direct harm are therefore more often regarded as responsible (to stop such actions and rectify 
the harm caused) than firms not found to be causally connected to the harm. Pedersen (2009) 
finds a preoccupation among business students with the related concepts of “ownership”24 and 
“genesis of problems”. Business students tend to think that limited liability means also limited 
responsibility, by “conceiving of moral features as encapsulated in a legal frame and that law 
serves as a normative yardstick against which they judge right and wrong” (Pedersen, 2009). 
Hence, the degree of mindfulness in perceiving of ethical responsibility conceptions (and 
hence the degree of which an ethical problem is perceived) of business students and managers 
often relies on a legal perspective, which implies that they appear to be less capable of making 
moral decisions independent of a legal anchoring. But, as exemplarily shown by Donaldson & 
Dunfee (1999), businesses enter a social contract between them and the societies in which 
they operate, which makes them also partly responsible for existing problems in the society, 
                                                 
23
 Or at least less that e.g. NGOs and cultural/environmental/ social experts 
24
 The conception of ownership is often misunderstood in a business context. Although somehow wrongly 
preached in property rights classes, after all – as Ghoshal asserted - we know that shareholders do not own 
the company, not in the sense that they own their homes or their cars. They merely own a right to the 
residual cash flows of the company, which is not at all the same thing as owning the company (Ghoshal, 
2005). 
 
   100 
where no direct causality link is necessary. Further, as De Geer (2002) correctly asserts, 
especially on a global level, no legal terms exist, and responsibility has “moral character”, 
based on a combination of interest and sense of duty. It is these connections, which business 
students tend to see less than their generational peers. This discussion suggests why managers 
and business students often have difficulties in constructing ethical problems in a “rich” 
perspective, since their view is overridden by the search for causality and ownership of a 
problem, although this is not a necessary condition for a problem to be considered ethical. 
Linking critical need to corporate capability “throws however a broader net of ethical 
responsibility over more potential actors” than looking only on for causality connections, as 
De Geer (2002) asserts. 
Pedersen (2009) hypothesizes that business students are generally rather inclined to view the 
“genesis and background” of an ethical problem as important whereas generational peers 
might have a more “practical, forward-looking approach” to problem-solving. He puts 
forward that these differences might partly evolve from the degree to which different 
educational patterns are characterized by “analytical thinking”. Jordan (2009) explains the 
differences in perceiving of moral problem situations by the tendency (i.e. habit) of business 
people to exclude moral-related information from the decision-making process because of 
“schema-based cognitive mechanisms that draw attention and recall abilities away from moral 
stimuli” (hence from a neuro-cognitive perspective). 
 
Other common concepts for assigning responsibility are capability or power. Ethical 
responsibility is placed on actors that possess the power or the capability to act. Greater 
responsibility may be associated with greater capability (reflected in the Spiderman adage that 
with greater power goes greater responsibility) (Kline, 2005). Business students are seldom 
inclined to evaluate their accountability with regards to capability and power. This means that 
they do not associate greater power with greater responsibility. In other words, although 
managers might have control over the problem situation (i.e. have the power, capability and 
knowledge), they might not identify a responsibility for the action and be more inclined to 
evaluate other “dimensions” in the given situation at hand.  
Lastly, proximity is also often associated with the concept of responsibility: actors closest to a 
case situation are likely to me more cognizant of unethical actions than groups operating at a 
greater distance. This concept lies at the heart of the subsidiary principle that assumes the 
actors closest to a situation are going to be the best placed to respond to its circumstances, 
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thereby giving them principle ethical responsibility (Kline, 2005). A classic example of 
proximity is the consultation of local communities of resource-exploration companies. The 
concept of proximity is indeed believed to be of primary importance for ethical decision-
making, as business decisions in a professional context often take place in boardrooms 
whereas e.g. medical decisions almost always take place in the presence of, or close to the 
patient. Hence, a lack of proximity might significantly blur the individual‟s ability to conceive 
of the ethical dimension of a problem.  
 
With the example of the interpretation of responsibility it was suggested that business students 
and managers generally differentiate between ethical and non-ethical problems based on 
different categories than their generational/ professional peers, and that they perceive some 
problem dimension as more salient than other professional groups. It thus appears that 
managers often have a less mindful approach to conceiving of ethical problems due to their 
strong focus on technical and financial perspectives on problems; which - according to 
Pedersen (2009) - is probably influenced by the amount of analytical thinking which 
characterizes their education. Business students and managers often reduce their responsibility 
to the legal framework and do not see that this is not the only nor the “optimal” perspective of 
conceiving of responsibility. 
 
3.2.1.4. Summary 
This chapter introduced to Pedersen‟s (2009) idea that moral language is important for the 
promotion of ethical competence, since it enables individuals to conceive of and formulate a 
broader spectrum of moral features of situations. However, a moral vocabulary must be 
expanded by real-life experience in order to develop not only the linguistic framework but 
also to “master” the moral language in different environments. Moreover, the individual‟s 
awareness of his/her experience is argued to be strongly correlated with his/her mindfulness in 
conceiving ethical problems, which in turn is believed to have a major impact on the ability to 
conceive of ethical problems.  
Despite these claimed influence on moral competence, Pedersen (2009) acknowledges that 
“the role of both a rich moral language and mindfulness in problem formulation must be seen 
within a broader context of development of moral competence”. He concludes that, like most 
tools, “moral language may be used for good and bad purposes alike, and instrumental uses of 
moral language may indeed serve non-moral or even immoral purposes”. Similarly, he asserts 
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that “an open approach to novel problems and ability for divergent thinking are not in 
themselves panaceas for ethical thought and action”. 
 
The discussion along the suggested factors to counteract the (mostly unconscious) moral 
disengagement processes highlights the difficulty in changing System 1 thinking. In order to 
improve ethical decision-making of managers and business students, we must however 
understand not only how they are different with regards to their moral vocabulary, their 
experiences and their mindfulness (hence the individual psychological make-up), but also the 
situational factors which surround them. This paper claims that only a combination 
approaches is necessary in order to understand how moral agents differ in the extent to which 
they are able to conceive of moral features of situations. To elaborate on how moral 
awareness and ethical competence can be promoted, and especially how System 1 thinking 
can be changed, this paper discusses in what follows existing approaches to change System 1 
thinking before suggesting a process view that describes how System 1 thinking can be 
modified. 
 
Figure 4: Strategies to improve moral decision-making (own graph) 
3.3. Framework to change System 1 thinking 
Pedersen‟s (2009) argues that capabilities such as moral language and mindfulness (of which 
it can be claimed that they are also “conscious” in the usual sense of the word since they are 
parts of conscious experience) influence the ability of how individuals unconsciously construe 
(ethical) problems. Based on this perspective, this section further elaborates on the question 
how we can systematically leverage System 1 thinking in order to improve ethical decision-
making.  
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3.3.1. Change of environment 
One strategy for improving biased System 1 judgments focuses on the “environment” and 
“contextual” factors, so that System 1 thinking will lead to “good” results (Milkman, Chugh 
& Bazerman, 2008). Rather than trying to move System 1 thinking “harder” towards more 
conscious principle based System 2 thinking, the change of environment strategy - amongst 
others discussed by Sunstein & Thaler (2003) - suggests that in order to improve biased 
decision-making, we must “leverage our automatic cognitive processes and turn them to our 
advantage”.  
The change of environment approach calls upon designing situations in which choices are 
made to increase the probability that individuals make “wise” (i.e. ethical) decisions and 
construe and solve ethical problems in a rich manner. Several authors have contributed to the 
question what must be changed in order to promote more ethical decision, as for example 
empirical studies on the influence of the presence of a code of conduct on ethical behavior. 
Gino, Ayal & Ariely (2009) highlight the social process component of the change of 
environment perspective by showing that when people observe an in-group member behaving 
dishonestly, they are more likely to engage in dishonesty themselves, but the effect disappears 
when observing an out-group member. Shu, Gino & Bazerman (2011) assert more generally 
that “providing the opportunity to cheat leads to increased moral disengagement” as compared 
to a situation where a control condition does not allow cheating. The authors claim that 
making morality salient not only reduces cheating in these studies, it also keeps individuals‟ 
judgments scrupulous, a claim which was supported by making participants to read an honor 
code prior to a problem-solving task, which led to a reduction in engagement in moral 
disengagement. Ayal & Gino (2011) conclude that when the opportunity costs to act ethically 
are high
25
, a higher share of individuals crosses ethical boundaries and acts unethical, while 
maintaining a positive image of themselves as “ethical” individuals.  
 
A remaining issue of the change of environment approach is, however, that individuals do not 
like to admit that they are susceptible to cognitive biases and therefore feel uncomfortable 
acknowledging their egocentrism and errors in judgment (and hence also in designing 
“favorable” situations), even to themselves, as Milkman, Chugh & Bazerman (2008) 
highlight. Humans put (too) much trust into their intuition (which goes along with the 
                                                 
25
 This perspective resembles strongly to Zsolnai‟s model of the “Moral Economic Man” which will be 
referred to at a later point of this thesis 
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decision aid “listen to your heart”26) since they believe that they are “natural” and impossible 
to be changed. This paper however argues that System 1 intuitions can be changed and that 
part of the solution to reduce cognitive biases depends on the individual to acknowledge 
his/her biases (i.e. recognition of the need for specific training and designing favorable 
environments) and to commit consciously to “improving his/her unconsciousness”.  
3.3.2. Changing the unconscious through conscious experiences 
The argument brought forward in this thesis is that moral competence can be promoted 
through real-live exposure to situations where cognitive biases are challenged – that is 
unconscious processes such as moral disengagement can be counteracted through the (from a 
normative perspective) “right” experiences. This includes conscious engagement in mindful 
diverse theories (as well as by engaging in a diverging learning style), as proposed by 
Pedersen (2009), in order to promote a multi-perspective exploration of problems.  
 
Improving or changing the outcome of System 1 thinking is particularly important for 
decision-making biases that individuals do not like to admit or believe they are susceptible to. 
For instance, as highlighted by Nosek, Greenwald & Banaji (2007), many individuals are 
susceptible to implicit racial biases but feel uncomfortable acknowledging this fact, also to 
themselves. In this context, conscious efforts to “do better” on implicit bias tests are often 
found futile, however not believed to change the intuitive judgment. This paper claims that 
through the “right” conscious experiences it is possible to align our System 1 judgments more 
and more with our conscious normative views. Referring to the racism bias this means that by 
exposing ourselves to situations where the bias is active, and discussing (and writing down) 
consciously, our normative view of these situations and biases can promote unconscious 
“proactiveness”27.  
 
This latter claim is derived from organizational development theory. Organizational theory 
has developed an approach to deal with a company‟s “reactiveness” to ethical challenges and 
unconscious “blindness” to ethical challenges. This paper presents a framework from 
                                                 
26
 The perspective of this paper suggests that one should only listen to his heart if your intuitions are 
aligned with your normative views 
27
 One saying in line with this claim is that stereotyping occurs as a consequence if you know 7 or less 
people “good” enough from a certain group of people (i.e. you don‟t engage deeply enough in conscious 
discussions and experiences with a certain group to change your bias with them). 
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organizational development theory which insights are believed to be helpful to describe the 
process of how the individuals‟ moral System 1 competence can be promoted. The framework 
believed to be useful to deal with the individuals‟ unconscious reactiveness is Egon Zehnder 
International‟s process diagram of phases of organizational capability development. Egon 
Zehnder International (2009) describe different phases of organizational capability 
development of how companies facing sustainability and CSR challenges (such as for 
example a climate change adaptation strategy implementation) can evolve over time from 
being unconsciously reactive to being consciously reactive, consciously proactive before 
reaching the desired state, a unconsciously proactive orientation (Figure 4 and Appendix). 
evolves through three distinct phases between these stages, of which each requires different 
levels of organizational capability to address sustainability-related issues. This paper suggests 
that the same may apply to the individual in becoming more proactive in regards to cognitive 
biases. In order to become unconsciously proactive (in a normative sense), individuals should 
hence (in order to achieve the desired state) engage in conscious proactive behavior to 
improve their unconscious proactive capabilities.  
 
Figure 5: Phases of organizational capability development (Egon Zehnder International, 2009) 
 
In other words, it is claimed that we must commit ourselves to applying the descriptive 
knowledge we possess about how our learning and development in order to promote the 
normative views the world possesses of how much better decision-making can be. 
Consequently, in order to reduce cognitive biases and its consequences (such as amongst 
others bounded ethicality, racism and sexism) we must gather “the right” conscious 
experiences designed based on the descriptive knowledge about human boundedness. Bartsch, 
Cole & Wright (2005) write that by experiencing real situations, we obtain knowledge which 
is activated in a similar, new situation and which can lead to a “new” intuitive reaction. 
This view can be combined with the previous argument based on the concept of the use of 
analogy in a sense that we must commit ourselves to making consciously proactive ethical 
views a “habit”. The work of Moran, Ritov & Bazerman (2008) supports this former idea, as 
they assert that people who are encouraged to see and understand the common moral principle 
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underlying a set of seemingly unrelated tasks generally demonstrate an improved ability to 
discover solutions in a different task that relied on the same underlying principle (in Milkman, 
Chugh & Bazerman, 2008). In other words, instead of making cost benefit analysis a habit, we 
need to consciously commit to making ethical approaches to problem-solving and cognitive 
bias reduction mechanisms a habit. As an example for such an exposure to cognitive biases, a 
community outreach program is discussed in chapter 3.5. 
 
3.4. How to override System 1 thinking? 
It was previously mentioned that one way to promote moral competence is via overriding 
System 1 thinking with conscious System 2 experiences.  
Klein (1998) asserts that most everyday behavior is “intuitive, unproblematic and successful”. 
Kahneman (2002) asserts that in a “fraction of cases”, even though a need to correct the 
intuitive judgments can be identified from a normative point of view, intuitive impressions 
will still be the “anchor for the judgment”. He thereby highlights that we are only aware of 
some biases such as racism and are able to override our intuitions, but not of all. This view is 
also supported by Haidt (2008) who argues that moral situations often invoke intuitive 
judgments of right and wrong, which spring from immediate emotional responses to a given 
predicament. Emotions, as he claims, can lead to ethical failures that people later regret, and 
which according to him can be avoided by increased deliberation and structural thought. 
 
In recent years, several generic strategies to override System 1 thought by more conscious 
System 2 reasoning have been developed. As such it is for example suggested to replace 
intuition with formal analytic processes. Kahneman (2002) argues that the use of linear 
models can help decision makers avoid the pitfalls of many judgment biases (this might be 
especially true for “probability biases”). This suggestion may at the first glance seem opposed 
to earlier claims of this thesis (the one that analytic thinking can shut down mindfulness), 
however highlights the complexity of the vast number of cognitive biases as there are some 
intuitive unconscious judgments which need to be approached more analytically, while the 
opposite is true for others
28
. 
                                                 
28
 This chapter illustrates the duality of both analytical thinking and the use of analogy as all the concepts 
can serve moral and immoral purposes in ethical decision-making. 
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Another strategy to move from System 1 thinking to System 2 reasoning involves taking an 
“outsider‟s perspective”29, understood as trying to remove oneself mentally30 from a specific 
situation (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993 in Kahneman, 2002). This conception is closely related 
to the idea of mindsight and mindfulness as suggested earlier in this paper. Taking an 
outsider‟s perspective has proven to reduce the individuals‟ overconfidence about his/her 
knowledge, as well as the time it would take him/her to complete a task and the odds of 
entrepreneurial success. Instead of (or better additive to) engaging in mindful thinking, 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) suggest to ask a genuine outsider for his or her view regarding a 
decision. This suggestion highlights how closely the concepts of stakeholder management and 
mindfulness in the domain of ethical problem-solving are connected.  
 
Milkman, Chugh & Bazerman (2008) quote research on the power of shifting individuals 
towards System 2 thinking which has shown that simply encouraging individuals to “consider 
the opposite” of whatever decision they are about to make reduces errors in judgment due to 
several “particularly robust decision biases: overconfidence, the hindsight bias, and 
anchoring”. This argumentation highlights that System 1 thinking and System 2 reasoning do 
not happen in a causal sequence, but rather that these two systems are intertwined and that 
later intuitive judgments (as a consequence of considering the opposite) can change, override 
or enforce initial “views” of the individual.  
Finally, Larrick (2004) suggests that System 1 errors in judgment also can be overridden by 
having groups rather than individuals alone make decisions, as well as making people 
accountable for their decisions. This is also supported by Bazerman, Gino, Shu & Tsay 
(2011), who have documented the application of a joint group evaluation as an effective tool 
                                                 
29
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) suggest reference class forecasting as a method to deal with cognitive 
biases. Based on their finding that human judgment is generally optimistic due to overconfidence and 
insufficient consideration of distributional information about outcomes, they argue that individuals tend to 
“underestimate the costs, completion times, and risks of planned actions, whereas they tend to overestimate 
the benefits of those same actions”. They hence claim that these actions are partly caused to the individual 
taking an “inside view”, where focus is the specific planned actions instead of on the statistical actual 
outcomes of similar actions that have already taken place. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) conclude that 
disregard of distributional information is perhaps the major source of error in forecasting. Based on this 
perspective the claim was built that individuals should make “every effort to frame the forecasting problem 
so as to facilitate utilizing all the distributional information that is available”. 
30
 Not in a sense of dehumanization of Bandura but seen from a different yet personal perspective 
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that can help decision makers to manage their emotional assessment of morality in favor of a 
more deliberate and analytical assessment of moral dilemmas
31
. 
 
To conclude, the proposed strategies to promote more “cool-headed” System 2 thinking 
mainly involve changes in how decision are made (e.g. taking an outsiders perspective; to 
consider the opposite or group/individual), which are believed to potentially reduce cognitive 
biases and errors in judgment typically classified as the result of “biases and heuristics” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1979). This indicates recent efforts in the decision-making domain to 
not only think about who should take a decision, but more “how decisions are made”.  
 
Implementation 
[But] cognitive shortcuts can cause problems when we’re not 
aware of them and we apply them inappropriately, leading to 
rash decisions or discriminatory practices (based on, say, 
racism and sexism). Relying on biases but keeping them in 
check requires a delicate balance of self-awareness 
(Psychology Today, 2010). 
 
Although much focus in ethical discussion has in the past been paid to approaches to refine 
conscious moral reasoning skills (i.e. normative moral reasoning) and on frameworks of 
which ethical considerations shall be taken in consideration in conscious ethical reasoning, 
insights from cognitive psychological mechanisms and barriers to sound problem-solving 
such as the numerous biases have been mostly ignored. This paper has suggested that, in order 
to improve ethical decision-making, our cognitive biases have to be reduced, amongst other 
strategies by committing to consciously engage in experiences where these biases are 
challenged (hence applying our descriptive knowledge in order to make ethical considerations 
“automatic”). One pivotal assumption for these strategies to be successful was the claim that 
individuals acknowledge their cognitive bias and the need to reduce them. Brooks (2011) 
argues in this context that a key challenge for ethical decision improvement strategies to be 
successful is that individuals need to possess the “serenity to read the biases and failures in 
their own mind”. So far this need has been it has been considered as given, which is however 
rarely the case.  
 
                                                 
31
 Although then other problems, such as group thinking, could come into play. 
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As previously mentioned, also Haidt (2008) considers it of utmost importance to know our 
moral psychology in more depth in order to understand why - and acknowledge that - 
“everybody thinks he is right”. Building on this, it is argued in this paper that the 
acknowledgment of cognitive biases such as bounded ethicality and the serenity to read them 
is best achieved by knowledge about (and hence teaching of) procedural knowledge of ethical 
decision-making (i.e. descriptive theories of ethical decisions making), including insights 
from cognitive psychology such as our numerous biases. It is argued that being better 
informed about the cognitive biases that influence our thought sensitizes individuals to the 
necessity to engage in moral practice (conscious moral experience) to improve unconscious 
problem-solving processes. 
3.4.1. Teach procedural knowledge 
Through understanding the differences between whom we think 
we are, who we aspire to be, and how an outsider would 
perceive us, we can begin to uncover the biases that cloud our 
self-perceptions, and identify our everyday ethical 
shortcomings relative to our espoused moral standards. 
Bringing this ethical discrepancy into resolution will be the 
first pivotal step towards seeing a positive shift in ethical 
behavior (Shu, Gino & Bazerman, 2011). 
 
One main implication of the presented psychological barriers to sound problem-solving is that 
effective ethics training must lead to ensuring that decision makers do not always take a rash 
decision but that instead interpret and try to understand their intuitive emotive processes as 
well as its errors. The position of this paper is that this can best be achieved by teaching 
procedural knowledge of ethical decision-making (i.e. descriptive approaches to ethical 
decision-making).  
By studying descriptive theories of ethical decision-making individuals learn to better 
understand their „thinking patterns”, i.e. their moral cognitive processes. A series of articles 
(such as Banaji, Bazerman & Chugh, 2005) confirm that descriptive knowledge about ethical 
decision-making contributes to better decisions, asserting that individuals thereby become 
aware of systematic cognitive biases that affect how they process information. Moreover, by 
learning about how the human mind works, individuals can acquire a more systematic 
problem-solving technique for moral conflicts (Seiler, Fischer & Ooi, 2010). 
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Descriptive theories of ethical decision-making teach us to see ourselves and our ethicality 
differently from the still most widespread view of human behavior. This new perspective 
includes the acknowledgment of the inter-subjective nature of ethical problems, our 
sometimes misleading intuition and the cognitive biases of individuals. Descriptive theories 
from the field of social and cognitive psychology help in particular business students to 
understand that ethical problems are better viewed as a social construction of the individual 
and by no means unambiguous. If they realize, for example, the need for a shared 
understanding of the ethical problem, this will most likely also change their view of e.g. 
stakeholder management in business practice. Moreover, acknowledging the tendency for an 
ethical bias in moral judgments not only allows to easier address stakeholders which might 
have been left unaddressed and thereby perceive of the ethical problem from a richer 
perspective, but also to rethink the claim of their moral rectitude and moral objectivity.  
 
The need for teaching procedural knowledge on ethical decision-making becomes also 
obvious by empirical evidence on self-perceptions. Brooks (2011) argues that empirics clearly 
show that we are “overconfidence machines”. According to his studies, 95 percent of 
professors report that they are above average teachers. 96 percent of college students say they 
have above average social skills. Moreover, when Time magazine asked Americans if they are 
in the top one percent of earners, 19 percent of all Americans reported that they believe that 
they are in the top one percent of earners. Moreover, the level of overconfidence is a gender-
linked trait (which again would indicate the strong need to teach procedural knowledge at 
male-dominated business schools). Empirical evidence shows that men drown at twice the 
rate of women, because they think they can “swim across that lake”.  
 
3.5. How to change System 1 thinking - Implications for business education 
The presented perspective has important implications for business education which shall be 
discussed in this chapter. The suggestions made are however by no means exhaustive. Several 
other fruitful strategies on how to improve ethical decision-making may be added. As 
suggested several times throughout this paper, one major implication is that we must not only 
change what we teach (e.g. a stronger focus on descriptive theories of ethical decision-making 
as well as a stop of self-fulfilling immoral theories), but also how we teach ethics at business 
schools (i.e. the learning style, which needs to include more experiential elements): 
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- In order to improve ethical decision-making, individuals must be aware of both normative 
philosophical approaches to ethics (to know how much better his decision-making can 
be), but especially descriptive theories of how the human mind works and how 
individuals actually do make decisions. Recent research in the field of descriptive 
behavioral ethics supported by empirical studies help individuals to acknowledge their 
many cognitive biases and contribute to being more careful about claims of moral 
objectivity and rectitude, thereby perceiving ethical problems from a richer perspective.  
- Business schools must stop teaching immoral theories of human behavior (such as the 
homo oeconomicus model) since they become self-fulfilling and create an illusion of 
objectivity. 
- Particularly in the business domain, we must be careful not to teach too fragmented 
concepts with too high of a focus on causation and accountability of problems so that 
other salient ethical problem dimensions are also perceived of properly. We must be 
careful to not crowd out our moral capabilities to perceive of distinctively ethical 
dimensions of problems. 
- The “change of environment” perspective suggests that we need to try to eliminate 
institutionalized moral disengagement, i.e. to promote an environment in which the 
individual is able to perceive the ethical problem from a richer perspective. This implies 
amongst other things e.g. to cement the use of convoluted language in business practice 
(which by definition is an ethical decision-making context, since everything is grounded 
in an ethic). To the contrary, we must equip individuals with an advanced moral 
vocabulary in order for them to be able to be unconsciously proactive in perceiving of 
ethical problems in a rich manner. 
- We must improve the ability of individuals to perceive situations from different 
perspectives (i.e. the individuals mindfulness), which is strongly influenced by the 
individual‟s ethical decision-making experiences and the awareness of his or her 
experience (extend and support the discourse on ethical problem situations). 
- Moreover, once we have acknowledged our many cognitive biases and learned more 
about out cognitive psychology, we must commit ourselves to putting conscious efforts 
into reducing them by engaging in situation where we are exposed to unconscious 
reactive intuitions (such as e.g. through a community outreach programme). In these 
situations and during these experiences, we must consciously override some of our 
intuition with the ambition to de-bias our unconsciousness. 
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3.5.1. How ethics should be taught in order to change intuitive judgments 
Existing learning style 
It was claimed above that existing learning at business schools is dominated by specialized 
approaches, with a high focus on analytical thinking and financial/technical concepts. This 
focus has also affected the learning/teaching styles of business schools, which are dominated 
by abstract concepts and non-creative approaches to problem-solving.  
One example for this is that in business education, and especially in large corporations, 
information technology is increasingly being used in ethics training. Supporters of this 
approach argue that this makes it possible to “record” the number of students/workers/ staff 
members who have completed an ethics training program, which for companies is important 
when trying to comply with rules regarding training(or more generally legal requirements). 
Further advantages are believed to be cost-effectiveness, timeliness and expediency. 
However, features of computer based ethics training may also limit its value as far as having a 
real effect on people‟s beliefs, perceptions and behavior is concerned. In online ethics 
training, ethics is treated as though it compromises a fixed body of knowledge, which can be 
digitalized and “downloaded” for easy consumption from a distant location, without any real-
life experience connected to it. Moreover, predefined cases of “ethical dilemmas” are 
presented, which generally involve clear “correct” answers and do not allow increasing moral 
awareness of individuals, but rather how to deal with ethical problems ones they are 
constructed (as well as how to construct them). As such, it is unlikely that computer-based 
ethics learning approaches have any meaningful effect on people‟s everyday behavior 
(Painter-Morland, 2008).   
 
Ethical problems are much more complex construct than “pre-defined cases of moral black 
and white” and involve conscious and unconscious judgments. The moral agent himself must 
construct ethical problems. Pedersen (2009) correctly argues that students need to identify and 
formulate their own problems, and this “task of making sense of which features are morally 
significant in any given problem or situation” is a primary issue in ethical problem-solving. 
Building on the presented framework on decision improvement strategies, this paper argues 
that although the development of moral competence may to some extent be promoted by 
consciously employing strategies from a classroom for actively perceiving problems in a 
multitude of perspectives (and for stimulating imaginative formulations of problems), these 
exercises should ideally be connected to “lived” real-life experiences of the individual.  
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Pedersen (2009) suggests that in order to address the “duality” (System 1 and 2 thinking) of 
moral competence, a different learning style is necessary. Ritter (2006) argues that an 
effective implementation of promoting ethical competence involves providing a good learning 
environment with an open atmosphere that includes “experiential and active learning 
components”. Providing creative components as part of the (ethics) curriculum can help 
demonstrating the relevance of applying ethical theories to real-life scenarios, as well as 
increasing transfer from school to work contexts (Ritter, 2006). In support of this, Pettifor, 
Caldow & Rowcliffe (2000) present empirical evidence that suggests that an experiential 
approach may be most effective for students to “learn” ethical decision-making, to increase 
awareness to ethical dimension of problems, as well as to increase self-awareness (Pettifor, 
Caldow & Rowcliffe, 2000).  
 
In order to respond to mounting criticism of the inadequacy of business education, Sims & 
Sauer (1985) proposed the experiential learning model as a theoretical base to design 
management curricula intended to develop managerial competencies in business students 
already in 1985. Sims & Sauer (1985) offer seven core principles, most of which are still 
relevant, that need to be in place if such curricula are to be successfully implemented:  
1. Ability to face new situations and problems 2. Emphasis on both theory and practice 
3. Opportunity to have a direct managerial experience 4. Relevant and reliable assessment 
methods 5. Effective feedback 6. Increase self-knowledge 7. Reflection and integration as a 
key final step in the acquisition of moral competence. 
Pedersen (2009) elaborates in detail on this position and argues for engaging more in the 
diverging learning style of experiential learning theory as conceptualized by Kolb, where the 
individual is feeling and reflecting (which corresponds with the duality of moral thought, in 
the sense that it involves both “hot” and “cold” (i.e. conscious and unconscious) processes). 
Pedersen (2009) bases his argument on findings from experiential learning that show how 
engaging in diverging learning, which is oriented towards imaginative ability and awareness 
of meaning and values (Kolb, 1984), enables the “exploration of ethical problems” (i.e. 
construction).   
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Diversity awareness training programs – de-bias the unconscious 
Based on the developed position, a broad moral vocabulary allowing well formulated ethical 
problems, can be regarded as an important “ingredient” for the promotion of moral 
competence. However, ethical problems can only be perceived of from a richer perspective if 
the (even diverse) moral language employed is not only reduced to definition, but expanded 
by experience. Moreover, this paper claimed that we need to exposed ourselves to situations 
where “unethical” cognitive barriers are at work, and consciously override some of our 
intuitive judgments with normative views (in order to de-bias our unconsciousness). One way 
to actively engage in situations with salient ethical dimensions are community outreach 
programs, as e.g. employed by the American parcel delivery company UPS since 1968. UPS‟s 
Community Internship Program is intended to raise diversity awareness of “high advancement 
potential”- employees through “living the experience” (UPS, 2007).  
 
UPS community outreach programs‟ intention is to touch an emotional chord and unlock “an 
attic in the mind of well-intentioned people” that may only be accessible by “taking the time 
to walk in someone else‟s shoes” (UPS, 2007). Participants in the program are required to 
leave their work for five weeks and travel to a distant community. One year for example, they 
were assigned to either a social service agency, an immigrant border town or an Appalachian 
mountain community. The locations chosen are afflicted with issues such as poverty, 
homelessness, spousal abuse, drugs, crime, and gang warfare (hence all situations in which 
ethical problem dimensions reside), which typically allows assigning managers to unfamiliar 
environments
32
. The program allows students to cultivate the ability for scanning the 
disorderly reality of everyday life in order to identify morally significant dimensions of 
problems. The participants engage in situations in which cognitive biases affect their moral 
thought (as some of them might engage in racist (intuitive) judgments against Appalachian 
mountain community members or stereotype drug abusers etc.). Hence the participants take 
part in situations in which unconscious and conscious reactive
33
 thinking is evoked. This is 
one major reason why the program is believed to be a good example of a program to promote 
moral System 1 competence, as it is argued that in order to appreciate what diversity is about, 
                                                 
32
For example, if they have urban backgrounds, the program operators try to assign them to the rural 
communities. If they are from rural areas, they are sent to a bigger city.  
33
 in a normative sense of the word 
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we have to get out of our “comfort zones” from time to time and to see things from the inside 
looking out by “living the experience”.  
 
Students and managers taking part in a this or a similar program can be required to keep a 
daily log of activities performed and their personal thoughts, promoting their moral 
vocabulary. They should also be encouraged to regularly discuss their experiences with other 
participants (students, social workers and affected people), to promote the discourse on ethical 
problems and to create a better understanding of the need for shared recognition of ethical 
“challenges”. Such discussions promote the individual‟s ability to see problems from very 
different perspectives, and it reminds the individual of his or her experience during the 
program and thereby increases the awareness the experiences. This success of such a program 
is supported by empirics. All these measures contribute to reduce cognitive biases, as 
conscious experiences in overriding unethical System 1 judgments is gathered. Leaving the 
program, most interns were assessed independently as being more aware of some “conditions 
that exist in our society”. They were more sensitive to the reality that e.g. problems like 
homelessness, spousal abuse and drugs could also happen “in their backyard” and affect their 
colleagues (increased reciprocity).  
 
It could be argued that a specialized trainer could have given the participants all the relevant 
information about the projects in a classroom exercise (as it is – to a limited extent – the case 
in present business education). Or, the community outreach interns could have downloaded a 
self-study culture module from the Internet, while never leaving their home or workplace. 
These claims highlight a central point for the promotion of moral competence. Just the 
information (i.e. pure knowledge and vocabulary) itself only limitedly promotes the 
participant‟s diversity awareness, since these “tools” must be expanded by experience.  
 
Such intensive programs as the one presented may however not be “feasible” for business 
students and managers in the existing management and education paradigms due to time and 
money constraints. Mentoring from outside the subject area is another way to gather 
experience in diversity awareness and overriding “unethical” cognitive biases. McCoy (2007) 
for example describes that when he realized the need for a shared recognition of ethical 
problems, he started to acquire a set of “outside mentors” in the real estate business and 
doctors who advised him and supported his business decisions (McCoy, 2007). McCoy argues 
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that - very generally - in order to increase diversity awareness and to decrease cognitive biases 
and psychological barriers such as moral disengagement, one has to “engage in activities - 
whether music, writing, philanthropy, athletics or others”. He asserts that this helps us connect 
with people of different backgrounds and interests than those we know at work, helping us to 
perceive of ethical problems from a richer perspective. This view can also be found in a 
statement by Thronten Wilder, in his novel Theophilus North, who wrote that in order to stay 
attuned to life, “a man should have at least three masculine friends older than himself, three of 
about his own age, and three younger. And he should have three older women friends, three of 
his own age, and three younger.” And that the friends should not be all of the same occupation 
nor have the same interests.  “Such relationships can become signposts in our journey” to 
personal integrity and developing moral competence, with the “younger reminding us of the 
past and the older giving us hope for the future”.   
 
The view that diversity awareness and more “ethical” System 1 judgments are learnable (and 
thus teachable) is supported by van Aerssen. Van Aerssen (2010) argues that diversity 
awareness is best trained through engaging in changes of perspectives. Besides “common” 
techniques such as brainstorming and mind mapping, he mentions several other techniques in 
order to practice taking various perspectives. He argues that the different techniques can be 
categorized into three types: methods to collect “loose” ideas such as brainstorming and mind 
mapping, role-plays such as the Walt-Disney-method or the Six-Hat-Method, and checklists. 
Van Aerssen (2010) argues that in role play, students can develop and act out (i.e. actively 
experience) situations characterized by (ethical) conflict and take on various roles to assume 
different perspectives and involve emotionally and existentially in the problem. Examples of 
such roles could be to be a “dreamer”, “realist” or “critic”. In role-play, participants engage in 
active experimentation, which stimulates reflection. Through the dialogical relationship with 
other roles in such games, the discourse that often exists in “normal” universities between 
different faculties (compared to “specialized” business schools), can be simulated. Role-play 
practice has been conceptualized by, amongst others, de Bono (1985). The de Bono Hats 
system or “Six Thinking Hats” is considered a thinking tool, with the premise of the method 
being that the human brain thinks in a number of distinct ways which can be deliberately 
accessed and hence planned for use in a structured way allowing one to develop different 
strategies for thinking about particular issues. To use six thinking hats to improve the quality 
of decision-making, individuals are asked to look at the decision, ”wearing” each of the 
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thinking hats in turn, where each ”thinking hat” is a different style of thinking. The method 
helps one to understand the full complexity of a decision, and spot issues and opportunities, 
which you might otherwise not notice. De Bono (1985) argues, similar to this paper that 
successful people often think from a very rational analytical viewpoint even in situations in 
which it would be better to “listen to the intuitive judgment”34, and this is part of the reason 
that they are successful. Often, though, they may fail to look at problems from creative 
viewpoints of a different perspective, especially in situations in which cognitive biases bound 
the individuals thinking. 
To conclude, there a several different strategies for disciplined imagination to de-bias our 
cognitive biases increase our diversity awareness that the individual can employ to enhance 
his ability to stimulate more imaginative ways of understanding ethical problems and thereby 
increase the likelihood for more “ethical” behavior. The presented recommendations and 
techniques are by no means exhaustive and other approaches and techniques might be added. 
 
3.6. Limitations 
Discovering a more accurate vision of the unconscious is challenging in different ways. On 
the one hand the unconscious can offer help to override “poorly trained” System 2 thinking, 
e.g. when existing schemata and thinking patterns are based on the rational, homo 
oeconomicus paradigm. On the other hand, the unconscious can also lead to judgment errors 
and bound ethical decision-making, hence work as cognitive barriers to sound judgments 
which - from a normative standpoint - are clearly unethical. The field of cognitive biases and 
behavioral economics, especially System 1 thinking, is still a relatively undiscovered topic 
with a vast potential for further research and thought. The role of the unconscious as both a 
poise and help for decision-making offers a lot of room for more research on this topic.  
Similar to this view of System 1 thinking is the idea that experience and the use of analogy 
can serve good as well as immoral purposes. For an individual who engages in diversity 
awareness programs, but already possesses relatively persistent stereotyping schemes, an e.g. 
too short training might in fact have opposite effect on ethical thought and behavior. 
Moreover, experience that increases the individual‟s tendency to apply cost benefit 
                                                 
34
 Not all cognitive biases are “bad” in a sense of that they lead to unethical outcomes. The same accounts 
for our intuitive judgments. While some intuitive judgments are from a normative perspective required to 
be overridden, emotions such as compassion and empathy can be very helpful to promote ethical behavior 
and should not be moved to more conscious System 2 cost benefit decisions. 
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approaches may stifle the individual‟s ability to conceive of the moral dimension of a 
problem, and thereby lead to more immoral behavior.  
 
The position of this paper is that it takes practice, commitment and discipline to promote 
moral competence, and that not all areas of the multidimensional construct moral competence 
are addressed in existing approaches to teaching ethics. Promoting moral competence can in 
certain ways be compared to learning a language. In fact, it also involves learning a “new” 
language. To master a language, we need not only to study the basic grammar rules and 
vocabulary, but also learn how to express ourselves in different situations and accept the fact 
that sometimes it is more difficult to say what we feel and think than at other times. We 
sometimes are also misunderstood by others. We need to both study consciously and digest 
“unconsciously” our acquired knowledge. We need experience about which words to use in 
certain situations and which not. We must learn that there are several ways to describe the 
“same thing”. Lastly, we must constantly cultivate and practice a language. While some 
people are more “gifted” than others to learn a new language / acquire moral competence (e.g. 
to identify and understand claims of some stakeholders), others are more challenged with 
taking a reciprocal perspectives or thinking in different roles. The perspective of this paper is 
that personal background and family values, as well as childhood experiences play an 
important role in the formation of personal values and the acquisition of moral competence
35
, 
but are not deterministic.  
 
Discovering ethical problems is a never-ending journey, or as Pedersen (2009) writes “an 
ever-changing arena that is created, negotiated and evolved inter-subjectively by the actors 
and agents involved”. For corporations that means, as Pedersen (2009) asserts, that they must 
always (re)formulate (moral) problems. This has a profound impact on management as a hole. 
As he conclusively points out, the developed systems which aim for individuals to manage 
problems need to be dynamic rather than routinized. Successful organizations change their 
view on what behavior is appropriate over time. Cultures and ethical standards must therefore 
be modified and tested against new developments and the changing behavior of competitors 
and society at large. Successful organizations also acknowledge the fact that there is a need 
                                                 
35
In this context it is worth noting that the role of a rich moral vocabulary that is expanded by experience of 
the individual and the ability to see problems from multiple perspectives are not panaceas for more ethical 
behavior, but must be seen in a broader context of ethical development (Pederson, 2009). 
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for a joint view of ethical problems, as the ethical domain is not as easy to narrow down as 
e.g. financial and analytical data.  
 
Finally, as highlighted earlier in this thesis, ethical problems don‟t necessarily have a right 
answer. Most often, there is no textbook response to ethical situations as opposed to pure 
financial ones. Nor is it always clear when System 1 and 2 judgments are unethical. The 
problem, however, is that often it is assumed that ethical problems do not exist in finance 
other analytic settings, as they are assumed to only reside in softer fields such as human 
resource management and marketing. By ignoring salient moral dimensions of problems or 
following System 1 judgments blind, students and managers sometimes make decisions, 
which are against their conscious ethical values and unintentionally unethical.  
The fact that salient moral dimensions of problems are often crowded out indicates that good 
ethical decisions may take longer time than commonly given by corporations, where the need 
to act fast in lights of competitiveness is generally emphasized. Information overload, 
especially of clearly measurable analytical data contributes to the individual to put his or her 
moral faculties “on hold”. We clearly need to fundamentally rethink the way we train people 
and corporations for success (Brooks, 2011). Our tendency to value the things we can 
measure more than complex human traits such as character, cognitive biases and morality 
clearly increases insensitivity to moral domains.  
Finally, this paper argued that in order to improve ethical decision-making, individuals shall 
consciously and continuously commit to de-bias their “unethical” cognitive shortfalls. This 
paper has for simplification taken a black and white view of cognitive biases, which is not 
reflecting decision-making reality. To the opposite, ethical problems and awareness of them 
are much more ambiguous and grayish than assumed in this paper.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
RQ1: How do “traditional” descriptive theories of moral cognitive development as well as related research 
which builds on this approach explain (un)ethical behavior and what are the main underlying assumptions of 
(the theoretical base of) this paradigm? 
Kohlberg‟s and Rest‟s cognitive moral developmental approach establishes the rationalist 
position that moral judgment is reached as a causal consequence of conscious, language-based 
cognitive awareness processes, which allow to be explicitly ranked based on the extent to 
which judgments on pre-defined cases can be considered as “advanced” or “developed”. 
Although smaller efforts are taken to include situational and contextual factors in decision-
making models (such as e.g. by Treviño, 1986 or Jones, 1991), most additional research is 
dominated by objectivist models which consider e.g. the step when the individual becomes 
aware of a moral issues as the “recognition of moral reality”, and thereby moral blindness as a 
pure individual-level phenomenon. Unethical behavior is thus claimed to be the responsibility 
of unethical “bad apples” with immature moral development. 
As the bad-apple approach is however not able to account for a huge part of ethical failures, 
this paper chooses a descriptive view of human behavior and thought to investigate further on 
the topic, in distinction to economists‟ traditional normative view on ethical decision-making. 
 
RQ2: What are  barriers to “sound” ethical awareness and judgments that lead to cognitive biases, and what 
are their implications on the theoretical base of the moral cognitive development theory, and hence the 
understanding of the entire ethical decision-making process? 
The second part of this paper argues that the role of rational thought aka Kantian typology to 
the point of excluding other relevant cognitive processes such as intuition and emotions, as 
well as the impact of the problem environment on ethical thought, to be insufficiently 
accounted by approaches building on Rest and Kohlberg‟s theoretical base. Besides 
emotional/intuitive influences, this paper highlights the importance of motivational influences 
of individuals on ethical thinking. It illustrates that in addition to emotions and intuitions 
which strongly affect the “wisdom” of decisions, there are several other systematic “failures” 
in ethical thought. Consequently, unethical behavior is found to not necessarily have to be due 
to underdeveloped (conscious) principle-based reasoning skills nor bad intensions, as 
individuals engage in anticipative (and mainly unconscious) psychological mechanisms such 
as moral disengagement, which cause that humans often do not “sense” the moral significance 
of a situation at hand. After the discussion of concepts such as bounded ethicality and other 
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cognitive biases, it is argued that individuals are not only unconsciously “blinded” to a rich 
perception of ethical problems
36
, but often also consciously apply self-serving interpretation 
of problems to avoid conflicts of interest while maintaining a positive view of their own 
ethicality. This paper sees human beings not only as much “nicer” than suggested by the 
existing homo oeconomicus paradigm, but also much “weaker” (in their ability to make 
rational, unbiased decisions) than classical theory predicts. The position of this paper 
therewith detaches itself from the “bad apples” approach, claiming that despite advanced 
moral reasoning skills and best intentions, people can nevertheless can fail to act ethical as 
responsible individuals due our “moral psychology” (i.e. certain cognitive barriers to sound 
ethical problem-solving). 
 
RQ3: In light of the barriers to “sound” ethical decision-making due to the individual’s boundedness, how can 
moral competence of future managers be improved through “moral” business education? 
The third part of this paper addressed the question how moral competence of future managers 
can be improved based on the insights from the earlier developed view of ethical problem-
solving. It is argued that a descriptive behavioral approach relying on insights from 
(cognitive) psychology is a necessary complement to more traditional prescriptive normative 
approaches to business ethics teaching. This builds on a central claim of this paper - the need 
to learn about, acknowledge and continuously de-bias our cognitive shortfalls. This is in line 
with Shu, Gino & Bazerman‟s (2011) position that in order to improve ethical decision-
making, we need to “cast our rose-tinted self-perceptions aside in favor of a truthful look at 
behavior - ethical vulnerabilities and all”.  
This paper argues that our System 1 cognitive biases can be reduced (aligned with conscious 
normative views) through experience in situations where “barriers” to sound ethical decision-
making are at work. In other words, it is suggested that in order to improve our “unethical” 
System 1 thinking, we must commit ourselves to apply the descriptive knowledge we possess 
about when our human mind works wrong (i.e. is bounded) in order to promote the normative 
views the world possesses of how much better decision-making can be.  
                                                 
36
Based on the work of Pedersen (2009), a subjectivist/objectivist position of moral problems is presented. 
The cognitive processes when the individuals perceive of and solve ethical problems are argued to be to a 
major extent unconscious and strongly dependent on the moral vocabulary, experience and ability to 
investigate problems from a multi-perspective of the individual. 
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The findings of this paper indicate that our System 1 thinking is much more decisive for 
ethical decision-making than commonly thought. But despite from being “right” in every 
instance, our intuitive unconscious processes also bound decision-making through 
psychological processes such as moral disengagement and can even lead to unethical behavior 
with full awareness which is in contradiction to our own conscious normative views. 
Evaluating which judgments need to be corrected or overridden is an act of balancing both 
requiring knowledge about our moral psychology (descriptive ethical theories including 
cognitive biases) as well as normative views to ethical decision making. 
Nowadays, empirical evidence and descriptions of cognitive biases exist in abundance. And 
while cognitive biases are not necessarily an issue of “honesty”, they have major implications 
for the trustworthiness of decision-making and managers. The training and de-biasing of our 
unconscious mind is believed to be a major challenge to improve ethical decision-making. We 
need to more deeply understand System 1 thinking and develop more strategies on how to 
change and improve it. This paper calls for more research on strategies for improving ethical 
problem-solving. 
 
“Finally, although this book is complete, the journey is not 
over, either for me not for you, the reader. We are always 
growing [and becoming] and dealing in new contexts. A 
specific gripe of mine about “business ethics” is the complaint 
that graduate students are too old to learn ethics - that their 
values have been embedded long ago” (McCoy, 2007).  
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